On August 26th, U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with President Lee Jae-myung upon his arrival at the White House in Washington D.C. [Photo=Yonhap News] 

[Table of Contents]

① Continuity of Trump-Biden-Trump through the NSS

② Policy Signals from Trump's Second Term National Security Strategy

③ Where is the Endpoint of Crisis Management Deterrence Strategy?

④ What Changes if Applied to the Korean Peninsula?

What Remains After the Deal is Done, and the Moment Choice is Forced

The strategy of Trump's second term can be summarized by the term 'cost-charging' allies, meaning 'collecting dues.' However, this is not the end. After shifting strategic direction, institutionalizing it, and passing costs onto allies, U.S. security strategy is now preparing to move to the next stage.

Instead of setting new goals, the U.S. is now focusing on sorting out existing relationships and identifying core partners. It no longer manages all alliances with equal weight and is entering a phase of reclassifying alliances based on roles and responsibilities tied to cost-sharing.

The essence of U.S. strategy after passing costs onto allies is not power expansion. Instead of broadening fronts or increasing interventions, it aims to streamline existing strategic frameworks and maximize efficiency.

This does not signify an abandonment of hegemony, but rather a shift towards maximizing practical benefits by lowering maintenance costs. The U.S. will retain its leadership but will present clear 'deal terms' instead of opaque security promises. It will rebuild the international order by meticulously calculating the roles and responsibilities each country will shoulder, expressed in numbers.

△ Step 1. 'Grading' of Alliances

The first change following the 'dues collection strategy' is the hierarchical ranking of alliances. The single bloc of 'alliance' will break down and be divided into core partners, functional contributors, and temporary cooperation partners.

The criteria for grading will not be democratic values or past history, but rather tangible contributions and actual response capabilities. In this process, some allies will become core members sharing the strategy, while others will be relegated to subcontractor partners performing only specific roles. The level of protection provided by the U.S. will vary according to this grade.

△ Step 2. From Automatic Intervention to Crisis Management

The second characteristic is the change in deterrence methods. The past approach of automatic intervention during crises is no longer the default. The U.S. will now focus on deterrence at a crisis management level. Rather than preempting provocations, the emphasis will be on controlling the spread of crises and reducing costs.

The decision of U.S. intervention will be made conditionally, based on the nature of the incident, the allies' contributions, and U.S. interests. Allies will find themselves in a situation where they must handle the incurred risks themselves, rather than relying on and expecting U.S. protection.

△ Step 3. Integration of Economy, Technology, and Supply Chains is Key

As the U.S. realigns its strategy around national interest, the scope of security will expand comprehensively. Now, not only military and diplomacy, but also the economy, technology, and supply chains themselves are security matters. Tariffs, export controls, and technology standards are no longer secondary tools.

These will become the most powerful tools for aligning allies with U.S. strategy. In the future, the deciding factor between ally and adversary will not be traditional military cooperation. The depth of engagement within the U.S.-led technology and supply chain framework will become the standard for survival.

△ Step 4. 'U.S. Designs, Regions Execute'

The U.S. will focus on designing the overall framework, while the burden of execution will be shifted to regional allies. In the Indo-Pacific, Japan's role will increase, and in Europe, major powers will be mandated to take responsibility for their respective regions.

This solidifies a structure where the U.S. retains leadership from behind, while initial costs and risks are borne by regional nations. This is not about avoiding intervention, but rather about reversing the order of who steps forward first, meaning U.S. intervention becomes the 'last resort'.

△ Step 5. Selective Maintenance of Ambiguity

Interestingly, strategic ambiguity will not disappear entirely. However, this ambiguity will be employed not for the benefit of allies, but to preserve U.S. options.

While the roles allies are expected to play and the costs they must bear will become increasingly clear, when and how the U.S. will intervene will remain shrouded in mystery. This is not to leave room for negotiation, but to assert the U.S.'s exclusive right to judge the situation and make decisions.

△ Questions for South Korea

These steps do not signify the dissolution of alliances. Rather, they represent a process of pragmatically reshaping alliances. However, this change is difficult to reverse.

Once a hierarchy is established and roles are solidified, the level of protection the U.S. will provide in times of crisis will also be determined within that framework. The time to debate the direction of the strategy has passed. What remains is to determine where one will stand within the framework designed by the U.S.

The questions South Korea will face in the future are not simple. It's not just about whether to agree or disagree with the U.S., but about which grade it will be assigned. It will become increasingly clear whether it will remain a core partner, become a contributor for specific tasks, or be classified as a mere management target. This grading will be a harsh report card reflecting the accumulation of past choices.

The U.S. security strategy does not begin with grand new declarations. Quietly but surely, a selection process will be underway to identify who will be considered core partners and who will be excluded.

The reason this process is dangerous is not due to a sudden break in relationships. The real problem is that the changes will occur gradually, as if they are everyday occurrences, leading to costs that are irreversible only when it's too late.

The next phase of U.S. strategy has already begun. The remaining key is when and in what manner its true substance will be fully revealed before our eyes.

It cannot be definitively stated that these prospects will materialize exactly as described. However, in strategic response, proactive analysis that anticipates events is always overwhelmingly more important than post-event interpretation.

In this phase where the U.S. is 'collecting dues' from its allies and prioritizing national interest, understanding the direction of their security strategy will be the starting point for our efforts to survive.

Trump's 1st Term NSS (2017, PDF)

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Biden Administration NSS (2022, PDF)

https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

Trump's 2nd Term NSS (2025, PDF)

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf