Identity verification device installed at a prior voting station. [Photo=Yonhap News] 

The First Gateway to Guaranteeing Voting Rights Has Been Breached

The core issue of the prior voting identity verification controversy is not the performance of the equipment. The key lies in the potential for failed identity verification to infringe upon a voter's right to vote. 

If a vote is processed using someone else's ID, and the actual ID holder arrives at the polling station later to find they have already been recorded as having voted, this is not a simple on-site error. 

This is an incident where the substantive opportunity to vote, which the state must guarantee to its citizens, has been preemptively exhausted by the actions of another. 

The starting point of an election is not the vote count, but identity verification. 

If a person presenting an ID at the entrance of a polling station cannot be verified as the actual eligible voter, then the subsequent procedures of issuing ballots, marking votes, and depositing them into the ballot box all become unstable. 

Identity verification is the crucial first step to ensure that each person votes only once, that votes cannot be cast in another person's name, and that actual voters can cast their ballots directly according to their own will. 

Therefore, this controversy is not about whether the device has a fingerprint recognition function. If the identity verification process failed to prevent voting with another person's ID, the question is: what has the election commission been using for identity verification until now? This question is at the heart of the issue. 

The Flaws in the Identity Verification Process Revealed by the Daegu Case

The prior voting case in Daegu starkly illustrated this flaw. 

A voter presented their cousin's ID and completed their vote. When the actual ID holder arrived at the polling station later, they were already recorded in the system as having voted. 

The election commission explained that they later rectified the situation to ensure the actual voter's rights. However, the fundamental issue is not the post-hoc correction. The question is why the initial identity verification process failed to detect the vote cast with another person's ID. 

Furthermore, in this case, there was a fingerprint scanning process, but the fingerprint did not confirm the person's identity. Despite submitting a fingerprint, the identity was not verified. The ID scanning procedure also failed to distinguish between the ID holder and the actual voter. 

Ultimately, the identity verification that operated on-site was not by machine, but by visual inspection by human staff. 

This incident exposed the weakest link in the prior voting system. 

Prior voting offers the convenience of voting anywhere in the country. However, the ability to vote anywhere also means that accurate identity verification must be conducted everywhere. 

The greater the convenience, the stricter the identity verification mechanisms should be. Yet, the reality was the opposite. 

The Principles of Universal, Equal, and Direct Elections Are Also Undermined

Failure in identity verification is a problem of infringing upon the right to vote. 

According to the Constitution, elections are based on the principles of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. If a vote is processed using someone else's ID, and the actual holder arrives later to find they have already been recorded as having voted, this first undermines the principle of universal suffrage. 

Every citizen eligible to vote must be able to cast a ballot. If one's voting right is preemptively exhausted by the actions of another, the substantive opportunity to vote guaranteed by the state is infringed. 

The principle of equal suffrage is also shaken. 

Electoral equality is not merely a matter of distributing one ballot per person but includes substantive equality, where one person's vote is counted as having only one vote's value. If it is possible to vote in another person's name, some people could effectively vote twice, while others would have their single vote taken away. This undermines the principle of one person, one vote, and the equality of voting value. 

The possibility of infringing the principle of direct election is even more evident. 

Direct election means that voters must cast their votes directly according to their own will. The moment a vote is processed using another person's ID, that ballot does not represent the direct expression of the ID holder's will. If the identity verification process fails to prevent this, the election management system has failed at the first gateway of direct election. 

The relationship with the principle of secret suffrage cannot be overlooked. 

The essence of secret suffrage is ensuring that it cannot be externally known to whom a person voted. While voting with another person's ID does not immediately imply the disclosure of the cast vote, when identity verification and the record of voting status are compromised, the trust in who voted, who could not vote, and whose name a vote was processed under collapses. The reliability of a secure voting environment and electoral procedures, which secret suffrage presupposes, is inevitably damaged as well. 

Thus, the failure of identity verification leads to issues concerning the constitutional principles of elections. 

Therefore, the simple question to consider now is: what exactly did the device that the election commission calls an "identity verification device" actually verify? 

Fingerprints are Scanned, But Not Used for Identity Verification

At prior voting stations, voters present their ID and then place their finger on the so-called "identity verification device" to scan their fingerprint. Seeing this, most citizens assume that the machine compares the fingerprint with the information on the ID to confirm their identity. 

However, the actual mechanism is different. The fingerprint scanning at prior voting stations is not a biometric authentication process that compares with resident registration fingerprint data. It is closer to a record-keeping procedure to confirm that a ballot has been received. 

According to the Public Official Election Act, prior voters must present proof of identification to confirm their identity, then electronically stamp their fingerprint or sign, and then receive their ballot. 

Even from the wording of the law, the fingerprint or signature is a procedure that takes place *after* identity verification. It is not for identity verification itself, but to confirm the receipt of the ballot. 

The election commission has also previously explained that the fingerprint stamp at prior voting stations was not for confirming identity using biometric information, but rather to record the fact that the elector had received a ballot. 

While the act of voters scanning their fingerprints may appear to be a symbolic gesture of identity verification, it does not actually function as identity verification. 

The procedure that the public understood as identity verification and the procedure that the election commission actually operated were different. This gap is the very origin of distrust. 

Is it an "Identity Verification Device" or an "ID Information Recognition Device"?

The very name "identity verification device" is problematic. 

Contrary to its name, the operational identity verification device is not a fingerprint authentication equipment. Nor can it be considered a device that captures an ID photo and computationally compares it with the face of the person at the polling station. 

Its known function is limited to reading the text information on the ID and connecting it to the lookup of the integrated voter roster and the ballot issuance process. In essence, this device is closer to an ID information reader or an ID scanner than an identity verification device. 

Reading the information written on an ID, such as name, date of birth, and resident registration number, is a completely different function from computationally comparing the person in the ID photo with the face of the person at the polling station. 

The former is for information input to query the roster, while the latter is a procedure to verify the actual identity. If the identity verification device does not perform the latter function, actual identity verification is still left to the visual judgment of the poll worker. 

The fact that the election commission scans ID information does not mean it constitutes identity verification. 

Verifying whether the information on an ID exists in the voter roster is a separate issue from verifying whether the person presenting the ID is the actual holder of that ID. 

The Daegu case precisely illustrates this distinction. The name existed in the roster, but it was not verified whether the person at the polling station was the actual holder of that name. 

The Reality of Fingerprint Scanning Unknown to the Media and National Assembly

The news reports on the Daegu case themselves show how widely this issue was not understood. 

The headline "Identity Not Verified Even with Fingerprint Scan" is not just a simple case title. It reflects that the public and the media had perceived the fingerprint scanning process at prior voting stations as functioning for identity verification. 

If the fact that fingerprint scanning was not for identity verification from the outset had been sufficiently shared socially, such a headline would have been difficult to construct. 

The problem becomes more serious if the actual function of this device was not sufficiently shared even during National Assembly questioning and budget review processes. If the National Assembly, which is supposed to monitor the electoral system and review budgets, misunderstood the reality of the identity verification device, then the introduction of equipment costing tens of billions of won and the operation of the prior voting system have been packaged under the single label of "identity verification device." 

The public believed that identity was verified because fingerprints were scanned. 

The National Assembly accepted the name "identity verification device" as is. The media only addressed the point that fingerprint scanning was not biometric authentication after an actual incident occurred. 

The problem is not a reporter's misunderstanding. The problem lies in the system and the naming convention that made such misunderstandings possible. 

Identity Verification Based on Resident Registration, Left to Visual Inspection

The election commission has explained that direct linkage with the Ministry of the Interior and Safety's resident registration network is technically difficult. However, this explanation also needs careful scrutiny. 

Connecting the Ministry of the Interior and Safety's resident registration fingerprint network directly to terminals at all prior voting stations for real-time comparison of all voters' fingerprints is a matter requiring legal and security review. Fingerprints, once leaked, are biometric information that cannot be changed like a password. 

However, this does not mean that there are no ways to strengthen identity verification. 

Moreover, the voter roster itself is already compiled based on resident registration data. The heads of districts, cities, and counties compile the voter roster by investigating eligible voters registered in their jurisdiction, and a copy of the electronic data is sent to the relevant election commission. 

The Minister of the Interior and Safety can also process and provide necessary information, such as resident registration numbers, to support the compilation of the voter roster. The election commission is already utilizing resident registration-based information in the stage of creating and operating the roster of eligible voters. 

So, the question becomes simple. 

While the voter roster is compiled based on resident registration information received, why was a verification system based on resident registration not established at the stage of verifying whether the person presenting an ID at the polling station is the actual holder of that ID? 

