Kim Ju-ae, identified as the successor to Kim Jong-un (right). [Photo=KCNA]

U.S. political columnist Gene Cummings analyzed that the upcoming U.S.-China summit will be "the final battlefield for Trump's strategy on the Korean Peninsula."

In a Facebook post on the 9th, Cummings stated, "The summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, to be held in Beijing on the 14th and 15th, will be the first major step in reordering the entire Northeast Asian order." He predicted, "It is highly likely that the North Korean issue will be seriously addressed following this summit."

He further predicted that the Korean Peninsula will become the final battlefield for Trump's strategy, and that the grand prelude is now beginning.

He analyzed Trump's strategy as "The United States will proactively manage the North Korean issue, while the Lee Jae-myung administration in South Korea will be thoroughly bound by a multi-layered pressure structure of △Kill Web △tariffs △defense cost sharing." He added, "This is a calculation to partially detach North Korea from China's sphere of influence while simultaneously preventing South Korea from leaning towards China."

The following is the full text of Gene Cummings' Facebook post.

President Trump, now entering a phase of consolidating the Iran issue, will hold a summit with President Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 14-15.

This is not a simple bilateral diplomatic schedule. It is the negotiation table where the U.S. and China will directly confront each other in the ultimate goal of all strategies pursued by the Trump administration, namely the hegemony competition with China.

The meeting between the two leaders will be a decisive showdown determining the direction of the U.S.-China economic war, and the first major step in reordering the entire Northeast Asian order.

Furthermore, it is highly likely that the North Korean issue will be seriously addressed following this summit with President Xi Jinping. Ultimately, the Korean Peninsula will become the final battlefield for Trump's strategy, and the grand prelude is now beginning.

Based on my observations of Trump's deal-making mindset and recent moves, his strategy is clearly outlined as follows:

First, after pragmatically aligning with China, the U.S. will proactively manage the North Korean issue, and South Korea, i.e., the Lee Jae-myung administration, will be thoroughly bound by a multi-layered pressure structure of Kill Web, tariffs, and defense cost sharing.

This is a calculation to create a "Cold Peace" by partially detaching North Korea from China's sphere of influence, while simultaneously preventing South Korea from leaning towards China.

Beijing Summit - China is brought to the 'deal table' first

The core demand Trump will make most strongly to Xi Jinping is clear.

It is: "Reduce strategic ties with Iran and acknowledge U.S. leadership on the North Korean issue." In return, Trump is likely to offer substantial tariff reductions, easing of some technology export restrictions, and limited breathing room necessary for China's economic recovery.

However, Trump's plan does not stop at simply concluding trade negotiations with China. It has a larger objective of securing strategic space for the U.S. to negotiate directly with North Korea without direct Chinese interference, while simultaneously reaching a certain level of deal with China.

Of course, China will not completely abandon North Korea. North Korea remains China's security buffer and a geopolitical card to check the U.S.

Therefore, what Trump is demanding from Xi Jinping will likely not be complete surrender or a declaration of abandoning North Korea. A more realistic goal is to ensure that China does not actively interfere with the U.S.'s direct involvement and proactive negotiations on the North Korean issue.

In other words, what Trump is seeking is likely not public concessions, but strategic acquiescence from China on the North Korean issue.

Over the past year, Trump has been systematically dismantling the surrounding pillars that have sustained China's power, in order to pressure China from multiple fronts.

He has neutralized Venezuela and Iran, and visited Asian countries within China's sphere of influence, establishing direct dealings with their leaders. This created an intermediate barrier, making it difficult for China to re-extend its reach to these countries.

By managing and consolidating the key pillars China has used to expand its global hegemony, such as exports, crude oil, energy, currency, and digital infrastructure, he has created an environment where China finds it difficult to refuse U.S. demands.

This is not a strategy to defeat China head-on in one go. It is a form of strategic pruning that narrows China's external sphere of influence by incrementally constricting the peripheral passages and detours China relies on. By sequentially pressuring the external pillars that sustain China's power, it is a method of reducing China's options at the negotiation table with the U.S.

