Guest Columnist. ROK Military Academy Class of 40 President Lee Jae-myung showed a strong will to push for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) in his commemorative address for the 77th Armed Forces Day. He made a statement that is difficult to interpret, saying, "On the basis of a firm ROK-US alliance, we will regain wartime operational control and lead the ROK-US combined defense posture."  

The only difference from before is the use of the term "regain OPCON" instead of "transfer" or "reclaim." We strongly opposed the transfer of OPCON, viewing it as a dangerous gamble that would nullify the ROK-US alliance and lead to the withdrawal of US forces, but the current administration is like preaching to deaf ears. I will use an analogy to explain why the transfer of OPCON is a fatal security self-inflicted wound, something even an elementary school student would understand. 

1. Visible Dangers of Regaining OPCON: Disadvantageous to National Interest, War Prevention, and Survival 

In 1950, President Syngman Rhee hastily entrusted the 'wartime operational control' to our ally, the United States, following the invasion by Kim Il-sung, a war criminal incited by the Soviet Union and China. This can be likened to a minor entrusting their family's life-or-death matters to their teacher. The teacher, the United States, used this 'OPCON sword' to deter communist aggression and protect the Republic of Korea. This marked the beginning of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and led to our history of maintaining security and economic growth for over 70 years.

Now, we have become fully grown adults in terms of security and economy, and a desire for self-reliant defense has naturally emerged to reclaim the teacher's 'OPCON sword' and wield it ourselves. External forces, uncomfortable with the presence of US troops, have been subtly pushing for a visible set of three security self-inflicted wounds: OPCON transfer, US troop withdrawal, and a declaration of peace. The OPCON transfer, seemingly stalled and fading due to the three barriers of national interest, war prevention, and survival, has once again been placed on the chopping block by the current administration as a security self-inflicted wound. 

Continuing the analogy, if we ask the teacher for the 'OPCON sword,' will the teacher simply hand over the all-powerful 'OPCON sword' equipped with information and power? They will likely give us a shell of a sword, lacking information and power. The teacher, concealing their unease, will withdraw all weapons and US troop deployment systems, except for administrative personnel, under the guise of 'strategic flexibility,' stating, "We need to go to other regions to deal with those who still invade neighboring countries and dream of communization." From the US perspective, this is not an unreasonable prediction.

Let's blend analogy and reality. Should we wait until the teacher's 'OPCON sword's' advanced functions and expertise are perfectly integrated into our system? Or should we accept a 'shell sword' that cannot prevent war while ruffling the teacher's pride? Core functions such as nuclear counterstrike systems and high-performance reconnaissance satellites (ISR) still depend on the United States. Without the security teacher, the United States, these advanced functions could become inoperable simultaneously with the OPCON transfer.

2. Invisible Dangers of OPCON Transfer: Security Self-Inflicted Wounds that Pervade Pride 

Returning to a realistic perspective, will the current administration hastily seek nominal command authority while losing actual nuclear deterrence and advanced information capabilities, thereby weakening our war prevention capabilities? Should discussions on OPCON transfer be suspended until we can independently establish war prevention capabilities? We must face the fact that OPCON transfer is poison to security and a self-inflicted wound in terms of national interest, maintaining national continuity, war prevention, and survival.

⓵ Fatal damage to national interest and maintenance of national continuity: Even if we gain operational control, we cannot possess the core hegemonic power that the United States holds in 'advanced intelligence (ISR)' and 'nuclear counterstrike technology.' In the current battlefield, true initiative lies not with the 'commander's rank' but with 'the one who possesses the most accurate information.' Even if we reclaim OPCON, we will inevitably remain subject to the United States' strategic decisions. This will come at a tremendous cost for the sake of the cause of 'autonomy.' 

⓶ Fatal weakening of war prevention capabilities: OPCON transfer signifies an ROK-US alliance with differing objectives and the dissolution of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). Simultaneously with the OPCON transfer, the 'nervous system (C4I) of the two countries' militaries,' built over decades, will be severed. This will make immediate and organic responses impossible in the event of war and provide North Korea with an opportunity for 'miscalculation.' The 'paralysis of security infrastructure' during the promotion process will lead to losses in national interest and threats to survival, far exceeding the 35 trillion won cost of OPCON transfer.

⓷ Fatal damage to survival capabilities: OPCON transfer will accelerate the 'strategic departure' of US forces in Korea and threaten the survival of the Republic of Korea. It will provide the United States with a rationale to move key assets (air force, reconnaissance intelligence, etc.) out of the Korean Peninsula for its 'global strategy.' Strategic fragmentation will deepen the complexities of Northeast Asian geopolitics, leading to capital flight, weakening diplomatic standing, and potentially turning the Korean Peninsula into a battlefield. The flapping of anti-American wings, disguised as self-reliant defense through OPCON transfer, will make our survival environment even more unstable.

3. Security Strategy for National Interest and Survival

OPCON transfer should be approached from the perspective of national interest and war prevention, not pride. We should seek a cooperative survival strategy through 'symbiotic design,' rather than an anti-American 'separation strategy' that provokes the United States and pushes away our ally. Security organizations should persistently voice their opposition to OPCON transfer and consider innovative methods to make US forces cooperate with our strategies even without OPCON, by investing the OPCON costs into building independent intelligence and surveillance (ISR) systems such as 'K-Ironcloud.'

OPCON transfer is not a simple issue of 'command authority' but a complex issue of 'national interest, war prevention, and survival.' Those advocating for OPCON transfer do not mention independent nuclear armament. There is a strong suspicion that they are, in some form, minions of the enemy. In the field of security, differing opinions cannot be accommodated; they must be corrected or changed.

A symbiotic structure that reinforces the Korean military's lacking core capabilities through the strength of the alliance is the consideration of independent nuclear armament. This is the smartest strategy to overcome inferiority in military intelligence and nuclear response. We urge security leaders to provide realistic alternatives based on conscience.