Joo Eun-sik, Director of the Korea Institute for National Strategy Problem Awareness and Background

The strategic environment of the late Cold War and the post-Cold War era demanded a new role for military strategists. Moving beyond the mindset focused on nuclear deterrence strategies and large-scale maneuver warfare, there arose a need for comprehensive strategic capabilities encompassing politics, diplomacy, economy, and culture. General John R. Galvin deeply felt this necessity while serving as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). After retiring, he joined Tufts University, where he pointedly criticized the weaknesses in the military strategist education system. He emphasized that a military strategist should not merely be a commander or a staff officer, but a national asset equipped with a long-term perspective and historical insight.

Yesterday, under the Lee Jae-myung administration, seven four-star generals were discharged at once, and three-star generals were selected and appointed to key positions in the South Korean military. For those rising from corps commanders to the highest ranks of the military, there are certain points I wish to emphasize to raise awareness of the gravity of the responsibilities that a nuclear crisis will impose upon them. Generals who are moving from tactical operational echelons to contemplating war strategy must be particularly mindful of the following points. For the first time in a while, a four-star general has emerged from the armor branch and has been appointed as the Ground Operations Commander. It is rewarding to see him rise after having guided him as an armor officer during his time at the academy. Selecting General Jin Young-seung from the Strategic Command as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Kim Sung-min as the Deputy Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command were fitting choices for national defense.

The article written by General John Galvin, "What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist?", which I introduced to the current four-star generals when they were cadets, emphasized that because military science was not yet treated as a formal academic discipline, a military historical approach had to be adopted. At the time, I summarized and introduced General Galvin’s thesis, titled "Ways to Cultivate Military Strategists," as part of our "Military Classics Exploration" series.

General Galvin's Definition of a Military Strategist

Galvin defined a military strategist as "a person who designs and coordinates the use and limitations of military force to align with national objectives." Unlike a tactical-level combat commander, a strategist acts as a bridge, looking toward long-term trends and connecting political intentions with military means. Therefore, he insisted that they must be thinkers and designers, not just "military technicians."

The Core Position of Military History in the Educational Curriculum

The point Galvin emphasized most was the indispensability of military history. He believed that if strategic education becomes overly preoccupied with contemporary technology and tactics, it loses sight of long-term lessons and human essence.

The Repetitiveness of History: While the techniques of war change, human nature, the competition for power, and the structure of uncertainty remain constant. Therefore, lessons learned from the Peloponnesian War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World War II remain valid.

The Power of Case Studies: He emphasized that tracing historical war cases, alongside the thoughts of strategic thinkers such as Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and Mahan, builds a strategist’s "intellectual muscles."

Critical Perspective: He pointed out that the essence of a strategist is not to merely praise the past, but to compare and analyze the successes and failures of history, contemplating "why certain choices failed."

Galvin particularly criticized the short-term, pragmatic tendencies of American military education, warning that without a broad study of Western civilization and military history, one might become an "impromptu manager," but never a "true strategist."

Concrete Measures for Cultivating Strategists

General Galvin's proposals can be summarized as follows:

Long-term Educational Curriculum: Rather than short-term courses and education focused on tactical training, a 10-year long-term development plan including history, politics, economics, and philosophy is necessary.

Fusion of Humanities: While military history must be the foundation, integration with international politics, economics, and the history of technology is essential.

Combining Field Experience with Academic Research: A strategist loses touch with reality without combat experience and suffers from a narrow perspective without academic grounding; therefore, both must be pursued in balance.

Establishing a Culture of Debate and Criticism: In a culture where one merely obeys the commander's orders, creative strategists cannot be cultivated. Academic freedom and a culture of debate must be guaranteed.

Implications for the ROK Military and Newly Appointed Four-Star Generals

Galvin's critique is applicable to our military as well. While our military has long focused on short-term crisis response and tactical proficiency, it has been assessed as lacking in long-term strategic conceptualization. In particular, the fact that military history research and the study of strategic thought are neglected in Korean military educational institutions perfectly aligns with Galvin's critique. A certain Minister of National Defense once pressured the Army University to abolish war history education under the pretext of an educational inspection; however, I strongly argued to the inspection team leader, General Choi, that it must not be abolished.

The U.S. military has systematically strengthened military history education to cultivate political and strategic talent, whereas Korea has focused relatively more on training functional officers, which has limited the production of strategists. Therefore, as Galvin emphasized, the ROK military also needs to institutionalize military history-centered education, long-term strategist development programs, and integrated learning with international politics and economics. In particular, the seven four-star generals promoted today should take to heart the words from General Galvin's 1989 article, "What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist?". It is available for download on the internet. I urge you to read the full text.

We have a duty to educate and prepare those who follow us to take on the immense responsibility of providing military leadership and advice to the nation. In other words, we must make them (or at least the best among them) military strategists. If this is true, we need to reflect for a moment on what it is we are seeking. A military strategist is a person uniquely qualified by aptitude, experience, and education in the formulation and implementation of military strategy. (Strategic formulation and implementation are equally important.)

He understands our national strategy and the international environment, and recognizes the limitations of the use of force and the constraints of national resources committed to defense. He also knows the process by which the U.S., its allies, and potential adversaries formulate their strategies. He possesses fundamental knowledge of the structure, functions, and capabilities of both friendly and enemy military organizations (at least to the extent that solving strategic problems would be difficult without it).

General John R. Galvin was not merely a commander in the field, but an educator and a thinker. He consistently emphasized that military-historical insight is the most fundamental foundation for cultivating military strategists. This is a revival of the classic proposition that "the essence of war does not change," and it remains a valid warning even in the 21st century, where technology and the environment are rapidly changing. For our military, the seven generals promoted today, as well as junior officers and generals preparing for the future, heeding Galvin’s voice is not merely a reflection on the past, but a practical survival strategy.