Joo Eun-sik, Director of the Korea Strategy Institute U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has ordered approximately 800 top military leaders, including generals and senior non-commissioned officers from around the world, to convene in Quantico, Maryland, effective September 30th. This is a traditionally highly unusual measure. In today's military command structure, with its comprehensive video conferencing and electronic communication systems, physical gatherings are rarely necessary for simple information sharing or policy directives. Nevertheless, the fact that the head of defense is gathering four-star generals, admirals, three-star commanders, and key NCO leaders from across the globe suggests not just a military meeting, but a signal of "organizational transformation" based on structural change.

External Risk Factors: Russia-Ukraine War, Venezuela, and the Taiwan Strait Are Not Enough

When news of this measure broke, some attempted to interpret it in connection with an expansion of the Ukraine front, political instability in Venezuela, or the potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. However, a closer examination of the situation reveals that these variables do not provide enough urgency to necessitate a physical assembly of the entire top military command.

The Russia-Ukraine war has already seen significant achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. Without direct U.S. military intervention, it has induced Russia's strategic exhaustion and accomplished goals such as strengthening NATO cohesion, enhancing European defense capabilities, and increasing defense spending to 5%.

At this juncture, the war situation has not changed so drastically as to require the U.S. to plan for further large-scale intervention or a complete strategic overhaul.

While the crackdown on drug cartels and political instability in Venezuela are matters of concern for the security of the Americas, they do not warrant a national strategic shift that would require convening the entire U.S. military command. There is no precedent for summoning such a comprehensive military-wide meeting in response to past interventions like the invasion of Panama or the U.S. response to the war on drugs in Mexico.

The situation in the Taiwan Strait involving China also presents limited possibilities for short-term conflict. China is not yet fully prepared for full-scale war due to its economic slowdown, internal political instability, diplomatic isolation, and intensifying technological sanctions. The U.S. is also proceeding with strengthening Taiwan's defense capabilities and building deterrence, and there are no immediate crisis signals that would necessitate urgent policy discussions.

Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that this convening is focused on a more fundamental reason: internal structural reorganization, rather than merely responding to external security threats.

Internal Factors: Signal for 20% Reduction in Four-Star Generals and Command Restructuring

Since taking office, Secretary Hegseth has been critical of the excessive expansion of the senior command structure and has foreshadowed reforms. Recently, he ordered a 20% reduction in four-star general and admiral positions, and there have even been reports of an order for at least a 10% cut in all general and admiral positions. This is not simply about reducing numbers; it reflects a strong determination to streamline the upper echelons of the military and transition to a mission-oriented, agile command structure.

Since the Cold War, the U.S. military has segmented its commands and continuously expanded general positions to manage global deployments, complex joint operations, the war on terror, and responses to emerging technological warfare. However, this has led to overlapping command lines, inefficiencies between operational and administrative functions, and substantial budget burdens. In particular, the increase from eight four-star generals immediately after World War II to 40 creates a reality where multiple four-star commanders exist, diverging from the traditional system centered on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands.

Hegseth's current nationwide military convening can be seen as preparatory work to materialize this structural streamlining and consolidation of commands. Furthermore, prior to the release of the National Defense Strategy, issues related to command consolidation need to be resolved, and opposition to these changes must be pacified. It would have been necessary to explain the policy intentions to generals who would lose their existing authority and status, and to engage in political and psychological persuasion to minimize internal backlash. Additionally, a forum would be needed to explain the increased mission burdens and responsibilities to the remaining commanders and to share a new leadership culture.

Linkage with the New National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The United States is soon expected to release its National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS is a key document that determines the U.S. military's force structure, budget allocation, and operational concepts, and it will define the military's direction for years to come.

The upcoming NDS is projected to follow these trends:

Transition from Large Ground Force-Centric to Technology Integration and Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) Focus

The core focus will be on enhancing capabilities in AI, cyber, space, and precision strike, with a strong perception that the vast, bureaucratic, general-centric command structure of the past is inefficient.

Maintenance of Alliance-Based Deterrence Strategy

However, the U.S. military itself will pursue qualitative superiority, rapid mobility, and agile commands over sheer size.

Budget Reallocation and Defense Industry Reform

The reduction in senior positions is likely to be directly linked to increased investment in advanced capabilities through budget savings.

Ultimately, this convening can be seen as strongly driven by the intent to directly instill a new strategic paradigm in senior commanders and secure internal consensus for change ahead of the NDS release.

Traditional and Cultural Significance: A Return to ‘Direct Leadership Control’

The U.S. military is an organization that emphasizes hierarchy. The fact that the Secretary of Defense is directly convening and addressing the global command structure and persuading them of the need for change is a symbolic act beyond a mere meeting. It is a "direct signal opening a new era for the U.S. military," conveying the following messages:

Bureaucratic inertia will no longer be tolerated. This is a warning that the complacency of maintaining existing structures and preserving positions at the senior level will be directly challenged. The command structure will be reorganized to be agile, in line with technological innovation and strategic shifts. In the face of the U.S.-China strategic competition, new technology warfare, and budget pressures, a "small and strong command" is essential.

Direct leadership from political and defense leaders will be strengthened.

This is a move to refocus the core of war deterrence and preparedness on the Department of Defense and the President.

Implications for South Korea and the Alliance

These changes carry significant implications for South Korea as well.

Change in Alliance Operational Structure: As the U.S. military's command structure is simplified, adjustments to the ROK-U.S. combined command structure will be inevitable. In particular, the roles of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Command and the Indo-Pacific Command are likely to be redefined. It cannot be ruled out that the commander of USFK could be downgraded to a three-star general, while the commander of U.S. Forces Japan becomes a four-star general.

Shift in Operational Responsibility: If the U.S. military transforms into a more rapid and agile "core command," an expansion of the ROK military's autonomy and scope of responsibility may parallel this. This could also be linked to discussions about the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON). USFK is highly likely to be reorganized around the United Nations Command (UNC), and the UNC may relocate to Japan.

Defense Reform Model: The U.S. military's choice of "senior leadership reduction + technology-centric transition" is a case worth considering for South Korea. Amidst population decline and budget constraints, a direction of reducing the rank pyramid and strengthening qualitative capabilities may prove effective.

In conclusion, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's order for senior military leadership to convene is not a mere response to a crisis. The Russia-Ukraine front has already achieved strategic objectives, and the situations in Venezuela or the Taiwan Strait do not currently warrant an urgent military-wide meeting. The essence of this convening is a large-scale organizational reform, including the reduction of generals and the restructuring of commands, as well as leadership alignment in anticipation of the release of the new National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The U.S. military is currently undergoing a reorganization into a "smaller, faster, and more flexible" command structure. This is a bold measure that challenges traditional military organizational culture and the vested interests of senior leadership. The fact that the U.S. is moving in this direction serves as both a warning and an opportunity for its ally, South Korea. It is a time to accurately understand the changing strategic structure of the United States and for the ROK military to accelerate its own command and force structure innovation to meet the times.

This is purely personal speculation, and therefore prone to misjudgment. However, the inclusion of senior non-commissioned officers is believed to be in preparation for unit consolidation.

Joo Eun-sik, Director of the Korea Strategy Institute