The shadow of Cambodian scams, lost voices. A newspaper left on an empty podium symbolizes the disappearance of Koreans overlooked by a nation without sanctions. Hanmi Ilbo Graphics

Prince Group's Shadow, 330 Missing... Citizens of a 'Nation Without Sanctions' Became Targets

The reason for the disproportionately high number of Korean victims is not simple.

Prince Group, which operated scam centers in Cambodia, has been designated a 'Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO)' by the United States and the United Kingdom, yet has not faced a single official sanction in Korea. In the meantime, victims have piled up, and 91.2 billion KRW in deposits linked to this organization are frozen in domestic banks.

Hanmi Ilbo analyzed the structure of this situation by synthesizing foreign media records, financial authority data, and victim testimonies.

The number of Korean victims is estimated to be at least over 330 in the past year.

The primary type of victimization was recruitment fraud, luring individuals with promises of high-paying overseas employment. Online job postings in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar featured phrases like "Guaranteed 5 million KRW per month" and "English not required."

Upon arrival, victims had their passports confiscated, their contact with the outside world severed, and were forcibly engaged in online scams or cryptocurrency investment schemes. Partial evidence of Korean intermediaries being involved in this process has emerged from local police investigations.

The term "scam center" refers to the 'online farms' of criminal organizations.

Prince Group is suspected of operating such facilities across Cambodia, generating profits through forced labor, human trafficking, and assault.

The U.S. Department of Justice indicted Prince Group chairman Chen Zhi on charges of operating online fraud through forced labor, and the U.S. Treasury Department added 146 entities and individuals associated with the group to its sanctions list. The UK also froze assets, including real estate in London.

However, Korea's response was different.

The government was unable to impose independent sanctions, citing the absence of entities directly linked to Prince Group in Korea. Korea lacks legislation like the U.S. 'Global Magnitsky Act' to sanction overseas human rights violators or criminal organizations. The government's stance is that without a UN Security Council resolution, there is no legal basis to sanction foreign companies under domestic law.

As a result, the 91.2 billion KRW in Prince Group-related deposits remaining in the Cambodian branches of Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, and Jeonbuk Bank remain merely 'frozen.' Legal confiscation or recovery of criminal proceeds has not occurred.

This systemic gap has led to the targeting of Koreans for crimes.

As the channels blocked by sanctions from the U.S. and UK were closed, criminal organizations turned to the less regulated Korean market as an 'alternative route.' Korean banks, being outside international sanctions networks, became highly susceptible to being exploited as channels for money laundering or remittance.

Young Koreans dreaming of overseas employment became easy prey within this structure.

Cultural factors also played a role.

Scam organizations meticulously mimicked 'Korean trust codes.' They presented business cards and contracts that did not actually exist, such as 'Seoul Branch' or 'Korean Team Leader,' in an attempt to imitate formal hiring procedures. Koreans tend to place a strong emphasis on documents and formality, lowering their guard the more perfect the paperwork appears.

According to foreign media reports, the proportion of Koreans drawn into scam centers was two to three times higher than that of Taiwanese and Malaysians.

The government's response was belated.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a travel advisory 'black code' for Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh three months after the deaths occurred. Victim families were unable to access local investigations, and Korea remained at an observer level within the international cooperation network.

Ultimately, citizens remained 'citizens outside their nation's protection.'

Experts point to Korea's sanctioning gap as a "blind spot of a developed nation without institutions."

While economically developed, Korea's approach to sanctions and human rights responses is at a developing country level. The argument for Korea to adopt U.S.-style 'independent sanction laws' is growing. While sanctions are delayed due to diplomatic concerns, Prince Group's funds continue to circulate in Cambodia.

A financial authority official stated, "While deposits are frozen, legal confiscation is difficult. Sanctions are only possible once it is confirmed as criminal proceeds through international cooperation." However, this 'confirmation' could take years. Meanwhile, another young Korean falls into the same trap through another job posting.

In conclusion, there are three reasons for the significant extent of damage in Korea.

First, individual vulnerabilities created by illusions of overseas employment and investment.

Second, the nation's incompetence in lacking institutional mechanisms to respond to overseas crimes.

Third, international criminal organizations, unafraid of sanctions, view Korea as an 'easy country.'

While Korea refrains from imposing sanctions, the world has already begun to classify Koreans not as those to be protected, but as 'Targets.'

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