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[Special Feature - Disenfranchisement National Investigation ②] The Full Picture of the June 3rd Election Management the National Investigation Must Uncover
  • Kim Young
  • June 21, 2026 at 7:48 AM
기사수정
  • From the decision to lower it from 60% to 50% to the additional supply of 140 locations nationwide
  • The entire management record of unnumbered ballots, sealing, transport, and receipt must be verified.
  • The final question is, "Who decided and how many people couldn't vote?"

[Photo Credit: Korea-US Daily Graphic]

Table of Contents

① A National Investigation Without Eyewitness Testimony is like a 'Red Bean Bun Without the Red Bean Filling'

② The Full Picture of the June 3rd Election Management that the National Investigation Must Uncover

③ Constitutional Amendment is a Long-Term Task; The Treason Trial Act Should Be Applied

 

The National Election Commission's Truth Finding Committee concluded that the election management of the June 3rd local elections was a "total failure."

 

According to the self-investigation results released by the Election Commission on the 19th, additional ballot papers were sent to 140 out of 14,288 polling stations nationwide, actually used at 91 stations, and voting was temporarily suspended at 26 stations. There was a shortage of 7,194 ballot papers, and the suspension time ranged from a minimum of 4 minutes to a maximum of 105 minutes.

 

However, this is not the conclusion of the national investigation, but its starting point. It is necessary to go beyond the figures confirmed by the Election Commission's self-investigation to reveal who made such decisions, what happened at the scene, and consequently, how many voters were disenfranchised.

 

Who Reduced the 60% to 50%?

 

The first agenda item is the decision-making process for lowering the minimum printing standard for ballot papers from the previous 60% to 50%.

 

According to reports based on data submitted by the Election Commission to the National Assembly, this standard change was processed through internal approval by the Secretary-General and the Director of Election Policy, without an official meeting of the Central Committee in December 2025. While the intention was to reduce leftover ballot papers and prevent unnecessary suspicion, guidelines for responding to ballot paper shortages were not properly prepared.

 

The Special Committee for National Investigation must identify who first proposed the 50% figure and its statistical basis. It also needs to confirm whether analyses were conducted on the voter turnout rates for early voting and regular voting by region, the proportion of the elderly population, and the fluctuations in voter turnout by election.

 

It is also important to understand why the printing standard, which can affect citizens' voting rights, was processed through internal approval by the secretariat rather than the Central Committee. If Chairman Noh Tae-hak did not receive the report, it means the reporting system collapsed. If he received the report and did not take action, the responsibility for management remains.

 

The Whereabouts of Unnumbered Ballots and Serial Numbers

 

The second agenda item concerns the continuity of management from the printing of ballot papers to their use and collection.

 

In Songpa District, reserve ballots without numbers, which should have been prepared according to regulations, were not distributed sufficiently. After a shortage occurred, staff hastily wrote serial numbers and sent them to the field. It was also reported that due to the urgency of the situation, some ballots were sent without serial numbers being written, leading to confusion as numbers were handwritten at the scene.

 

The Special Committee for National Investigation must link all additional ballot papers to their printed quantity, serial number, custodian, dispatch time, transporter, vehicle, recipient, quantity used, remaining quantity, and return status.

 

While it is not necessary to use the term "chain of custody" as used in criminal evidence management, the principle that the record of the entire process, including who received and transferred how many sheets when, must be continuous and unbroken is the same.

 

If ballots were brought from other polling stations, it must be matched to how many were from which station and what the remaining quantity was at that station. Ballot boxes must also have their sealing time and seal number, transporter, accompanying observer, vehicle route, and receipt and opening times at the counting station confirmed.

 

An election is not a process where trust is secured simply by the final numbers matching. The entire process, from the moment the ballots are produced until the results are confirmed, must be recorded.

 

Why Did the Communication Network, Checked Three Times, Stop?

 

The third agenda item concerns the early voting communication network and voter authentication devices.

 

A whistleblower, who identified himself as a current Election Commission employee, claimed to have witnessed an incident at an early voting site where a communication equipment failure occurred, leading to the use of Wi-Fi to connect and operate voter authentication terminals.

 

While these are not yet confirmed facts, given the claims of specific locations and the existence of internal KakaoTalk records, this is a matter that the national investigation must verify.

