President Lee Jae-myung's X posts are becoming a starting point for controversies in diplomacy, markets, and politics. [Photo=Yonhap News Agency Composite]President Lee Jae-myung's X can no longer be seen as a simple communication channel with the public.

Looking back at the publicly reported news in chronological order from late January to mid-April, the president directly addressed various issues such as diplomacy and security, international controversies, media disputes, real estate, oil prices, and stock prices, sending strong messages first. This was repeatedly followed by explanations and damage control efforts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Office, ministries, and relevant agencies.

The problem is not the fact that the president uses social media (SNS). Rather, it is that in some sensitive matters, a larger political framework has taken precedence over practical explanations and coordination.

Based on public reports, the only confirmed case of deletion is the Cambodian post. However, regardless of whether it was deleted or not, posts related to Israel, the dispute over SBS's "Unanswered Questions," the controversy over former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's "Guseong" remarks, and messages on real estate, oil prices, and stock prices all led to further explanations, diplomatic damage control, apologies, and follow-up policy responses.

While the outcomes differed, the starting points were similar: the president's direct posts came first, followed by the widening repercussions and subsequent actions by working-level officials.

Deleted Posts, Lingering Burden

The post responding to the Cambodian scam is the clearest example of this structure.

On the morning of January 30, President Lee posted on X in Korean and Khmer with a message to the effect of "If you mess with Koreans, you'll be ruined," and captured screenshots of the post were included in the news reports at the time.

However, after Cambodia inquired about the meaning of the post through the South Korean ambassador to Cambodia on February 2, the post was deleted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained this as "routine communication," and the Presidential Office stated that it was "presumed that it was deemed sufficiently publicized."

A strong message intended for domestic crime response led to diplomatic explanations and deletion.

The significance of this case lies not in the deletion itself, but in the timeline. Direct language for domestic consumption was posted first, followed by the other country's reaction, and then deletion and clarification. Diplomatic issues originated from the president's personal account, not from the coordination of the diplomatic line.

The Cambodian case most vividly illustrates the burden that strong messages incur when they cross national borders.

Posting Came First

The timeline of damage control, rather than deletion, is clear for the post related to Israel.

On April 10, President Lee shared a video and mentioned forced mobilization of comfort women, the Holocaust, and killing during wartime together. On the same day, he added a post explaining that the video was a real situation from September 2024 and that related investigations had been conducted.

However, it was the following day that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially explained that "the president's remarks were misunderstood." On April 15, then-Foreign Minister Cho Hyun stated that Israel had accepted South Korea's explanation and the situation was resolved.

The starting point was the president's account, and the resolution was handled by the diplomatic line.

The dispute over SBS's "Unanswered Questions" shows a similar structure.

On March 20, President Lee mentioned a broadcast from the past that dealt with "gangster involvement rumors" on X and demanded further reporting. Later that day, the Presidential Office requested further reporting from the relevant media outlets, and that evening, the production team of SBS's "Unanswered Questions" apologized for raising suspicions without grounds.

Although there was no deletion, the president's direct post came first, followed by the Presidential Office's actions and the broadcaster's apology on the same day, indicating that the president's X served as a catalyst for the subsequent procedures of the issue.

The president and the ruling party do not agree with this criticism.

On February 13, President Lee quoted a citizen's reaction, "I look forward to the president's posts," and stated, "Of course, I communicate with the sovereign," and the Blue House explained this as part of an effort to expand communication based on SNS.

The president and the ruling party view this not as an impulsive intervention, but as a responsible direct communication and an expression of policy will.

Signal Sent to the Market

In the economic sector, "preemptive signals" are more important than deletions or apologies.

On January 25, President Lee sent a strong signal to the market on X, stating that anyone expecting a renewed deferral of the heavy capital gains tax for multiple homeowners would be "mistaken."

On March 13, he wrote on X, "If you find gas stations violating the maximum oil price system, please report them to me," and about an hour and a half later, he posted a screenshot of a price map of gas stations in the Siheung area.

In the stock market as well, he repeatedly sent messages about market regulation, writing on January 14, "Stock manipulation leading to ruin is not an empty threat," on January 29, "The stock exchange is a kind of department store," and again on February 6, "Stock manipulation leading to ruin."

In economic matters, a pattern emerged where the president's personal messages were read as market signals before the detailed design of policies.

The oil price aspect even confirms follow-up response figures.

According to reports citing data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, on March 13, the first day of the implementation of the maximum oil price system, as of 2 PM, 4,633 out of 10,646 gas stations nationwide lowered their gasoline prices compared to the previous day's closing price.

While it cannot be definitively concluded that the president's message directly led to price reductions, it is clear that the president's direct call for reporting, the government's on-site enforcement, and actual price adjustments all occurred simultaneously on the same day.

Divergent Reactions and Concerns

Reactions from the market and political circles were mixed. 

