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[Two Narratives, One Event: The December 3 Martial Law] ③ Noh Sang-won’s Notebook: A Blueprint for Insurrection or a Political Script?
  • Kim Young
  • September 2, 2025 at 12:51 PM
기사수정
  • Special Prosecutor: “Noh Sang-won Admits to Notebook”… Shocking Terms Include ‘Collection, Execution, and Inciting North Wind’
  • Handwriting analysis is inconclusive, and Noh Sang-won refuses to acknowledge the content; ownership and authorship are separate issues.
  • Coexistence of the symbol of the Democratic Party's narrative and the counterargument that it is a script born from political pressure.

본 기획 시리즈는 12월 3일 계엄 사태를 둘러싼 두 개의 서사, 즉 ‘내란 기도’와 ‘정치적 각본’이라는 상반된 해석을 추적한다. 제3편에서는 노상원 전 국군정보사령관의 수첩을 둘러싼 논란을 집중 조명한다. 민주당과 특검은 이를 내란 청사진으로 제시하지만, 보수 진영은 정치적 각색의 산물로 본다. 또한 한미일보 취재를 통해 드러난 중국 간첩단 체포작전 정황은 또 다른 맥락을 제공한다. 특히 홍장원 전 국정원 1차장의 메모는 계엄 실체 논란의 또 다른 핵심 증거로, 다음 편(제4편)에서 심층 분석할 예정이다. <편집자 주>

The December 3rd Martial Law: Two narratives born from a single notebook. A blueprint for insurrection, or a record of an espionage arrest? Composite image by Hanmi Ilbo  

The seeds of the controversy surrounding the December 3rd martial law were sown in a single notebook. However, the debate extends far beyond the notebook belonging to Noh Sang-won, former commander of the Defense Intelligence Command (DIC).


As allegations of a plot to arrest key figures raised by Democratic Party lawmakers Park Sun-won and Kim Byung-joo, the memo by former NIS First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won, and the arrest of a Chinese espionage ring revealed by reporter Heo Gyeom's exclusive report all converge, the debate over the nature of the martial law has oscillated between a "blueprint for insurrection" and a "political script."

 

In August 2025, the Jo Eun-seok special counsel team held a briefing and announced that "Noh Sang-won has admitted that the notebook belongs to him." The notebook contained terms such as 'event (martial law),' 'collection (arrest),' 'execution (kill),' and 'inducing a North Wind scenario.' The special counsel interpreted these not as mere notes, but as evidence of a martial law conspiracy.


However, according to the special counsel’s announcement, Noh maintained the position that "the notebook is indeed mine, but I did not acknowledge its contents." Handwriting analysis by the National Forensic Service also remained "inconclusive." This suggests that ownership and authorship are not identical, and it is unclear whether the entries were written in his own hand.


The Democratic Party has used this notebook as a smoking gun for insurrection.


Lawmaker Park Sun-won exposed that "the Defense Intelligence Command was conducting surveillance on political figures and preparing for their arrest," while lawmaker Kim Byung-joo claimed that "there was an attempt to seize control of the National Election Commission's servers." Combined with the testimony of the lawmakers and the words found in the notebook, the frame has expanded: martial law was not a mere military measure, but an attempted insurrection aimed at arresting politicians and seizing power.


The conservative camp flatly refutes the evidentiary value of the notebook.


They argue that its independent credibility is weak due to the combination of inconclusive handwriting analysis, lack of admission of the contents, and refusal to testify. Noh's statement, "It is my notebook, but I don't know if I wrote it," reveals a contradictory situation that makes it difficult to view as a smoking gun.


Another point of contention is the eight-month gap between the general election and the martial law declaration.


The Democratic Party and the special counsel view the notebook's distinction between "before and after the general election" as evidence of long-term planning. However, the conservative camp counters that "a plan that was never executed and left abandoned lacks realism and is merely a political dramatization."


The issue of Noh Sang-won's qualifications is also being raised.


While the Democratic Party pointed to him as the primary culprit in the arrest of key figures, the Defense Intelligence Commander's primary duty is overseas and North Korean intelligence gathering; operational command for enforcing martial law fell under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Therefore, it is difficult to definitively label Noh as the mastermind of the martial law enforcement.


In contrast, the reporting by reporter Heo Gyeom (current CEO of Hanmi Ilbo) presents Noh's role from a different perspective.


In an exclusive article dated December 3rd of last year, reporter Heo Gyeom reported that a mission to arrest a Chinese spy ring was underway concurrently with the martial law, and that even the Defense Intelligence Command’s HID (Headquarters for Intelligence Detachment) was mobilized. This aligns with the "collection of key figures" operation alleged by Park Sun-won. Given that military special forces were acting as the primary agents in the same region while excluding the police during that period, the operation bears a stronger resemblance to a counter-espionage or intelligence mission than an act of insurrection. It is also quite plausible that Noh Sang-won, as a former Defense Intelligence Commander, was involved in the management and oversight of this operation.


Therefore, the "deployment of intelligence agents" claimed by lawmakers Park and Kim may be interpreted as circumstances related to the espionage arrest mission rather than evidence of carrying out an insurrection. Reporter Heo Gyeom's report has shaken the Democratic Party's narrative that frames Noh as the primary culprit of an insurrection, raising the possibility that the notebook is part of an espionage operation record rather than an insurrection blueprint.


The arrest list memo written by former NIS First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won has been shown to match documents secured by the prosecution from within the Defense Intelligence Command and the military, but critics point out that this, too, has limits in terms of its evidentiary value. This is because the circumstances of the memo's creation and delivery process are unclear, and controversies have been raised regarding the consistency of statements.


While this shows that the military leadership was preparing for the arrest of key figures, it simultaneously suggests that it is distant from the role of Noh Sang-won individually. The substance and significance of the Hong Jang-won memo will be covered in more detail in the next installment (Part 4).

 

For the Democratic Party and the special counsel, the Noh Sang-won notebook is a smoking gun for proving insurrection. For the conservative camp, however, it is nothing more than an illusion. The reasons cited are the inconclusive handwriting, lack of admission of contents, the eight-month gap, and the limitations of his official position.


The distinction between the roles of the Defense Intelligence Command and the Counterintelligence Command, the Hong Jang-won memo, and the field reports by reporter Heo Gyeom all challenge the "Noh Sang-won as mastermind" narrative and offer room for new interpretations.


The truth of December 3rd remains under debate. Is the notebook a key, or an illusion? Beyond the battle of interpretations, the truth will only be revealed in the context of the reality where the martial law and the espionage arrest operation intersected.

 

 

#December3rd #MartialLawControversy #NohSangWonNotebook #InsurrectionBlueprint #DemocraticPartyFrame #SpecialCounselBriefing #HongJangWonMemo #ChineseSpyRing #HID #ReporterHeoGyeom

 

 

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    hanultns2025-09-02 19:23:31

    필적 검증을 뒤로하고 발표부터 하는 특검이 의심이 간다.

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