Gunpo City Hall inspecting the implementation of the 5-day driving restriction. On the 25th, the first day of strengthened implementation of the public sector's 5-day driving restriction as an energy conservation measure due to the Middle East situation, public institutions nationwide generally carried out the system in a calm atmosphere. [Photo=Yonhap News]

As energy supply and demand instability becomes a reality due to rising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, the government has stepped in to curb demand by introducing a '5-day driving ban for passenger cars'.

However, criticism of "yet another belated response" is emerging from the market. This is because the approach of reducing consumption without securing supply is being repeated.

The starting point of this controversy is '900,000 barrels of crude oil'.

Despite the government having the priority purchase right for the jointly managed international reserves stored in Ulsan, it failed to exercise this right in a timely manner, resulting in the oil being exported. Consequently, strategic reserves that could have been used in a crisis have effectively disappeared.

The problem is that this incident revealed not just an administrative error but a structural limitation. The government has consistently emphasized "sufficient reserves." However, if these reserves did not function in an actual crisis, it is a systemic issue, not just a matter of numbers. It means that while the reserves existed, they were unusable.

In this situation, the government's move is the '5-day driving ban for passenger cars.' This measure aims to reduce fuel consumption by restricting vehicle operation. This approach, which also appeared during past oil crises, is a typical administrative tool for crisis response. However, the market is raising concerns that this measure might be an attempt to "cover up supply failures with demand control."

Indeed, the current response pattern shows a consistent trend.

Failure to secure supply → Price increase → Demand suppression policy → Burden shifted to citizens.

The direction of policy is shifting from market response to control. In particular, the fact that post-crisis measures were implemented before proactive responses, despite anticipated instability in crude oil supply and demand, raises questions about the government's crisis management capabilities.

The bigger problem is trust.

The government has repeatedly stated that "energy reserves are sufficient." However, this incident revealed how detached those words are from reality. It has been confirmed that the crucial factor is not the scale of reserves but whether they can actually be used.

The most important factor in energy policy is 'time'.

Secured quantities at the onset of a crisis represent not just volume but also room for response. The 900,000 barrels lost this time are not merely a few hours' worth of consumption, but a loss of time for initial response.

As a result, the government has resorted to the easiest option once again: consumption control.

However, the market already knows this. It knows that control policies, in a state where supply has been missed, are not a fundamental solution.

This situation is not simply an energy supply and demand issue.

It poses the question: "Is the crisis response system actually functioning?"

And the answer, based on the flow so far, is far from positive.