The Lee Jae-myung administration faces a triple threat. Plunging approval ratings, judicial risks, and pressure from allies are fueling rumors of an exodus among high-ranking officials. [Photo=Hanmi Ilbo Graphic]The Lee Jae-myung administration is standing before a triple wave: public sentiment, the judiciary, and the alliance. Outside the government, support is crumbling; inside, the lines of accountability are wavering; and within the sphere of the alliance, pressure from the U.S. for a strategic realignment is intensifying. 

Following the local elections, the government's approval rating has plummeted, while high-ranking officials have been handed heavy sentences in cases involving insurrection and abuse of power. Compounded by U.S. moves to reassess its Korean Peninsula policy, concerns are rising that the burden within the seat of power is growing early in the administration's term.

A Warning from Public Sentiment: The KSOI Dead Cross

The shift in public sentiment is clearly reflected in the trends from the Korea Society Opinion Institute (KSOI). Positive assessment of Lee Jae-myung's state governance fell from 63.4% in the second week of April to 50.4% in the second week of June, and slid further to 47.7% in the survey conducted from June 22–23. 

In the same survey, the negative assessment reached 48.2%, surpassing the positive rating within the margin of error. Even looking at the data from a single polling agency, positive ratings have dropped by 15.7 percentage points in just over two months. 

What matters is not just the numbers, but the direction. The KSOI trend shows that public sentiment after the local elections has moved beyond a simple adjustment phase, heading toward a breach of the 50% threshold and a "dead cross." 

The first warning light has turned on for a governance style that relied heavily on high early-term approval ratings. When public sentiment wavers, the bureaucracy reassesses the sustainability of power. This is why talk of an exodus of high-ranking officials is not being dismissed as mere rumor.

A Warning from the Judiciary: Heavy Sentences for Abuse of Power

The second wave is the judiciary. The message from recent trials involving insurrection and abuse of power is clear: the fact that an action was directed by the President is no longer a shield for high-ranking officials. 

The courtroom reality is that if ministers and military commanders utilize their authority while carrying out presidential directives, that exercise of power can result in criminal liability for abuse of office and the undermining of the constitutional order.

In relation to the so-called Pyongyang drone infiltration incident, former President Yoon Suk-yeol and former Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun were each sentenced to 30 years in prison, while former Defense Security Support Commander Yeo In-hyung received a 15-year sentence. The charges included aiding the enemy and abuse of power by obstructing the exercise of rights. 

Subsequently, former Minister of Justice Park Sung-jae was also sentenced to 25 years in prison in his first trial for charges including participation in insurrection and abuse of power, and was taken into court custody.

This judicial trend sends a strong signal to current high-ranking officials. In the past, "the President's will" or "directives from above" acted as a shield against political responsibility. However, recent trials have centered on how individuals exercised their own authority, even when following presidential orders, as the core of criminal liability. 

This inevitably fuels a sense of crisis that going along with the administration’s unreasonable policy pushes could lead to criminal, not just political, consequences.

The speculation regarding Minister of Justice Jung Sung-ho’s desire to return to the National Assembly is difficult to view separately from this judicial environment. 

Reports suggest Minister Jung has recently expressed to those around him a desire to step down as minister and return to the National Assembly, with Lee Jae-myung’s side reportedly attempting to dissuade him. 

While his resignation has not been made official, it is plausible to interpret that the burden of issues—such as prosecutorial reform, controversies over manipulated indictments and withdrawal of charges, and the heavy sentencing of his predecessor—is weighing heavily on the Ministry of Justice.

Cracks in the chain of policy responsibility are also being detected. In the Ministry of Health and Welfare, First Vice Minister Lee Seul-ran was replaced on May 15, before completing a year in office. Former Vice Minister Lee is a prominent pension policy expert who served as head of the National Pension Finance Division, the National Pension Policy Division, and the Pension Policy Bureau. 

Thirteen days after her replacement, on May 28, the National Pension Fund Management Committee significantly increased the target proportion for domestic stocks for 2026 from 14.9% to 20.8%. The committee cited the improvement of long-term profitability and stability, as well as the mitigation of market impact from rebalancing, as reasons for the change.

Of course, one cannot definitively conclude that changes to pension management policy were the direct cause of Lee Seul-ran's replacement. Chronologically, the replacement came first, and the committee’s decision followed. 

However, the fact that the domestic stock target was drastically raised immediately after a pension expert official stepped down is the crux of the controversy. The market interpreted this as a measure to mitigate shocks to the stock market by reducing the pressure on the National Pension Service (NPS) to sell domestic stocks. 

This is why questions are being raised about whether the NPS is an independent fund managing the retirement savings of its subscribers or a tool for government market stabilization.

A Warning from the Alliance: The Void at the G7 Dinner

The third wave is the alliance. Recently, the U.S. has been treating Korean Peninsula policy not merely as a matter of managing North Korea, but as a broader agenda for alliance realignment that encompasses nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear fuel sovereignty, wartime operational control (OPCON), shipbuilding cooperation, and the issue of the Chinese Communist Party’s influence within South Korea. 

U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Alison Hooker led an interagency delegation to South Korea from June 1 to 3. It has also been reported that in discussions regarding the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, the U.S. Congress has required an assessment of the impact that the Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence within South Korea has on U.S. security and defense interests.

The dinner conversation between Lee Jae-myung and U.S. President Trump, as explained by the Lee administration at the G7 summit, is also difficult to view as a simple social encounter. Most of the currently disclosed details are based on the Lee administration’s account. 

The Lee side explained that the two leaders discussed the ROK-U.S. alliance, Korean Peninsula issues, and Middle Eastern affairs during the official dinner, and that President Trump asked whether 10 U.S. warships could be built quickly.

However, exactly what demands or concerns President Trump himself conveyed at the dinner has not yet been publicly verified.

Among multiple diplomatic and security sources, the possibility is being raised that the message Trump delivered to Lee at the G7 dinner may have been more specific than what the Presidential Office announced. 

What is clear is that the essence of Trumpian diplomacy is closer to transaction than protocol. If he directly brought up issues such as defense costs, OPCON, warship construction, containment of China, and the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in South Korea, the G7 dinner may have been a trailer for a readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than a friendly chat.

It is too early to conclude that an exodus of high-ranking officials has materialized. However, the plummeting approval rating is pressure from public sentiment, the heavy sentencing for insurrection and abuse of power is judicial pressure on the bureaucracy, and the U.S.’s reassessment of Korean Peninsula policy is external pressure at the alliance level. 

A crisis of power usually manifests first in approval ratings, and cracks in the lines of accountability are revealed through personnel changes and rumors of departure. 

What the Lee Jae-myung administration faces now is not just a decline in opinion poll figures. Amid the triple wave of public sentiment, the judiciary, and the alliance, it is the first true test of whether the internal power structure can handle the weight of its responsibilities.