Joo Eun-sik, President of the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy The North Korean weapons systems unveiled at the military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party on October 10th are being evaluated as a serious threat. They go beyond mere power projection, reflecting a fundamental shift in warfare and the evolution of practical operational strategies. While past North Korean parades were characterized as "intimidation-focused strategy parades," this event served as a display of a combat-ready military system integrating technology, tactics, and command structures.

First, the appearance of the new solid-fuel Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the operation of an 11-axle super-large mobile launcher (TEL) signify that North Korea has moved from the "possession" phase to the "operational" phase. Solid-fuel ICBMs have shorter launch preparation times than liquid-fuel missiles, making preemptive detection and deterrence difficult. When combined with potential multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities, they create a structure capable of quantitatively overwhelming the ROK-U.S. missile defense network.

Furthermore, the simultaneous exhibition of hypersonic missiles, strategic cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads emphasizes that North Korea has established a framework encompassing strategic nuclear deterrence alongside tactical nuclear combat operations. This suggests a "preemptive strike strategy, including nuclear threats," against key operational hubs of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces, such as forward command posts, air bases, and ammunition and fuel depots.

Notably, the most significant scene at this parade was the presence of suicide drones and various unmanned conventional strike systems displayed alongside strategic nuclear missiles. Following the Russia-Ukraine war, North Korea has clearly learned the effectiveness of "low-cost, high-efficiency" unmanned systems and is applying them to the realities of the Korean Peninsula theater to build an "all-domain force structure." This trend points toward the construction of a system capable of large-scale attrition warfare and multi-layer saturation attacks (attacks that overwhelm the defensive capabilities of the target).

In summary, through this parade, North Korea has demonstrated the diversification of nuclear delivery vehicles, the expansion of low-cost unmanned forces, and a combat-oriented operational structure based on dispersion and mobility, all of which pose a fundamental challenge to the existing deterrence and missile defense concepts of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Advancement of Nuclear Command Systems and Structuralization of Tactical Nuclear Operations—Deterrence Failure and Escalating Risks

This parade was more than just a display of weaponry. For the first time, North Korean military commentary defined the Strategic Force as the "national nuclear backbone force," emphasizing that its Nuclear Command & Control (NC2) system is already structured.

While control over nuclear weapons appears to remain centralized under Kim Jong Un, the fact that tactical nuclear units are dispersed across field army rear areas, coupled with mentions of potential delegated launch authority, significantly undermines the stability of war deterrence. In other words, if a structure for "delegated nuclear authority" becomes operational during wartime, regional North Korean commanders could potentially decide to use nuclear weapons. This introduces the risk of decentralized nuclear use, which collapses the traditional deterrence theory of "centralized nuclear monopoly." This appears to be a system similar to Russia's "Perimeter"—also known as the "Dead Hand"—an automated retaliatory nuclear launch system used in the event of a decapitation of national leadership. 

Additionally, a dual land- and sea-based nuclear force structure is taking shape. The Strategic Force is presumed to oversee ICBMs, IRBMs, hypersonic units, and rail-mobile missile units, while the Navy is simultaneously developing tactical nuclear-armed submarine squadrons (such as the Hero Kim Kun Ok) and nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs). Furthermore, nuclear-capable unmanned underwater attack craft (Haeil) represent an asymmetric nuclear strategic card targeting ROK-U.S. maritime supply lines and ports.

This demonstrates that North Korea is entering a "Nuclear Strategy 2.0" phase, going beyond traditional "Seoul in a sea of fire" conventional threats toward the tacticalization, combat-readiness, and decentralized operation of nuclear weapons. Key changes that must be addressed in our security concept are as follows:

Shift in threat nature: Deterrence against a single massive nuclear strike → Multi-axis tactical nuclear operational strategy
Shift in command system: Centralized deterrence → Increased possibility of delegated control (multiplying risks)
Shift in operational concept: Nuclear weapons as a last resort → Nuclear weapons as a tool for battlefield use

Direction for Response – A Strategic Pivot Beyond Defense

The ROK and the U.S. must not approach the North Korean nuclear missile threat solely through a "defense-centric" lens. In a situation where North Korea is building a structure for mass saturation and simultaneous attacks, traditional intercept strategies centered on Patriot and THAAD missiles are insufficient, as the cost of defense is becoming overwhelmingly higher than the cost of offense.

Therefore, our response must shift toward an integrated system of intelligence, deception, strike, defense, and deterrence.

First, we must gain more time for warning and surveillance.

Since the emergence of solid-fuel ICBMs, the most critical strategic variable is "Time to Detect & Decide." The ROK-U.S. alliance must move beyond legacy radar-centric ISR systems. We must rebuild detection capabilities by integrating LEO military satellite and commercial satellite data, securing infrared early warning (EO/IR) assets, and utilizing AI-based pattern analysis to track mobile TELs and rail-based missiles.

Second, we must move away from "attrition-style air defense."

North Korea's strategy of combining drones, MLRS, and cruise missiles is designed to deplete our Patriot and Cheongung batteries. Responding to low-cost weapons with high-cost defense systems is a losing proposition. Consequently, lower-tier air defense must be restructured to utilize electronic warfare (jamming), lasers, microwave interception, and anti-drone UAV-kill systems.

Third, beyond overwhelming punishment, we need practical denial deterrence. 

While the Korean-style 3-Axis System (KMPR, KMD, Kill Chain) is conceptually robust, it is currently slow in terms of operational timing, reconnaissance assets, and legal decision-making structures. We need an "Action-based Deterrence" strategy that demonstrates the capability for constant precision strikes against North Korean TELs and launch sites, induces confusion in North Korean command networks through electronic and cyber warfare, and includes parallel strategies to paralyze maritime supply lines and ports.

Immediate Measures to Prevent Deterrence Failure

This parade served as a turning point, signaling that North Korean nuclear weapons are no longer just political propaganda tools to be traded at a negotiating table, but have entered the stage of practical operational systems. We must discard the error of interpreting the North Korean threat through the lens of the "North Korea of the past." North Korea now possesses the capability to conduct complex warfare by integrating conventional, nuclear, and unmanned assets, and its concept of war is being reorganized around speed, saturation, dispersion, and deception.

The Republic of Korea's national strategy must also change. We must shift from a "defense-oriented survival strategy" to a "strategy of managing, denying, and deterring threats." Some argue that ICBMs are intended for the U.S. and not for South Korea, but the ROK-U.S. alliance's extended deterrence requires us to be prepared together. Only a deterrence posture that integrates technology, strategy, and political will can maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, and now is the critical juncture for a strategic transformation. Our top priority must be the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

Joo Eun-sik, President of the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy