National Election Commission. Yonhap NewsA military intelligence official, Mr. A, who was involved in the preparation of the operation to apprehend a Chinese spy ring at the Election Training Institute in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province, during the declaration of martial law on December 3rd, met with a reporter in an undisclosed location in January and stated that the operation was classified with extreme secrecy, known only to a few individuals who directly communicated with President Yoon Suk-yeol, and that thorough security was maintained.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "As you well know, this is a secret operation starting from the President, isn't it? Yes, yes. Ah... therefore, it was only discussed by a very small number of people who directly... conversed with him."] 

He further explained that security was meticulously maintained, with those involved in the classified operation being extremely wary of external exposure of information and consciously avoiding contact with the outside world.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "Those who directly conversed with the VIP (President) were extremely cautious. So, they agonized over it and consciously, intentionally, have been avoiding external contact all along."] 

He also explained that the classified information of the operation was so restricted that even high-ranking officials such as commanders or department heads had difficulty understanding the specific details.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "Ah... because of that, as you might know, there was a gap with the commanders or department heads, so the direct parties involved couldn't explicitly tell anyone about it."] 

He also recalled the tense atmosphere just before the declaration of martial law on December 3rd.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "But on December 3rd, it was very urgent. From the afternoon of December 3rd, it became very urgent, and connections were difficult to make. We were told to call later, and that's how it was handled in the evening."] 

Mr. A stated that the participants in the operation understood that President Yoon perceived both South Korea and the US to have been victims of election rigging.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "So, we understood that the VIP above was saying that the situation was ongoing in the same way for both the US and our country."] 

He added that they had early on identified Chinese involvement in the construction of the foreign dormitory at the Election Training Institute, which had undergone remodeling during the Moon Jae-in administration.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "But even then, there was talk about China. (Was it Chinese hackers, or just China in terms of diplomacy?) No, no, that was about the construction... directly, the secret construction... people who worked on that project also heard talk of China... everyone who knew at the time... (Did you say secret construction? Or operation? Building the Election Training Institute...) No, no, that... right, right. (The foreign dormitory next to it) The fact that talk of that came up had been discussed years ago."] 

Mr. A alluded to the process of acquiring classified information regarding the establishment of the foreign dormitory. This publication will withhold those details.

"Striving to confirm as closely as possible... Aware of US informants taking jobs near the training institute" 

When asked if he was aware of any indication of US intelligence operatives infiltrating the vicinity of the foreign dormitory, he unexpectedly replied, "Yes."

The intelligence analysis team, including the reporter, had never concluded that Ahn Byung-hee (Captain Korea, currently imprisoned for destruction of property at a police station), who acted erratically among the eight informants, was a US agent.

However, they closely monitored his four-month employment as a security guard at the Agricultural Museum near the foreign dormitory, observing the movements of the Election Training Institute as a highly suspicious circumstance.

The reporter and the analysis team attempted to conduct a background check on Mr. Ahn through intelligence agencies, as he knew about the captured spy ring information that we had obtained, but no significant findings emerged. An analysis of his social media (SNS) revealed a pattern of behavior inclined towards attention-seeking actions.

Although he claimed to be a former US Green Beret, he did not know the Green Beret marching song, spoke English at a basic level, and walked with a significant duck-like gait (outward-facing feet), with his feet spread more than 25 degrees apart. Furthermore, an individual with experience in intelligence agencies within the analysis team noted that his hands were clean and calloused, suggesting that his claim was false and that he likely had not undergone special training.

However, explaining how Mr. Ahn knew the information we had obtained was a separate issue. The analysis team found themselves in a dilemma.

Based on these judgment grounds, the reporter and the analysis team tentatively concluded that Mr. Ahn was either a white hat hacker, someone who had access to information on the Chinese spy ring in some capacity, or a collaborator with an intelligence agency. In fact, Mr. Ahn demonstrated his hacking program to the reporter via video call and claimed to be a member of the international hacker group "Anonymous."

In addition, Mr. Ahn exhibited peculiar behavior. On January 22nd, two days before the first official report by the Italian state news agency ANSA, he informed the reporter and the intelligence analysis team that "US forces in Europe will withdraw within 48 hours." The reporter received this intelligence during a call with Mr. Ahn in the early morning and shared it, but the analysis team deemed the possibility of it being true to be low. However, 48 hours later, ANSA reported it, and the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) cited and reported it, leading to this intelligence being globally recognized. The Trump administration did indeed announce a withdrawal plan.

Another individual from an intelligence agency, who leads our publication's intelligence team, personally visited Mr. Ahn's residence in Byeongjeom, Gyeonggi Province, and met with his father. Mr. Ahn continuously demanded money, leading to ongoing friction with individual members of the intelligence analysis team. The analysis team decided to consolidate communication channels, with the reporter exclusively tasked with extracting as much intelligence as possible from him and sharing it with the intelligence team.

After the first series of reports was published, on January 25th, the reporter intentionally asked Mr. A if he had identified Mr. Ahn as a potential US operative who had infiltrated the area, and surprisingly, Mr. A affirmatively responded that he was aware. The reporter immediately shared this response with the intelligence analysis team. Mr. A is not among the initial three sources. The reporter disclosed eight sources during the first police suspect interrogation on February 4th and refused to reveal any identities, asserting the reporter's privilege. As of July, the number of sources involved directly or indirectly in verification efforts is around 30.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "From their side too, for several years, their movements led our side to intensify surveillance. So, even then, we indirectly felt that they were trying to somehow get close and... get proper... confirmation. (Ah, so you were also aware, directly or indirectly, that US informants were employed nearby?) Yes, yes."] 

Meanwhile, Mr. A emphasized that the participants preparing for the operation risked their lives to maintain security and secrecy.

[Operation Preparation Participant (Voice Modulated): "Because it was a secret construction, it was said that the direct parties responsible for maintaining security and secrecy were risking their lives."] 

By Huh Gyeom