This is not a problem of technical impossibility but a problem of system design. What the election commission should have stated is not "linking is difficult," but "because linking is difficult, what alternative verification system has been established?" 

The Contradiction Between "Un-hackable" and "Difficult to Link"

Furthermore, the election commission has strongly refuted the possibility of hacking its election management network. Explanations that manipulating election results is impossible have also been repeatedly given. 

If so, the logic that even a one-time verification token method is difficult to consider due to security risks is inconsistent. 

If the election commission's network is so secure that it is un-hackable, then a method of allowing limited verification of a voter's identity on election day, with the Ministry of the Interior and Safety holding the original data, should also be considered. 

Conversely, if even such a method is risky, then the existing claim that the election commission's network is un-hackable must be re-examined. The criteria should not differ when the election commission says "the network is secure" and when it says "linking for identity verification is risky." 

If claiming security, that security must be applied to strengthening identity verification. If claiming risk, that risk must be honestly explained for the entire election management network. 

This is not an argument for the election commission to permanently copy and hold resident registration fingerprint data. Rather, such a method requires caution from the perspective of biometric information protection. 

There are several possible methods. 

> A method where the Ministry of the Interior and Safety holds the original data and the election commission only receives a confirmation of match/mismatch. 

> A method using an encrypted, one-time verification token that is then immediately discarded. 

> A method combining mobile ID QR verification with resident registration card authenticity checks. 

> A method of automatically flagging manual entry cases for audit. 

> A method of implementing a two-person verification process for cases involving family members with similar appearances or addresses. 

The Issue is Not the Introduction of Fingerprints, But the Absence of Alternative Verification

The problem is not that fingerprints must be introduced. 

The problem is calling a device that does not verify identity by fingerprint an "identity verification device," and leaving the actual identity verification to the visual comparison by on-site staff. 

If a fingerprint scanning device is named "identity verification device," but its actual function is limited to recognizing ID text information and looking up the voter roster, misunderstandings are inevitable. 

What the election commission should have clearly explained to the public and the National Assembly was: fingerprint scanning is not identity verification. Identity verification is visual comparison of the ID photo and the face. The device only supports the recognition of ID information, lookup of the voter roster, and the ballot issuance process. 

However, if this explanation was not sufficiently provided, the term "identity verification device" becomes a misleading expression that gave false confidence to the public. 

Prior voting was introduced to increase convenience. 

However, convenience cannot replace trust. 

If a system allows voting anywhere in the country, it must also have mechanisms in place to prevent voting in someone else's name anywhere in the country. 

It is unconvincing to state that resident registration-based verification is difficult at the identity verification stage while the voter roster itself is created based on resident registration information. 

Questions the Election Commission Must Answer

Technical difficulties are not an excuse, but the starting point for an obligation to improve. 

> If direct linkage with the Ministry of the Interior and Safety's network is difficult, has the one-time token method been considered? 

> Has a method of verifying only the match without using the original fingerprint data been considered? 

> Mobile ID QR verification, resident registration card authenticity check, 

> Manual entry audit logs, 

> Has a two-person verification procedure been established? 

If the election commission cannot answer these questions, its explanations will be mere excuses to cover up the inadequacy of identity verification, rather than technical explanations. 

The reliability of an election is not only shattered at the counting station. It can be shaken at the entrance of the polling station, at the very first step of presenting an ID and undergoing identity verification. 

If identity is not verified even after a fingerprint is scanned, it is not an identity verification device. Trust cannot be demanded from the public with a device whose name differs from its actual function. 

An identity verification device that failed to prevent voting with another person's ID is not simply a flawed piece of equipment. It is a device that has breached the first gateway to guaranteeing the right to vote. 

If the election commission knew about this structure and allowed it to persist, it is a grave failure of election management that undermines the principles of universal, equal, and direct elections and shakes the procedural trust that secret suffrage presupposes. 

The election commission must publicly disclose the actual functions and limitations of prior voting identity verification devices. If fingerprint scanning is not identity verification, it must be stated as such. 

If the identity verification device is merely an ID information recognition device, its name must be corrected first. And most importantly, alternative verification systems to prevent voting with another person's ID must be immediately established. 

Failure in identity verification is not a device problem, but a problem of infringing upon the right to vote.