Guest Editorial Writer. 40th Class of the Korea Military Academy 

In his address for the 80th anniversary of National Liberation Day, President Lee Jae-myung announced a commitment to the preemptive restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement and declared that his administration would not pursue any form of absorption unification, expressing hope for a reciprocal response from the North. Some critics have characterized this preemptive restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement as "begging for peace," a "declaration of surrender," and an act of "voluntary disarmament." While the Lee Jae-myung administration’s North Korea policy aims to project a gesture of peace intended to ease military tensions, reduce public security anxieties, and seek dialogue with North Korea, it is, in reality, deepening concerns over a security vacuum. 

The preemptive restoration of North Korea policies and the dismantling of loudspeakers amount to a self-destructive act—severing our own limbs and blinding ourselves—to build trust with a tangible enemy, thereby encouraging the ruin of the nation. With President Lee Jae-myung’s upcoming visit to the United States, warnings from the American media about a "crisis of Korean democracy" and a "test for the alliance" suggest that the South Korea-U.S. relationship has also reached a critical juncture. 

1. Do you still believe that North Korea will change if we "help" them? 

Recently, Kim Yo-jong shut down any discussion regarding the removal of anti-South loudspeakers, stating firmly, "We have neither removed them nor do we have any intention to do so," while criticizing the current administration's claims of a "partial removal by the North" as "baseless speculation." In reality, loudspeakers can still be observed next to North Korean guard posts near the border in Paju from our own military observation posts. 

The South Korean government has conducted investigations into the human rights situation in North Korea in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act enacted in 2016, and had produced annual reports on North Korean human rights since 2018 during the Moon Jae-in administration. However, it is reported that they are considering not issuing a report this year. This appears to be a clear example of extreme pandering to the North Korean regime. It is also piece of evidence supporting the assessment that the Lee Jae-myung administration is even more pro-North Korea than the Moon Jae-in administration. 

It is time to analyze the effectiveness of the peace and reconciliation policies that have operated under the belief that North Korea will change if we help them. The fantasy that the enemy will change if we offer aid is a dangerous form of self-consolation that ignores the strategic intentions of the opponent; in fact, it may lead to us being ensnared in North Korea’s long-term strategy and tactics against the South. If North Korea does not reciprocate our goodwill, the policy inevitably degenerates into "unilateral concessions" and loses its justification for sustainability as it fails to gain public consensus. The justification was lost long ago, yet the source of this contradiction, which persists stubbornly like a ghost from the past, remains inexplicable.  

2. Is aid to North Korea pouring water into a bottomless pit? Or is it eroding our security awareness?

The initial aid to North Korea was driven by a pure humanitarian concern for the survival of North Korean residents. In 1995, the South Korean government provided 150,000 tons of rice to address the North’s severe food crisis, and in 1999, provided 155,000 tons of fertilizer. Following these initial humanitarian efforts by private organizations such as the Korean Red Cross, inter-Korean economic cooperation began to expand in earnest in the 2000s under the "Sunshine Policy" of the Kim Dae-jung administration. 

In 2000 and 2002, aid was provided through food loans, and starting in 2002, 300,000 tons of fertilizer were provided annually. In particular, the Kaesong Industrial Complex project facilitated a massive influx of funds into North Korea—totaling 1.019 trillion won (616 billion won in cash)—and suspicions have consistently been raised that portions of these funds were diverted toward nuclear and missile development.

During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, average annual aid ranged from 300 to 400 billion won, while government-level aid was significantly reduced during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations due to strained inter-Korean relations following the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. As international sanctions, including those from the UN Security Council, intensified, most exchanges, with the exception of humanitarian aid, were halted.

While the Moon Jae-in administration’s actual support—including $8 million provided through international organizations and grain management special accounts—was significantly lower than that of the Roh Moo-hyun era, suspicions were raised regarding attempts to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea. Furthermore, the construction of North Korean military facilities on Hwambakdo, an island located near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), sparked a controversy over jurisdiction. Beyond these, if one considers the countless instances of unofficial, "under-the-table" aid, and the numerous spies working on behalf of the North Korean regime—as evidenced by the KCTU espionage case—aid to North Korea appears more geared toward communization than human rights. 

3. Peace comes from a balance of power, not unilateral goodwill.

Under the banner of "preemptive peace," the Lee Jae-myung administration reached out to North Korea first, but Kim Yo-jong’s firm rejection regarding the loudspeakers and North Korea’s continued provocations clearly demonstrate that their true intentions have not changed. Despite some politicians offering goodwill even at the risk of violating UN sanctions, North Korea has not seen these as signals for cooperation but has instead consistently obstructed progress. One cannot help but suspect that they are making even greater demands by exploiting the critical weaknesses of these politicians.  

History repeatedly proves the dangerous consequences of the simple belief that "they will change if we help them." True peace is not achieved through naive expectations or unilateral concessions. It is only possible on the foundation of a robust balance of power, grounded in the principles of reciprocity. Soft gestures, such as the restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement, dismantle public vigilance and the combat spirit of our soldiers, leading to an internal security vacuum and resulting in "voluntary disarmament" that weakens our military's deterrent capabilities. Public concern over a security vacuum is by no means an exaggeration. 

The Lee Jae-myung administration must immediately stop this "dangerous experiment" that gambles with the lives and safety of its citizens. True security leadership does not come from romantic expectations of an uncertain future, but from the wise courage to pursue a firm and realistic security strategy based on the principle of "denuclearization first." 

If we shout for peace while losing our deterrent and control capabilities, that peace is nothing more than a mirage that can shatter at any moment. It is time to accept the cold reality of "peace through strength," implement irreversible security measures for the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and approach the upcoming summit with that firm resolve.