Cheon Jun-ho, acting floor leader of the Democratic Party, and members of the special committee on the state investigation, are submitting the 'Special Prosecutor Act on Unveiling the Truth of Fabricated Indictments by the Yoon Suk-yeol Political Prosecution' to the National Assembly's Legislative Affairs Division on the 30th.  

The Democratic Party is pushing forward with the so-called 'Fabricated Indictment Special Prosecutor Act.' The justification is to investigate allegations of fabricated investigations and indictments by the prosecution under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. If there were any illegalities in the prosecution's investigation, they should naturally be revealed. However, the problem lies in the method. 

This bill is understood to include cases related to President Lee Jae-myung as targets for special prosecution and to allow the special prosecutor to determine whether to maintain the indictment for cases they receive.  

If the President's own criminal cases are handled by a special prosecutor appointed by the President, and that special prosecutor can decide whether to pursue the indictment, this cannot avoid the controversy of a "self-special prosecution" rather than uncovering the truth. 

The issue is not the format of the bill, but its content. 

Even just looking at the core contentious points of the bill that have been disclosed through the media, this bill goes beyond the scope of a typical special prosecutor act. 

The core structure includes cases related to the President as targets for special prosecution, allows the special prosecutor to receive cases currently under investigation or indictment by the prosecution, and permits the special prosecutor to decide on maintaining the indictment for received cases. 

This goes beyond investigating allegations of fabricated indictments and 'opens the door to redesigning the President's own criminal risk through the special prosecution process.'

Of course, it is too early to definitively say that the proposed bill will be submitted to the plenary session as is. There remains the possibility that clauses will be adjusted or some "poison pills" will be modified during the review process by the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee. 

However, given the way the Democratic Party has handled major contentious bills so far, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of a forceful passage. 

Therefore, it is even more crucial that constitutional issues such as the controversy over the right to withdraw indictments, special provisions for presidential records, and the possibility of investigating the Supreme Court's decision-making process be thoroughly scrutinized by the public before any plenary session action. 

The first issue with this bill, as revealed through the media, is the conflict of interest. 

Even if the nomination process for special prosecutor candidates formally goes through various political parties, the fact remains that the final appointing authority is President Lee Jae-myung. Yet, it is being reported that numerous cases related to President Lee Jae-myung are included among the investigation targets. 

If the President's own cases are investigated by a special prosecutor appointed by the President, and that special prosecutor can even decide on whether to maintain the indictment, it directly conflicts with the judicial principles of a free democratic country. 

Those in power must stand before the law. Those in power must not pull the law towards themselves. 

The second issue is the controversy over the withdrawal of indictments. 

If a special prosecutor can receive cases that are under investigation or indictment by the prosecutor and can decide on whether to maintain the indictment for those cases, it effectively opens the possibility of withdrawing indictments. Cases pending in court should be argued in court. If there are illegalities in the prosecution's investigation, responsibility should be pursued through separate procedures. 

However, bringing a presidential case that is already on trial to a special prosecutor to re-evaluate whether to maintain the indictment is an entirely different matter. This is not about scrutinizing a trial but about redesigning the trial structure. 

The third issue is the provision for sentence reduction or exemption. 

If there is a provision that opens the possibility of reducing or exempting sentences for those who cooperate with the investigation, while it cannot be definitively equated to the American plea bargaining system, it creates a structure that induces testimony by offering criminal benefits. 

Even in investigations of general crimes, testimony bargains raise issues of credibility. Moreover, the risks are amplified when this is combined with a structure where a special prosecutor handles cases related to the President and that special prosecutor can decide on maintaining the indictment. It is difficult to avoid suspicion that related individuals may give testimony in a specific direction in anticipation of criminal benefits. 

The fourth issue is the possibility of expanding investigations into the judiciary's decisions. 

The Dong-A Ilbo reported that Articles 4 and 5 of Article 2 of this bill include cases related to complaints and reports of alleged offenses and cases recognized during the special prosecution within the scope of the investigation, potentially expanding the investigation to include the Supreme Court's retrial process for President Lee Jae-myung's public election law case, according to legal circles' concerns. 

If the special prosecution can target the deliberation process of the Supreme Court's full bench, this is not simply an issue of investigating fabricated indictments. It raises deeper issues of the separation of powers, as the executive and legislative branches, through special legislation, can subject the final decision-making process of the judiciary to post-hoc investigation. 

The fifth issue is the controversy over the disclosure of presidential records. 

The Dong-A Ilbo reported that this bill lowers the criteria for accessing designated presidential records from the current two-thirds of the total number of National Assembly members to three-fifths, and relaxes the authority for issuing warrants for the seizure and search of presidential records from the presiding high court chief judge to a judge of the competent district court. 