 

The Special Committee must obtain records of the time of wired network failure and its cause, the type of wireless access equipment, the person who initiated the connection, connection logs between the voter authentication terminal and the server, and remote access records from the maintenance company.

 

It must be determined through technical appraisal whether general Wi-Fi was used or if field staff referred to a separate wireless communication device managed by the Election Commission as Wi-Fi. This is not a matter of choosing between the Election Commission's explanation or the whistleblower's claims beforehand. Connection logs and equipment should provide the answers.

 

Regarding the voter authentication devices, for which hundreds of millions of won were spent to replace just before the general election, the purpose of adoption, performance tests, on-site inspections, and any failure records on election day must all be confirmed. If confusion occurred in voter authentication and communication despite replacing the equipment, the responsibility for procurement and inspection must also be investigated.

 

Was It Appropriate to Proceed with Counting While Voting Was Extended?

 

At polling station #2 in Jamsil 7-dong, voting was extended until 10 p.m. for voters who received waiting tickets due to a shortage of ballot papers. At the same time, counting and counting broadcasts were taking place in other areas.

 

While this cannot be immediately concluded as illegal, it is necessary to examine how the fact that some voters continued to cast their ballots while counting results were being released in real-time could have affected the fairness of the election and the voting process.

 

It is necessary to confirm who decided to extend the voting period and consulted with the National Election Commission, on what basis voting eligibility was granted to the remaining voters, whether the fact that counting was in progress was communicated to the field, and how the late-arriving ballot boxes were sorted and stored.

 

In particular, if counting began while voting was still ongoing, the voting end time, the counting start time, and the ballot box receipt and opening times must be matched to the minute.

 

Are There Only 12 Actual Victims?

 

The Election Commission's investigation confirmed that 12 voters who received waiting tickets at polling station #2 in Jamsil 7-dong did not vote. However, this number does not represent the full scale of disenfranchisement.

 

It is difficult to confirm solely from existing records the number of people who left the line after being told there were no ballot papers, those who went home without waiting for a long time, those who did not receive waiting tickets, and those who did not know that voting had resumed.

 

Therefore, a comprehensive comparison must be made of the number of voters by time at the 26 polling stations where voting was suspended, the integrated voter roll confirmation records, waiting ticket issuance and return records, CCTV footage, and records of complaints and reports. If necessary, fact-finding surveys should be conducted on voters in the relevant areas.

 

The Questions This National Investigation Must Answer Are Not Complicated.

 

> Who reduced the number of ballot papers?

> Who knew about the risk of shortage and neglected it?

> What irregularities and illegalities occurred at the scene?

> As a result, how many citizens were unable to vote?

 

While issues of the Election Commission's discipline, such as overseas trips or evasive leaves of absence, can also be investigated, bringing these issues to the forefront could blur the direct line of responsibility for the disenfranchisement incident.

 

First, the decisions and actions on election day, the movement and management of ballots and ballot boxes, and the actual extent of the damage must be determined. That is the essence of the national investigation.




What to Check from the Storage of Early Voting Ballot Boxes to the Counting Process

 

The verification of the ballot counting should not begin when the ballot boxes arrive at the counting station. It must start by checking how the ballot boxes and return envelopes were handed over, stored, and transported after early voting concluded. If the records do not connect the period from the end of early voting to the counting, it is difficult to assess the appropriateness of management based solely on the final counting figures.


 ① Sealing and Handover of In-District Early Voting Ballot Boxes

 

After in-district early voting ends, the ballot box slot and lock are sealed in the presence of early voting observers, and the early voting management officer and observers sign the seals before handing them over to the district/city/county Election Commission.

 

The Special Committee for National Investigation must verify the following data.

 

* Time of early voting end

* Time of ballot box sealing

* Seal number and signatories

* Time of departure from polling station and arrival at Election Commission

* Transporter and vehicle number

* Accompanying observers and police officers

* Original handover/receipt form

* Sealing status at departure and arrival

 

In particular, it is necessary to confirm whether the transportation route changed or if there were unplanned stops during the movement from the polling station to the Election Commission's storage location, using vehicle operation records and video data.

 

② Handover of Return Envelopes for Out-of-District Early Voting

 

The procedure for out-of-district early voting differs from that for in-district early voting. After early voting ends, the ballot box is opened in the presence of observers, the number of return envelopes is counted, and then handed over to the postal service for registered mail delivery.

 

The items to be checked are as follows:

 

* Number of out-of-district early voters on the integrated voter roll

* Number of return envelopes from the ballot box

* Quantity handed over to the post office

* Time of registered mail dispatch and tracking number

* Observer accompanying to the post office

* Final quantity received by the Election Commission for the respective constituency

* Number of returned, delayed, or undelivered envelopes

* Number of return envelopes actually opened during counting

 

The following figures must be compared by constituency.

 

> Number of out-of-district early voters

> = Number of return envelopes handed over to the post office

> = Quantity received by the constituency Election Commission

> = Number of return envelopes for counting

 

If there are discrepancies, it must be clarified at which stage and for what reason the quantities changed.

 

③ Storage Process at the Election Commission

 

When receiving in-district early voting ballot boxes, the district/city/county Election Commission must confirm the sealing status in the presence of party-appointed committee members and store them properly.

 

The Special Committee for National Investigation must check the following.

 

* Condition of the seal upon receipt of the ballot box

* Participation of party-appointed committee members

* Storage location and period

* List of authorized personnel for access to the storage room

* Records of door opening/closing and access

* Records of seal inspection during storage

* Original CCTV footage of the storage location and any blind spots, if available

* Occurrence of power outages, equipment failures, or access control anomalies

* Final confirmation record before transport to the counting station

 

Early voting ballot boxes are stored for a certain period until the regular voting day. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm not only that the seals at the time of initial sealing and arrival at the counting station are the same, but also who had access to the storage area during the interim storage period and who actually entered.

 

④ Transportation from Storage to Counting Station

 

On the day of counting, the early voting ballot boxes are transported again from the Election Commission's storage facility to the counting station. This second transportation process must also be verified with separate handover/receipt records.

 

* Departure time from storage location

* Person who confirmed seals before departure

* Transport vehicle and driver

* Accompanying Election Commission members, observers, and police

* Route and arrival time

* Recipient at the counting station

* Seal numbers at departure and arrival

* Receipt log for ballot boxes at the counting station

 

The first transportation from the early voting station to the Election Commission and the second transportation from the Election Commission to the counting station should not be bundled together. The responsible persons and records for each segment must be checked separately.

 

⑤ Receipt at Counting Station and Seal Verification

 

At the counting station, it is necessary to confirm which early voting station's ballot box arrived and at what time, and then open the box after examining the seal in the presence of counting observers.

 

If the seal is damaged or the signature/number does not match, photographs, objections, and committee decisions and their outcomes must be retained.

 

⑥ Comparison of Early Voter Numbers and Ballot Paper Counts

 

After opening the ballot boxes, the number of ballot papers from the boxes must be compared with the number of early voters.

 

For in-district early voting, the following figures are checked.

 

> Number of in-district early voters on the integrated voter roll

> = Number of ballot papers from the ballot box

> = Valid votes + Invalid votes

 

For out-of-district early voting, the number of received return envelopes, the number of envelopes excluded from opening, and the actual number of ballot papers must be compared separately.

 

⑦ Sorting, Examination, and Tallying, and Announcement of Results

 

The input quantity of the ballot sorting machine, the quantity sorted by candidate, and the number of unsorted and re-sorted ballots must be checked, and the process of judging unsorted and questionable invalid ballots must also be recorded.

 

The results must be announced after examination and tallying, verification by Election Commission members, and signing/stamping of the counting status report. The time of electronic data entry, the time of official announcement, and any revisions to the counting status report must also be checked.

 

The key questions that this national investigation must address regarding the early voting and counting process are as follows:

 

* Were the in-district early voting ballot boxes sealed and normally handed over?

* Who accessed the storage location during the storage period?

* Do the out-of-district early voting return envelope counts match at each stage?

* Are there records of transportation from the storage location to the counting station?

* Did the seals at the time of arrival at the counting station match the original seals?

* Do the number of early voters and the actual number of ballot papers match precisely?

 

Counting verification that excludes the storage and transportation of early voting ballot boxes is only half complete. The national investigation must not only observe the opening of ballot boxes but also connect and verify the entire process from the moment early voting ends until the ballot boxes are opened at the counting station.


 

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