Guest Columnist. ROTC Class of 40President Lee Jae-myung stated in an interview with the U.S. weekly news magazine 'Time' on September 18th, "We can pursue disarmament after halting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and then complete denuclearization." This is a very dangerous act that shakes the foundation of our security, as it could easily fall into the trap of recognizing North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state.

While this statement is framed as a flexible approach to prevent North Korea's nuclear capability advancement, it is in fact a fatal misjudgment that effectively acknowledges North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons through decades of continuous deception and threats, and now considers them the sole guarantee of its regime's survival. In such circumstances, discussing 'disarmament' under unfavorable conditions is an act of treason that permanently abandons the ultimate goal of Korean Peninsula denuclearization.

North Korea's Nuclear Development Process, Denuclearization Negotiation History, and the Evolution of Threats

North Korea's nuclear development history is a continuous string of deceptions and broken agreements. Starting with the construction of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the 1980s, it threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 and continued its nuclear development even after signing the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. After re-withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, North Korea declared its de facto status as a nuclear-armed state by conducting its first nuclear test in 2006. Subsequently, it advanced its nuclear weapon technology through six nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches until 2017.

During this period, there were several denuclearization negotiations, including the U.S.-North Korea summits in 2018. However, North Korea rejected 'Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID)' and broke off negotiations, demanding only the lifting of sanctions. All this history clearly shows that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons; the talk of nuclear disarmament is an act of abandoning security.

Fundamental Problems with the Nuclear Disarmament Discourse

First, it falls into the trap of recognizing nuclear-armed state status. 'Disarmament' is a negotiation among nuclear-armed states to reduce their arsenals. The moment this term is used, we officially acknowledge the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. This results in us voluntarily bestowing the 'nuclear-armed state' framework that North Korea has so desperately sought.

Second, it conflicts with the denuclearization goals pursued so far. Disarmament means 'reducing the number of nuclear weapons possessed,' not 'completely eliminating nuclear weapons.' If this statement were followed, we would be trapped in an intermediate stage of disarmament without even possessing our own nuclear weapons, and North Korea would shift from its existing stance of "nuclear weapons are not a subject of negotiation" to a new negotiation framework of "let's discuss disarmament as a nuclear-armed state." This would result in drifting eternally away from the ultimate goal of denuclearization.

Third, it is a misjudgment of North Korea's deceptive strategy. It is highly probable that North Korea will gain economic benefits, such as the lifting of international sanctions, through disarmament negotiations and then secretly further advance its nuclear weapons. North Korea will never give up its core means of survival. Past failed negotiations clearly prove this point.

A New Paradigm: Realistic Alternatives Based on CVID Principles

National security should not rely on the goodwill of the enemy. Peace policies do not guarantee peace. Peace is a state where the enemy's threat is eliminated; therefore, only strong power and clear principles should be used as means of peace. Even amidst an unstable international situation, we must steadfastly adhere to the CVID principles and meticulously devise realistic and phased roadmaps to achieve them. The military leadership must exercise a greater sense of responsibility for national security than ever before and persuade the current government.

Let's strengthen the 'conditional strategy of pressure and reward.' We must maintain strong sanctions against North Korea until it gives up its nuclear weapons, while clearly presenting a 'conditional' roadmap that offers corresponding rewards at each stage of denuclearization. For example, we should guide North Korea toward negotiations by specifying concrete 'gifts' for abandoning nuclear weapons, such as promising large-scale economic support upon permanent dismantling of nuclear facilities and declaration of its nuclear inventory.

Let's build a 'multilateral security cooperation body.' We must further solidify the ROK-U.S. alliance and strengthen ROK-U.S.-Japan military cooperation, while simultaneously seeking multilateral security cooperation bodies in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. North Korea's nuclear threat affects the stability of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire Northeast Asian region. Therefore, we must maximize diplomatic and military pressure on North Korea through joint responses with neighboring countries. Currently, there are 18 member states of the UN Command; we must increase the number of member states through military diplomacy.

We should also discuss disarmament after we possess our own nuclear weapons.

This would have the effect of classifying North Korea's nuclear weapons as illegal and isolating it from the international community, with the goal of genuine denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula where both North and South Korea abandon their nuclear weapons. If we possess nuclear weapons, we can finally discuss disarmament from an equal footing with North Korea. North Korea would be demoted from the position of 'one who possesses nuclear weapons' to that of 'one who must give up nuclear weapons.' This should evolve into a new paradigm that seeks a path to practical denuclearization through reciprocal reduction negotiations, rather than unilaterally pressuring North Korea.

In conclusion, the discourse of 'disarmament' makes denuclearization impossible forever. Disarmament is a discourse that can only be discussed at the final stage of denuclearization, after North Korea has abandoned all its nuclear weapons. We must not commit acts of treason by undermining fundamental security principles in a rush for political achievements.

President Lee is scheduled to preside over a UN Security Council open debate for the first time as a South Korean president on September 24th. If he makes remarks about North Korean nuclear disarmament there, South Korea's standing as the rotating president of the UN Security Council for September could be tarnished and result in international embarrassment.

The current government's security views, statements, actions, and efforts are truly precarious and unsettling.