Guest Editorial Writer. KMA 40th Class 

The end of the Russia-Ukraine war (hereinafter the "Russo-Ukrainian War") signifies more than just the conclusion of a regional conflict. It will serve as a decisive turning point for the full-scale restructuring of the new international order in the 21st century. In particular, as the United States seeks an exit strategy for this war, its true strategic objectives are becoming clear. One can glimpse Trump's intention to reduce energy expenditure in other regions and focus on intensifying the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China. 

1. Is Trump’s Strategy to Pivot Russia Toward the Free World? Or to Break the North Korea-China-Russia Link? 

The core of U.S. foreign policy cannot be interpreted solely through "America First." The vast military, economic, and diplomatic resources poured into Ukraine will now be directed elsewhere. This is based not merely on war fatigue, but on the strategic assessment that Russia is no longer the "top-tier threat" to the United States. 

Through the war in Ukraine, Russia has exposed its military limitations, and due to Western sanctions, it has become economically isolated, deepening its dependence on China. In fact, Russia's exports to China exceeded $100 billion in 2023, accounting for over one-third of its total exports. For reference, China recorded a record-high trade surplus of approximately $990 billion in 2024. 

In this context, the U.S. may choose a partnership strategy through direct persuasion and negotiation to prevent Russia from remaining under China's sphere of influence. It is presumed that Putin, who could be pushed into a political corner by a prolonged war, will have no choice but to follow U.S. containment strategies. This is part of a long-term plan to separate Putin's Russia—which carries political vulnerabilities—from China in order to check China's rise. 

Rumors of Xi Jinping's downfall cannot be officially confirmed, as they involve complex factors including China's power structure, economic situation, and foreign relations. Some experts view these rumors as a tactical ploy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself to escape the pressure of containment. 

The U.S. appears to have judged that Xi’s CCP has lost some of its strength. The U.S. seems to be adopting a focused strategy to conserve energy previously spent on Ukraine, aiming to pressure the CCP in high-tech sectors such as semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, and 5G, while solidifying its military superiority in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The strategy concerning the U.S. and the CCP remains ambiguous, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.  

 2. Is the End of the ‘Russo-Ukrainian War’ a Gain or a Crisis for Us? 

If Trump's pressure to end the "Russo-Ukrainian War" is part of a strategic framework to check China, the U.S. will likely demand greater roles from its allies under the logic of "burden sharing." This will manifest in negotiations over the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. South Korea faces an increasingly complex dilemma, as its economy is deeply tied to China while its security depends on the United States. The longer the current government delays a proactive realignment of its front, the more exponentially national interest losses are expected to grow. 

The North Korean issue will likely become a lever in this U.S.-China competition. The U.S. will likely use North Korea as a card to check China, either by persuading Kim Jong-un behind the scenes or by leveraging Pyongyang's desire to distance itself from Beijing. Meanwhile, China will persistently intervene in Korean Peninsula issues to expand its own influence. In this process, the Korean Peninsula will be placed in a dual position as either a "strategic buffer zone" or a "frontline of conflicting interests," depending on the strategic calculations of the two superpowers. The consensus within the U.S. political establishment remains a desire to maintain and strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance at all costs. 

3. Overcoming Crisis through Multidimensional Military Readiness and Proactive Diplomacy

In this era of upheaval, our direction and strategy are clear. We must move beyond a passive stance, dragged by pro-China or pro-North Korea political interests, and strengthen our autonomous and proactive diplomatic capabilities.

First, we must expand the existing ROK-U.S. alliance beyond the military dimension into a comprehensive value-based alliance covering economy, technology, and culture, thereby securing the diversity and multi-layered nature of our current alliance. 

Second, we must diversify our relations with neighboring countries and broaden our diplomatic horizon by strengthening ties with nations that share similar values, such as Japan and European countries. Though it is a position that may draw criticism, we should also cautiously review a "ROK-Japan alliance."

Third, rather than trying to resolve the North Korean issue solely through dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas, we must make multidimensional efforts in solidarity with the West and the UN Command. We need a conditional offer strategy—stating, "This is what we will do if North Korea abandons its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction programs"—rather than "begging for peace" by restoring the September 19 Military Agreement and dismantling anti-North Korea broadcast equipment. Hasn't the experience with past left-wing administrations' North Korea policies proven that secretly providing aid while undermining our own security, in the hope that North Korea will change, is reckless, ineffective, and could even backfire? 

The end of the "Russo-Ukrainian War" will force us to face the reality of a new international order. We must not perceive this massive turning point solely as a crisis, but as an opportunity for the Republic of Korea to establish itself as a strategic actor contributing to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. 

If Trump succeeds in bringing Russia into the free world, we could anticipate free unification and the recovery of lost territory. However, if the war ends without weakening the North Korea-China-Russia alliance, Xi Jinping may attack Taiwan to restore his political status, and the CCP might induce local provocations by North Korea to prevent U.S.-ROK assets from being deployed to Taiwan. Since war is a "lose-and-die" game, a consolidated North Korea-China-Russia alliance will likely employ even the most brutal means we can imagine. 

As the international situation is unpredictable even five minutes ahead, I urge our military to review various scenarios and devise thorough contingency plans.