Guest Columnist. ROK Army Academy Class of '84

The National Policy Planning Committee has finalized the plan to transfer the wartime operational control (hereinafter referred to as 'wartime control') of the Marine Corps' 1st and 2nd Divisions from the Army to the Marine Corps. The current administration and the Democratic Party's decision to first finalize the transfer of wartime control for the Marine Corps' 1st and 2nd Divisions from the Army to the Marine Corps (hereinafter referred to as 'Marine Corps wartime control recovery') in order to forcibly recover it within their term appears to be the starting signal for a full-fledged recovery of wartime control. 

This is a hasty decision that causes over a hundred problems for the sake of one advantage, which is to enhance the Marine Corps' specificity, morale, and autonomy. Therefore, we must examine its background, as it raises concerns about shaking the command relationship and operational efficiency of the ROK-US alliance, which is the foundation of the national defense system. 

The hasty recovery of wartime control is not a simple matter of organizational adjustment, but an act that disregards the 'conditions-based transition of operational control' (COTP) principle agreed upon by the ROK and the US. It is a dangerous speed race that weakens the ROK-US combined defense system under the guise of 'self-reliant defense' and encourages the possibility of US Forces Korea withdrawal. It is a security regression that benefits China and North Korea and poses an 'security vacuum,' thus requiring reconsideration. 

1. Recovery of wartime control damages the ROK-US alliance due to a lack of understanding of the alliance. 

Some are misleading the public into believing that the recovery of wartime control is a 'process of regaining sovereignty by breaking free from US subordination.' However, this is a misunderstanding stemming from a lack of deep comprehension of the essence of wartime control. The current ROK-US Combined Forces Command structure is a combined structure where generals from both the ROK and the US serve as commander and deputy commander, respectively, and operate jointly. In a wartime situation, the Combined Forces Command commander (US Forces) must consult and agree with the deputy commander (ROK Forces) before issuing orders to ROK forces. This is not a simple relationship of subordination, but a mutually rational decision-making body based on close consultation and agreement between the ROK and the US. 

Rushing the recovery of wartime control while ignoring and disregarding this rational cooperative command relationship appears to stem from a deep lack of understanding of the ROK-US alliance. The ROK-US alliance is a blood alliance that shared blood in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. It is a security community based on deep trust and historical experience, distinct from other alliances formed by mutual defense treaties and even from the relationships among NATO member states. The ROK-US alliance is not a unilateral relationship of subordination, but a strategic cooperative relationship that jointly responds to common threats and promotes mutual interests, and it is a shared security asset of the ROK and the US. 

Ignoring the practical value of the ROK-US alliance, which has contributed to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the economic development of the Republic of Korea for over 70 years, and denigrating the essence of the alliance solely based on ideological standards is a severe logical contradiction and an anti-national act. 

2. 'Marine Corps wartime control recovery' undermines combined operational efficiency and command system consistency. 

If the core forces for the defense of the Seoul metropolitan area and amphibious operations are given their own independent command systems, it could lead to severe confusion in the organic operational deployment and integrated operations at the theater (a very wide area where war occurs) level. 

The core of modern warfare is Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), where all combat power is connected in a single network to share information in real-time, grasp the situation at a glance, and cooperate organically. If the Marine Corps and the Army adhere to separate tactical doctrines and operational procedures, the command, control, and communication systems will be separated, weakening efficient information sharing and joint operational capabilities, and causing confusion during actual operations. 

Historically, command centralization has been a key factor in winning wars. During World War II, the German army was able to fight simultaneously on the Eastern and Western fronts due to this secret, and in the 'Desert Storm' operation of the 1991 Gulf War, the US military achieved overwhelming victory by integrating available forces from each branch under a single command. 

These examples clearly show that integrated command systems, rather than military independence, determine victory in modern warfare. However, the transfer of the Marine Corps' command system is not simply aimed at integration, but will undermine centralized integration and decentralized autonomy, making operational success more difficult. 

3. Opposition to security regression hidden behind the pretext of 'self-reliant defense.' 

The decision to transfer the wartime control of the Marine Corps' 1st and 2nd Divisions from the Army to the Marine Corps ('Marine Corps wartime control recovery') is a political consideration that disregards military efficiency. It appears to be an ignorant decision made out of ignorance of the subtle dynamics of the ROK-US alliance or due to being rushed by something. The separation of core Marine Corps forces from the command system will lead to numerous fatal problems such as reduced operational efficiency, confusion in combined operations, and damage to ROK-US alliance interoperability. Therefore, the decision for 'Marine Corps wartime control recovery' must be reconsidered and rescinded. 

True self-reliant defense lies not in separating from and damaging the ROK-US alliance, but in strengthening national defense capabilities by maximizing synergy with the alliance. The issue of 'Marine Corps wartime control recovery' appears to be a decision swayed by political objectives, and therefore, we urge the military to carefully reconsider it from an objective perspective of military efficiency, jointness, and combined operational capability.