For a long time, memories of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement remained scattered, failing to converge into a single, unified meaning. The new book, "Memories of Two Gunshots, Tears of Two Gwangjus," brings together two documents that lie at the heart of these complex memories into a single volume.

Part 1 contains the original text of the "Report on the Truth of the Gwangju Incident," compiled by a joint government investigation team led by Major General Lee Gwang-ro.

In 1980, President Choi Kyu-hah ordered General Lee Gwang-ro to investigate the full scope of the Gwangju incident. General Lee formed an investigation team and surveyed 18 regions, including Gwangju, Mokpo, and Naju, over seven days from June 5 to June 11, 1980.

“The list of those to be held accountable, uncovered by General Lee Gwang-ro, was clear: Combat Education & Training Commander Yoon Heung-jung, 31st Division Commander Jeong Ung, and Jeonnam Provincial Police Agency Chief Ahn Byung-ha. From the perspective of the report, these individuals were at the center of command responsibility, erroneous operational directives, failed initial police responses, and command vacuums. Furthermore, certain police commanders were held responsible for desertion, loss of weapons, abandonment of equipment, and concealment of arms. However, the recommendations were not implemented. Although the responsibility was laid out on paper, it could not cross the threshold of reality.” - From the Preface

What if President Choi Kyu-hah had punished these individuals according to the joint investigation team’s recommendations? Perhaps Gwangju would not have remained such a subject of intense controversy for so long.

Part 2 features translated and compiled declassified CIA documents, including: the CIA Situation Reports from May 24 and 27, 1980; the NIC Warning Agenda from June 1980; an analysis of anti-Chun Doo-hwan forces from 1983; a report on the rise of anti-American incidents in 1985; an analysis of the radicalization of the South Korean dissident movement in 1987; and a document on the prospects for South Korea after the 1988 Olympics.

These documents demonstrate that U.S. intelligence agencies viewed Gwangju not merely as a regional disturbance, but in connection with the legitimacy of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the political role of the South Korean military, the spread of anti-American sentiment, the potential for North Korean propaganda and provocations, and the long-term burdens on U.S.-ROK relations.

The CIA documents provide a perspective different from that of domestic reports surrounding Gwangju. While the Lee Gwang-ro investigation report focused on on-site surveys and internal accountability of public power, the CIA documents analyze how South Korean politics would sway after Gwangju, how the theory of U.S. responsibility and anti-Americanism would spread, and how North Korea might attempt to exploit the chaos in the South, all within a long-term security framework.

"Memories of Two Gunshots, Tears of Two Gwangjus" does not simply repeat one side of the memory. It presents the original texts, translations, casualty statistics, status of weapon losses, lists of those to be held accountable, and CIA intelligence assessments together, leaving the final judgment to the reader. If the debate surrounding the memory of Gwangju is still ongoing, this book serves as a record that simultaneously provides the primary materials that should serve as the starting point for that debate and the external perspectives of foreign intelligence agencies.