On the 21st, Han Byung-do, acting leader and floor leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, and Choo Kyung-ho, floor leader of the People Power Party, pose for photos after signing an agreement on a special counsel bill regarding the ballot paper shortage during the National Election Commission (NEC) oversight at the National Assembly steering committee office. From left: Kim Seung-soo, Senior Deputy Floor Leader of the People Power Party; Floor Leader Choo; Acting Leader Han; and Cheon Jun-ho, Senior Deputy Floor Leader of the Democratic Party of Korea. 2026.7.21 [Photo = Yonhap News]The Democratic Party of Korea and the People Power Party have agreed to process a special counsel bill for the National Election Commission to investigate the ballot paper shortage that occurred during the 9th National Simultaneous Local Elections within the July extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

If viewed solely from the perspective of reaching a consensus on the introduction of a special counsel, this is a result of politics in action. However, when the agreement is placed side-by-side with the original parliamentary investigation plan, it becomes clear why it is difficult to praise this as simple bipartisan cooperation.

The terms "infringement of citizens' suffrage" and "election management reform," which were central to the parliamentary investigation stage, have vanished from the title of the special counsel bill. Instead, the incident has been defined as a "poor election management crisis." While a more powerful tool—a special counsel with mandatory investigative authority—is being introduced, the scope of what is to be investigated has actually been narrowed.

The six members of the "Citizen Recommendation Committee" tasked with vetting special counsel candidates will be appointed by the ruling and opposition parties, three each. The parties will jointly decide on two candidates to present to the President, who will then appoint one of them.

In this context, the responsibility of the ruling and opposition parties is not direct administrative accountability for the printing and supply of ballots. Rather, it is the political and institutional responsibility to oversee the NEC, refine the electoral system, and prevent recurring management failures. The structure is such that the very political forces who are not free from this responsibility are defining the name and scope of the investigation, and even narrowing down the list of special counsel candidates.

The public is now asking whether this agreement is a genuine attempt to uncover the truth or a scaled-down collusion where political factions have divided the scope of the truth and the initiative over the special counsel.

From 'Infringement of Suffrage' to 'Poor Management'

The official name of the Special Committee for Parliamentary Investigation formed by the National Assembly last June was the "Special Committee on Truth-Finding and Election Management Reform regarding the Infringement of Citizens' Suffrage due to the Ballot Paper Shortage Crisis during the 9th National Simultaneous Local Elections."

At the time, the National Assembly defined the ballot shortage and the suspension of voting not as simple administrative errors, but as an issue where the constitutional right to vote had been infringed upon. The purpose of reforming the election management system and organization was also included in the title.

However, the title of the special counsel bill agreed upon by the ruling and opposition parties is the "Act on the Appointment, etc., of a Special Counsel to Uncover the Truth behind the Poor Election Management Crisis, such as the Ballot Paper Shortage during the 9th National Simultaneous Local Elections."

'Infringement of citizens' suffrage' has been replaced by 'poor election management,' and 'election management reform' has been omitted. This is not merely a shortening of phrases.

'Infringement of suffrage' is a constitutional expression that asks whether there were citizens who were effectively unable to vote and how the suspension and delay of voting impacted the right to vote and the fairness of the election. Conversely, 'poor election management' is an expression that views the incident within the category of administrative incompetence, negligence, and operational errors.

Furthermore, the bill uses the term 'poor election management crisis' rather than 'suspicions of poor management.' This can be read as having already reached a judgment that poor management occurred, tasking the special counsel only with confirming the causes and the degree of responsibility. Deliberate dereliction of duty, organized cover-ups, post-incident data tampering, and the impact on election results and public trust have been pushed outside the scope of the title.

While the name of a bill does not necessarily determine the entirety of an investigation's scope, if the final provisions broadly include issues of intent, organized nature, cover-up suspicions, and infringement of suffrage, it could overcome the limitations of the title.

However, the title of a law reveals the legislative intent and the National Assembly’s fundamental perception of the incident. The ruling and opposition parties, who pushed for constitutional rights and structural reform during the parliamentary investigation, must explain why they have downgraded this to an issue of administrative failure at the special counsel stage. It is difficult to avoid criticism that while the investigative tools have been strengthened, the object of the investigation has been weakened.

Those Responsible are Designing the Gateway to the Special Counsel

Direct administrative responsibility for election management lies with the National Election Commission, an independent constitutional body that does not take orders from the President or political parties. That said, the ruling and opposition parties are not free from political and institutional responsibility.

The National Assembly enacts election-related laws, reviews the NEC's budget and systems, and checks the NEC through parliamentary audits and investigations. Political parties are also direct stakeholders, as they nominate candidates and gain power through election results.

It is questionable whether it is appropriate for such parties to erase 'infringement of citizens' suffrage' from the special counsel bill, negotiate the scope of the investigation, and retain the initiative in selecting special counsel candidates. In effect, the political forces who are subject to accountability are the ones designing the entry point for the special counsel.

A 'Citizen Recommendation Committee' without Citizens

According to the agreement, the two major negotiating groups will each appoint three members to the Citizen Recommendation Committee. Once the Korean Bar Association and the Law School Association each recommend three special counsel candidates, the committee will jointly decide on two candidates from the six to present to the President.

