The armband becomes power, and the flag becomes the standard of loyalty. Administration quietly, yet surely, transforms into an election organization. Hanmi Ilbo Graphics[Table of Contents]

① Reforms that Blinded the Board of Audit and Inspection

② Administrative State of Loyalty = Democratization Party's Election Organization

③ Those Who Disarmed the Prosecution

④ Judicial Personnel Politics, the Hidden Side of the Supreme Court Justice Expansion Act

⑤ The Language of Reform, the Grammar of Dictatorship

“Public officials must also be vetted. Administration that does not align with the government's direction will no longer be tolerated.” 

This statement was reportedly made by a presidential secretary for personnel innovation during an internal meeting in early September. Following this statement, the government, under the guise of establishing a "public official vetting system," is pushing for a "job suitability assessment" system targeting all central and local government employees. 

While the superficial reason is to prevent misconduct and inefficiency, there are growing concerns that a system of ideological vetting, which selects and excludes public officials based on their adherence to the regime's policies, is being introduced into national administration. Above all, the sense of crisis is mounting due to the potential for this structure to long-term reorganize the administrative apparatus into an "election organization for the regime."

The intensified vetting of public officials by the Lee Jae-myung administration is being packaged as a reform for administrative innovation. However, the core keywords that repeatedly appear in internal government documents are "loyalty," "policy uniformity," and "organizational control." 

Contrary to the stated objective of strengthening public service ethics, a structure is being designed where adherence to the regime's policies becomes the central pillar of performance evaluation. This is expected to paralyze public officials' independent professional judgment and lead to administrative execution based on the regime's convenience. 

The "Government Innovation TF" recently established under the Prime Minister's Office clearly reveals this structure. The government explains this as an "investigation of public officials involved in sedition," but the actual guidelines are reportedly much broader, including comprehensive investigations such as interviews (interrogations), written inquiries, and digital device checks. 

There have been media reports of internal directives in some ministries requesting public officials to submit personal mobile phones or mentioning the possibility of forensic examination. With cases even emerging where reassignment to a waiting status or suspension of duties was considered for non-cooperation, the public service sector perceives this as a de facto coercive investigation. The government emphasizes "consent," but in a hierarchical structure, consent is tantamount to an "irrevocable consent."

This process conflicts with the foundations of the Constitution. It directly contradicts Article 7 of the Constitution on the political neutrality of public officials, Article 17 on the privacy of personal life, and Article 18 on the freedom of communication. The government's intention to access public officials' mobile phones and digital records goes beyond simply checking for misconduct; it is akin to ideological vetting to identify public officials uncooperative with the regime. 

The "political reliability" item included in internal government documents, once reflected in actual personnel decisions, will transform the public service into an election organization that operates based on the regime's interests and re-election strategies, rather than those of the public. 

The irony is that this vetting system directly clashes with the past remarks of President Lee Jae-myung himself. During prosecution investigations, he repeatedly argued, "Power should not seize mobile phones," and "Mobile phone forensics is an invasion of privacy and an abuse of power." 

However, the current government is including personal mobile phones and digital records of public officials as objects of scrutiny and has created a structure that can utilize this as a tool to assess their loyalty to the regime. While he guarded against encroachment by power, he now demands proof of loyalty from public officials, demonstrating why this vetting system functions as a "regime preservation device."

This phenomenon also structurally resembles authoritarian phases in modern Korean history. The "public official loyalty test" during the Yushin regime, "official-backed election campaigns" by military regimes in the 1980s, and "election interference cases by local governments" in the 1990s are all precedents for using public officials as "election machinery for the regime." 

The commonalities are clear. 

First, vetting is introduced to filter out public officials who are critical of or hold dissenting views towards the regime. 

Second, the scope of investigation is expanded to include public officials' expressions and private lives. 

Third, the entire administrative organization is designed to operate according to the regime's re-election strategies. 

The current vetting system is replicating this historical pattern, even leveraging technology and data. 

The direction of this vetting system is not mere internal control. The "policy uniformity" spoken of by the regime is effectively substituted with "regime re-establishment uniformity," and the function of administration is transformed from serving the entire public to serving as an election organization for the defense, maintenance, and victory of the Democratic Party's regime. 

In such a structure, statistics and reports that deviate from the regime's policies are self-censored, and policy choices and implementations are adjusted based on election strategies and the need for re-election. Administration loses its public nature and professionalism, degenerating into a vast organization that operates not for "national governance" but for "regime preservation."

Signs of election organization are already appearing throughout the administration. 

Cases of sensitive policy statistics being re-timed, government criticism reports being neutralized internally, and public officials' internal tip-offs sensing pressure to alter expressions or modify data to align with the regime's direction, even on matters unrelated to elections, demonstrate that this structure is already becoming a reality. 

Public officials are now showing a tendency to judge and act not based on "whether a policy is right or wrong" but on "whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the regime." This is the beginning of election organization and the most dangerous sign. 

Vetting becomes control, control breeds silence, and silence transforms the administrative organization into an election organization machine subservient to the regime's will. The Lee Jae-myung administration's public official vetting system, though bearing the name of "administrative efficiency," is in reality a dangerous experiment that collapses democratic administration and reverts the nation to a "regime preservation election organization" state. 

Control, initiated in the name of vetting, has always ended in a retreat of freedom, and South Korea stands at that crossroads today.

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