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The Lee Jae-myung administration, which intended to negotiate the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) with the United States, has been blocked by the U.S. Congress.

It has been confirmed that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, passed by both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, includes provisions prohibiting all budget expenditures related to the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) while maintaining the size of U.S. Forces Korea.

This provision stipulates that "the Secretary of Defense may not use any funds for such action unless the Secretary certifies to Congress in writing that the action is consistent with the national security interests of the United States." This is not merely a political statement but a legally binding prohibition on budget execution. To date, the OPCON transfer has been gradually pursued through consultations and evaluations between South Korea and the U.S., but the actual execution of the transfer necessitates crucial elements such as training, restructuring of command systems, and reorganization of the Combined Forces Command, all of which require U.S. budget allocation.

Ultimately, this measure has effectively blocked the OPCON transfer by cutting off the practical infrastructure of the budget, and the Lee Jae-myung administration's pledge to "restore operational sovereignty" has hit an institutional barrier at the congressional level.

In particular, the bill mandates a risk assessment process involving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, in addition to the "certification by the Secretary of Defense," making it impossible to even disburse funds based on the executive branch's sole judgment. This effectively institutionalizes the "verification of alliance costs and risks" emphasized by former President Trump, clearly indicating that OPCON transfer is no longer an issue that can be resolved by the South Korean government's requests or diplomatic persuasion.

Previously, the U.S. House of Representatives inserted the phrase "maintain 28,500 U.S. Forces Korea personnel," and the Senate comprehensively banned budgets related to OPCON transfer, clearly signaling an effort to pre-structure the realignment of ROK-U.S. military relations following a potential second term for Trump.

As a result, the OPCON transfer has returned to a "structure impossible without U.S. approval," and practical preparations by the South Korean side, such as command structure adjustments centered on the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, crisis management capability tests, and expanded joint exercises, are now highly likely to be halted due to budget issues.

Lee Jae-myung has strongly emphasized "restoring South Korea's military sovereignty" since his candidacy and declared in his New Year's address last year that he would "reclaim OPCON as soon as the conditions are met." However, with the U.S. Congress having completely blocked even the minimal budget required for OPCON transfer, any room for the South Korean government to independently advance this issue has virtually vanished.

This measure represents a more distinct encounter with the wall of "American strategic decision-making priority" than the case of pursuing early OPCON transfer during the Moon Jae-in administration, casting doubt on the very feasibility of the transfer itself.

A former senior defense official, identified as A, stated, "OPCON is not merely a matter of military command but a symbol of diplomatic autonomy and strategic independence. This U.S. congressional action shows that the U.S. side has complete control over that symbol," adding, "South Korea's restoration of military sovereignty has now been downgraded to the level of awaiting notification of a U.S. decision."

An expert in foreign affairs and security, identified as B, commented, "Budget prohibition clauses based on law are a much stronger control mechanism than the policy will of the executive branch. This will be recorded as the first instance where the Lee Jae-myung administration's security pledges have been officially blocked by the U.S. Congress."

The issue of OPCON transfer has now shifted from diplomatic negotiation to an internal U.S. process of passing U.S. congressional certification and evaluation systems. Consequently, the South Korean government's role has changed from "promoting the transfer" to "requesting the transfer," and the U.S. legislative branch has gained the initiative in foreign policy.

Summary of Key Provisions

Complete prohibition of U.S. defense budget execution related to OPCON transfer

Mandatory "national interest certification" by the Secretary of Defense and risk assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, INDOPACOM, and USFK

Codification of maintaining 28,500 U.S. Forces Korea personnel

Effective suspension crisis for the South Korean government's pledge of "reclaiming operational sovereignty"

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