Although the text of the agreement may be joint, the hand that flips the switch was American. Hankyoreh Graphics

The South Korea-US summit on October 30th resulted in impressive figures: $350 billion, a 15% automobile tariff, and an annual cap of $20 billion. However, a "joint fact sheet" was not released. Analysis suggests that the absence of a document, contrary to a superficial agreement, stems not from numerical issues but from concerns over executive command and Washington's trust assessment.

The effectiveness of investment agreements hinges on the design of the execution framework rather than the wording itself. A document gains substance only when details such as project selection criteria, milestone establishment, quarterly execution limits, and recovery procedures for shortfalls are definitively established. However, interpretations in the South Korean media differ from those in foreign press and US reports. Foreign media identified the core factor slowing the agreement as "execution control" and "low trust in the Lee Jae-myung administration." Hankyoreh, based on this perspective, re-examined the background of the delay.

The primary reason is that the execution governance is already significantly tilted towards the US.

The MOU signed with Japan clearly illustrates this structure. The US President makes the final selection of investment targets, an Investment Committee chaired by the Secretary of Commerce reviews and supervises, and the U.S. Investment Accelerator handles execution and documentation. This three-tiered structure is a system where the US effectively controls the direction and pace of funds unilaterally, and it is assessed as natural for Washington to apply the same framework to South Korea. The extent to which South Korea accepts this structure is becoming the key to finalizing the agreement.

Compounding this is the analysis that Washington's distrust of the Lee Jae-myung administration has further slowed negotiations.

The lack of consistency in Seoul's messaging, inadequate market stabilization measures, and the wide amplitude of remarks regarding currency and tariffs were perceived as "counterparty risk" in the US. The lower the trust, the more strongly the US demands substantial control mechanisms such as enhanced executive command, milestone-linked commitments, automatic cap settings, and clawback clauses. The more South Korea began to emphasize formal balance through a "joint announcement," the more the US tended to fill those gaps with higher-level substantive commitments. The interpretation that the negotiation delay is closer to a structural issue of trust deficiency rather than a power struggle is gaining traction.

Another challenge is the asymmetry in how the 15% tariff is finalized.

The US intends to finalize tariffs through Federal Register notices, USTR guidance, and CBP enforcement documents, rather than a joint announcement. This method allows the US to unilaterally adjust the effective date, applicable items, and exception clauses. The AP's point that "nothing has been officially formalized in writing yet" is due to this implementation path not being settled. The consistent preference in Washington is that even if a joint text is announced, the hand that ultimately flips the switch is American.

The asymmetry in laws and procedures also tilts the balance of negotiations towards the US.

Tariffs become effective solely through unilateral US notification, while investments require signatures from both countries and subsequent administrative procedures. This is also a background for the US preferring a method where "substantive control is ours, display is joint." South Korea attempted to exchange tariff certainty, annual caps, and market stabilization measures, but limitations emerged that the inherent structural asymmetry could not easily overturn.

Synthesizing these trends, a structure where the form is "joint" but substantive control rests with the US is likely. In return, the US is highly likely to demand quantified additional commitments in areas such as shipbuilding, energy, supply chains, domestic employment, and export controls to China, with the precedent set by Japan expected to be repeatedly used as justification.

Ultimately, the core that ran through these negotiations was that the meaning of "up front" as stated by Trump was not "prepayment" but "initiative." Some point out that a failure to accurately interpret this meaning was the fundamental cause of the negotiation difficulties. Criticism is emerging that South Korea should have first established the execution control structure before focusing on the numbers. The remaining question ultimately boils down to this single point.

"Not the numbers, but who flips the switch?"

USTR Japan MOU Briefing Materials (2025), US Department of Commerce Investment Accelerator Description, White House NEC Briefing, Federal Register Tariff Procedures (Title 19), CBP Tariff Enforcement Manual, CRS US-Japan Investment Enforcement Report (2024), Foreign Press including AP and Bloomberg

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