Reports on January 25, the day the policy to end the heavy capital gains tax deferral was announced, described discounted urgent sales at hundreds of millions of won lower in Gangnam reconstruction complexes and a widespread wait-and-see attitude among buyers. Other articles quoted real estate agents in Songpa and Mapo areas introducing inquiries from multiple homeowners who were "desperate not to be unable to sell their homes."

Conversely, the People Power Party criticized the president's subsequent suggestion of abolishing the special deduction for long-term holding and his SNS remarks, saying, "They approach a market where sophisticated expectations and psychology operate with simplistic messages." In the economic sphere, the president's messages functioned as both policy promotion and market stimulus signals.

Concerns have also been raised within the domestic political science community.

Shin Yul, a professor of political diplomacy at Myongji University, pointed out in a Maeil Business Newspaper column in February that "the president's words, which should undergo rigorous internal vetting and be restrained, are being released unfiltered through emotional SNS, which is not appropriate for Korean political culture."

This suggests that while the president's direct posts may offer the advantage of communication, they can simultaneously create issues of verification and restraint.

How the Issues Have Shifted

The controversy over former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's "Guseong" remarks is the most recent example.

On March 6, Minister Chung mentioned Yongbyon, Guseong, and Kangseon as areas where North Korea's uranium enrichment facilities are operating, in the National Assembly. However, reports on the same day indicated that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi's report only mentioned Yongbyon and Kangseon.

Subsequently, reports emerged that the United States had restricted some intelligence sharing with North Korea. Reuters reported on April 1 that "President Lee dismissed claims that the leak of classified information provided by the United States was preposterous, stating that the existence of nuclear facilities in Guseong was known through research reports and media coverage even before Minister Chung's remarks on X."

The core of this case is not deletion, but a shift in the issue. Originally, the accuracy and source of the statement were the problem, but after the president's direct intervention, the dispute over "premised on leakage" came to the forefront.

The case of Chung Dong-young clearly illustrates one characteristic of Lee Jae-myung's X politics.

After the president intervenes, the issue does not simply conclude; rather, the original question transforms into a different question.

From a discussion about the accuracy, basis, and repercussions of a statement, a larger political front of "leakage or not" suddenly emerges. This is less about strengthening explanations and more about rearranging the focus of the issue.

The Paradox of Direct Communication

What is needed at this point is not simple criticism, but a standard for interpretation.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) views public communication as having a strategic function only when it is designed based on audience analysis and evidence, and possesses consistency in explanation and evaluability.

By this standard, the approach where the president's personal account first defines an issue and ministries and aides follow with explanations, while it may be direct communication, creates tension as institutional communication.

This is because the focus of the message is more likely to shift to political framing rather than policy explanation.

The interpretation from the diplomatic perspective is similar.

The Brookings Institution, a U.S. think tank, points out that while digital diplomacy provides governments with direct reach and speed, it also carries the risk of incurring costs to national image and foreign policy messages in a short period.

By this standard, the cases of Cambodia and Israel demonstrate how direct language or value judgments intended for domestic audiences can escalate into diplomatic issues once they cross borders.

When the speed of message diffusion outpaces the speed of coordination, working-level officials are easily relegated from explainers to damage controllers.

The interpretation from the market perspective is not significantly different.

The European Central Bank (ECB) explains that policymakers' words move the expectations of financial markets and economic actors, and communication itself becomes a policy tool.

It is not only what is said, but also who says it and how many voices speak simultaneously that directly affect the formation of expectations and confusion.

While this standard cannot be directly applied to Korean politics, in areas where expectation formation is important, such as real estate, oil prices, and stock prices, repeated direct messages from the president lead the market to read the president's signals before institutional ones.

This means that political messages can be consumed as leading indicators before policy explanations.

The Problem Is Not X Itself

Ultimately, the question is simple: Is President Lee Jae-myung's X a channel for direct communication with the public, or a tool for political intervention that reconfigures the speed and meaning of an issue?

When publicly reported news is reconstructed chronologically, scenes closer to the latter have been repeated, at least on several sensitive issues.

Cambodia led to deletion, Israel to diplomatic damage control, "Unanswered Questions" to apologies and follow-up measures, real estate, oil prices, and stocks to preemptive signals and on-site response figures, and the Chung Dong-young controversy to a rearrangement of the issues.

Although the outcomes differed, the common structure is clearly discernible: the president's direct posts shake up the issue first, and working-level officials follow.

The problem is not that the president uses SNS.

The more important question is whether the original structure of an issue changes the moment the president's X appears. The cases confirmed so far offer answers that are not to be taken lightly.

In some cases, the president's direct posts have prioritized framing over explanation, reaction over coordination, and personal messages over institutional ones.

As long as this is repeated, X cannot help but be seen not as a simple communication channel, but as a political variable that shakes the buffer zones of state affairs.

※ This article has undergone verification of factual accuracy, logic, and source consistency according to the ALO System (patent pending).