Legal analyses point to Article 6, Paragraph 5, Subparagraph 2 of the special prosecutor bill as the provision relaxing the authority for issuing warrants related to presidential records. The system of designated presidential records is a constitutional safeguard designed to prevent the politically motivated inspection of sensitive records of former administrations each time the government changes. 

If a special prosecutor act lowers this standard through special legislation, it is an act that shakes the presidential records protection system under the guise of investigating fabricated indictments. 

This bill carries the potential for unconstitutionality, going beyond mere political controversy. 

First, the structure of conflict of interest where a special prosecutor appointed by the President handles the President's own cases. The appointment of an investigative body that can influence one's own case by those in power conflicts with the fundamental principles of rule of law in a free democracy. 

Second, allowing a special prosecutor to determine whether to maintain an indictment for a case pending trial can undermine judicial independence. Cases already ongoing in court must be decided based on evidence and legal principles in court. Redesigning the existence of such cases through special legislation is bound to lead to controversy over political intervention in trial procedures. 

Third, the fact that the broad wording "cases recognized during the investigation" could extend the investigation to the Supreme Court's retrial process is also problematic. If the scope of the investigation is not clearly defined, the law becomes open to arbitrary interpretation by those in power. This can lead to controversy over violations of the principle of clarity. 

Fourth, if the structure lowers the criteria for accessing designated presidential records through special legislation, it becomes a problem of circumventing the presidential records protection system. The presidential records system is a constitutional safeguard intended to prevent former government records from becoming targets of political investigation upon a change of administration. Lowering this through a specific special prosecutor act goes beyond the pretext of investigating fabricated indictments and shakes the order of record access for power institutions. 

A bill with such contentious issues cannot be pushed forward solely on the pretext of investigating fabricated indictments. 

The Democratic Party must first explain to the public the controversy over the withdrawal of indictments, the conflict of interest issues, the possibility of investigating the Supreme Court's decision-making process, and the suspicions surrounding the relaxation of criteria for accessing presidential records. 

A special prosecutor act that fails to address the controversy over unconstitutionality is not a truth-finding law but merely a bill that tests the constitutional order. 

The problem of the overuse of special prosecutors is also serious. 

Since the Lee Jae-myung administration, several special prosecutors have been activated or are being pursued, including those for rebellion, Kim Keon-hee, Chae Sang-byeong, permanent special prosecutors for customs revenue and Coupang, and a second comprehensive special prosecutor. With the addition of the fabricated indictment special prosecutor act, this would be the sixth special prosecutor initiative during the current administration. 

Special prosecution is originally an exceptional measure. It is a system operated temporarily when there are significant doubts about the fairness of existing investigative agencies. However, when special prosecutions are repeated, another special prosecution is created due to the shortcomings of a previous one, and a special prosecution targeting the President is pursued again, this is no longer an exception. It is the normalization of special prosecution. 

The issue of budget cannot be ignored either. 

Based on verifiable estimated budgets alone, it is calculated that at least 44.16 billion won will be spent on three special prosecutors, permanent special prosecutors, and the second comprehensive special prosecutor. If the fabricated indictment special prosecutor, which can involve up to 350 investigators and be conducted for up to 180 days, becomes a reality, the total cost of special prosecutions could balloon to around 80 billion won. 

The People Power Party argues that including subsequent costs such as maintaining indictments, the existing special prosecutions alone would cost at least 67 billion won. With the addition of the fabricated indictment special prosecutor, the debate over special prosecution budgets could escalate into a 100 billion won taxpayer money controversy. 

Public taxes and government organizations do not exist to handle the legal risks of those in power. Special prosecution should be a sword for monitoring power, not a shield for defending it. 

If cases involving the President's own criminal accusations are entrusted to a special prosecutor appointed by the President, and that special prosecutor is allowed to decide whether to maintain the indictment, the public will not see this as uncovering the truth. It is impossible to avoid criticism of "self-special prosecution" and "self-exoneration." 

The Democratic Party must stop now. To investigate the allegations of fabricated indictments, they must first address the controversy over unconstitutionality and the conflict of interest issues. 

The controversy over the withdrawal of indictments, provisions for sentence reduction, the possibility of investigating the Supreme Court's retrial process, the suspicions surrounding the relaxation of presidential records access criteria, and the budget estimates and scale of personnel deployment are all subject to public scrutiny. 

Pushing forward a law that hands over the President's cases to a special prosecutor appointed by the President is a challenge to the rule of law in a free democracy. 

The Democratic Party must immediately cease its pursuit of the President's self-special prosecution law. Legislation that places the President above the law can never be permitted within the constitutional order of the Republic of Korea.