Electrical work for the relocation of the UPS and batteries at the Daejeon headquarters. Hanmi Ilbo

The project to relocate the UPS and batteries at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) in Daejeon was initiated under the pretext of strengthening the stability of the national core computing network. However, the recent fire accident cannot be explained simply as worker negligence. It was the result of a total systemic failure caused by overlapping voids in the procurement structure, safety design, and management/supervision.

According to information from the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and media reports, the fire started in the 5th-floor server room. At the time, the UPS unit and high-capacity battery modules were installed in the same space, and sparks flew the moment power cables were disconnected to move them to the basement UPS room. This immediately triggered thermal runaway in the lithium batteries, causing the fire to spread.

An expert in power safety, identified as ‘A’, pointed out, “Placing the UPS unit and the batteries in the same space was a structural flaw that inherently increased the risk of thermal runaway,” adding, “Attempting a battery replacement without a redundant power grid meant that, in practice, the project lacked the requirements for an uninterruptible replacement, making it a highly dangerous operation.”

According to international electrical safety standards, UPS units and battery modules must be installed separately, and replacement work should only be conducted under a redundant power grid. However, the NIRS did not follow these principles. This is evidence that the danger was inherent from the procurement stage, rather than being a mere on-site error.

Analyzing the bidding specifications reveals further issues. While the project was nominally a ‘fixed-price, lowest-bid’ contract, in reality, it followed a method where the price was determined after selecting a preferred bidder. Mr. ‘B’, an industry insider, criticized this, stating, “It was effectively a ‘targeted bid’ where a specific company was guaranteed to win,” adding, “It is a classic example of prioritizing procedure and formality over safety.”

The title of the bid was also problematic. The name, ‘Electrical Work for UPS and Battery Relocation,’ made it appear to be a simple equipment transfer, but the actual content involved critical work affecting the power safety of a national core computing network. By downplaying the nature of the procurement, the risks of the construction were effectively concealed.

Furthermore, because the technical specifications were not disclosed, even experts—let alone the general public—could not verify key safety conditions, such as power supply redundancy, uninterruptible replacement procedures, and the installation status of automated fire suppression systems. This further demonstrates how the procuring agency prioritized procedure over safety.

Although the bidding documents detailed the scope of work, budget, and bidding procedures, they provided almost no specific regulations regarding the procuring agency’s duty of management and supervision. Instead, a clause stating that “the bid announcement takes precedence” was included, creating a structure where the procuring agency could distance itself and shift all risks to the contractor in the event of an accident.

Safety expert ‘C’ emphasized, “The omission of the agency’s management and supervision duties in the tender documents represents a neglect of structural risks,” adding, “Ultimately, this left room for government ministries that should be responsible for safety to avoid accountability.”

This vacuum in supervision also coincides with the political situation. Former Minister of the Interior and Safety Lee Sang-min resigned voluntarily in December 2024 amidst impeachment pressure from the Democratic Party. An eight-month leadership vacuum followed until Minister Yoon Ho-joong was appointed in July 2025.

At the time, the media had already raised concerns that “a prolonged leadership vacuum at the Ministry of the Interior and Safety would create a fatal hole in the national safety management system.” Those concerns have now become a reality. Safety experts also pointed out, “The fact that the minister’s seat was vacant for eight months was a factor that increased accident risk,” noting that “in the absence of an overseer, a lapse in responsibility is inevitable.”

In short, the aggressive push for impeachment for political purposes led to a ministerial vacuum, and that void ultimately resulted in the failure of safety management for the national core computing network.

The NIRS fire was a total management failure triggered by a combination of factors: installation in the 5th-floor server room, violation of international standards, a targeted bidding structure, ambiguous project naming, undisclosed technical specifications, the absence of management and supervision duties, insufficient power supply redundancy, and a ministerial vacuum. This was not a simple worker error, but the result of overlapping weaknesses in the system, politics, and administration.

To prevent similar pitfalls, the government must implement fundamental institutional reforms, including: ▲mandatory disclosure of bidding specifications, ▲the legislation of power supply redundancy, ▲transparent reporting of automated fire suppression system inspection results, and ▲ensuring administrative continuity during political vacancies. 

However, measures from the executive branch alone are insufficient. A parliamentary investigation is essential to rigorously examine the entire process, including procurement, bidding structures, safety design, and management and supervision. This fire is not merely an accident; it is a warning signal of a failing national system.

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