There is no procedure for citizens to elect committee members or recommend candidates. While external legal organizations form the initial pool, the final gate remains in the hands of the political sphere. Practically speaking, it is closer to a "joint ruling-opposition recommendation committee."

Of course, the National Assembly is a representative body of the people. Therefore, to live up to the name "Citizen Recommendation Committee," it must disclose the list of members, selection criteria, candidate evaluation standards, the process behind any failed consensus, and the reasons for supporting or opposing each candidate.

It should also be possible to verify whether the committee members are acting as proxies for political parties or making independent judgments. If meeting minutes and voting results are kept confidential and only the final candidates are announced, the public will have no way of knowing which candidates were excluded and why.

Using the name of the people while hiding the processes and responsibilities reduces the title to mere political window dressing.

Mutual Veto or Mutual Delay?

This agreement grants both parties the power to veto candidates favored by the other side. In terms of preventing either side from monopolizing the special counsel, it could serve as a mechanism for neutrality.

However, if the Citizen Recommendation Committee fails to reach a consensus on two candidates, a list to present to the President will never be created. Even if new candidates are recommended, the deadlock will simply repeat if the parties cannot reach an agreement.

Who, then, takes responsibility when the launch of the special counsel is delayed?

The ruling party can blame the opposition for obstructionism, and the opposition can accuse the ruling party of shielding their side. If the structure allows for the exercise of a veto without accountability for the resulting delays, the timing of the special counsel's launch will inevitably be swayed by political calculations.

The final bill must specify deadlines for completing recommendations, the number of times recommendations can be resubmitted, and alternative procedures in case of a failure to reach a consensus. The list of committee members and the meeting process should also be made public so the public can judge which side blocked an agreement and for what reasons.

When Does the President Enter the Line of Accountability?

It is difficult to conclude that the President is directly in the administrative line of accountability for the ballot paper shortage, as the NEC is an independent agency not under the President's command.

However, the moment the President selects one person out of multiple candidates, they enter a new line of political accountability. Choosing one person out of two, rather than simply issuing an appointment certificate to a predetermined individual, involves judgment and discretion.

The President must take political responsibility for the independence and fairness of the special counsel they choose. Even if issues of poor investigation or bias arise, the President cannot retreat behind the excuse that "the ruling and opposition parties recommended them." The President bears the responsibility to explain to the public why they chose one candidate and why the other was excluded.

Conversely, if the President's role is merely formal, the ruling and opposition parties must explain why they require the President to choose between two candidates. Mere reliance on the precedents of past special counsels does not automatically guarantee the legitimacy of this appointment method. Precedents can serve as a basis for procedure, but they do not exempt one from responsibility.

Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Agreeing on Appointment Structure Before Investigation Scope

Although the ruling and opposition parties agreed on the special counsel recommendation structure and the principle of processing the bill during the July extraordinary session, they postponed negotiations on the scope of the investigation, the duration, and the size of the investigation team.

The order is reversed. What matters to the public is not who can veto a special counsel candidate, but what will be investigated, to what extent, and whose responsibility will be brought to light.

The investigation must cover the prediction of ballot demand and the determination of print quantities, the reports and directives from the NEC leadership, the suspension of voting and the supply of additional ballots, the transport of ballot boxes, and the process of data preservation and submission. Suspicions of downsizing, cover-ups, perjury, and evidence tampering following the incident must also be verified.

Most importantly, the issues of infringement of citizens' suffrage and election management reform, which were to be investigated during the parliamentary inquiry, must be maintained in the special counsel investigation. However, the ruling and opposition parties have left the substance of the investigation empty, lowered the bill's name to "poor management," and focused on dividing up the power to veto candidates.

Agreement or Collusion?

Politics is about negotiation, and legislation requires compromise. One cannot simply dismiss the Democratic Party’s acceptance of the special counsel or the People Power Party’s concession on their demand for sole opposition recommendation as mere collusion.

However, for this compromise to be recognized as an agreement for the sake of the people, the final bill must answer four questions.

Why were "infringement of citizens' suffrage" and "election management reform" deleted from the title of the special counsel bill? Why are the ruling and opposition parties, who are not free from the responsibility for NEC oversight and reform, appointing all the members of the Citizen Recommendation Committee? Who takes responsibility when the special counsel is delayed due to a failure to reach an agreement? What is the reason for the President choosing the final candidate, and what responsibility follows that choice?

The final bill must include the authority to broadly investigate the infringement of suffrage, sufficient time and personnel, and the obligation to submit materials and preserve evidence. There must also be established deadlines for candidate recommendations, alternative procedures, and a principle of transparency regarding the recommendation process.

Conversely, if the parties confirm a structure that deletes "infringement of suffrage," leaves only "poor management," divides up the veto power, and gives the President the final choice, it will be hard to avoid criticism that this is a scaled-down collusion designed to lower the starting line for the investigation and allow parties to shift the responsibility for delays onto each other.

The owner of the special counsel is neither the ruling/opposition parties nor the President. It is the public, whose right to vote may have been infringed. If it is a recommendation committee bearing the name of the people, the process and the responsibilities must be made transparent to the public.

If the ruling and opposition parties delay an agreement, they must reveal who blocked which candidate and why; if the President chooses the final candidate, they must take responsibility for the reasoning and the results. Even if the political sphere holds the key to the special counsel, the public must be able to verify for whom that door is being opened.