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This strategy has the effect of thwarting China's bid for global hegemony and is also a preparatory step to directly address the North Korean issue. To deal with the most troublesome problem of North Korea, the space for China's intervention behind North Korea must first be reduced.

Therefore, the realistic goal Trump seeks to achieve from Xi Jinping at this summit is clear: to obtain an implicit concession that China will not actively interfere in the U.S.'s process of proactively managing the North Korean issue.

In other words, President Trump's visit to China is not simply a schedule for a trade agreement, but a strategic step to first consolidate the periphery of the North Korean issue through a deal with China, and then bring the North Korean and Korean Peninsula issues onto his direct negotiation table.

Therefore, this Beijing summit is both a negotiation ground that will determine the direction of the U.S.-China economic war and a preparatory step towards the Korean Peninsula issue.

And the final stage will ultimately be the Korean Peninsula.

Trump's North Korea Strategy - A Two-State System on the Korean Peninsula and Managed Peace

To properly understand the essence of President Trump's envisioned North Korea strategy, it is crucial to examine recent changes in U.S. national security and defense strategies.

For many years, the U.S. has identified North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as a core threat in its National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defense Strategy (NDS) reports. However, recent trends show a gradual shift from viewing North Korea solely as a nuclear threat to be eliminated, to seeing it as a nuclear and missile-possessing actor that needs to be realistically managed. This is not merely a change in wording.

This can be seen as an important signal that the Trump administration is recognizing North Korea not as an "entity that must be eliminated," but as a realistic entity with which to manage and make deals.

From his first term, President Trump sought to deal with North Korea through negotiation rather than elimination. His North Korea strategy is to realistically abandon complete denuclearization, but instead freeze nuclear weapons through negotiations, and establish a peace treaty with North Korea to partially ally with the U.S.

This will have a significant and profound impact on South Korea.

It appears the U.S. already acknowledges that achieving complete denuclearization of North Korea is practically impossible. Therefore, President Trump's chosen method is to recognize North Korea as a state of "managed coexistence."

In other words, there is a high possibility that North Korea will be officially recognized as an independent sovereign state. This aligns perfectly with the situation where North Korea has also removed the unification clause from its constitution.

Conclusion of a Peace Treaty or End-of-War Declaration

Trump's approach to North Korea is likely to lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty or an end-of-war declaration. Furthermore, a compromise is highly probable, involving not complete denuclearization, but a freeze on nuclear weapons, with limited U.S. inspections and joint management.

He may propose selective sanctions relief and economic exchange with North Korea to Kim Jong-un, including investment in special economic zones and the opening of U.S.-North Korea trade channels.

Trump will actively exploit the fact that Kim Jong-un intensely dislikes being "manipulated" by China, in order to guide North Korea away from excessive dependence on China.

In particular, the fact that Kim Jong-un is actively grooming his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, as his successor is an important variable in this negotiation. To ensure a stable generational transition after his death, Kim Jong-un desperately needs economic stability and regime security guarantees.

If Kim Jong-un is considering a succession plan for his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, he will prioritize ensuring the stability and survival of the Kim Ju-ae regime in the long term. From Kim Jong-un's perspective, the most important thing is the survival of the North Korean regime, and ensuring that the regime does not collapse under external pressure if Kim Ju-ae becomes his successor.

In this regard, Kim Jong-un may consider a path of establishing limited relations with the U.S. and obtaining a certain level of regime security guarantees and economic growth opportunities from the U.S., rather than relying solely on China.

If Trump offers the proposal, "We will manage your nuclear weapons, and in return, we will help your economy grow and recognize you as a state," there is clearly a significant possibility that North Korea will agree.

Consequently, Trump is likely to seek to achieve both historical legacy and strategic benefits by partially separating North Korea from China and transforming it into a "manageable nuclear state."

South Korean Political Landscape Following North Korea's Limited Opening

If the U.S. signs a peace treaty with North Korea, effectively recognizing it as an independent state, and enters into a relationship of partial exchange with North Korea, there will inevitably be significant changes in the South Korean political landscape.

First, pro-North Korean and anti-U.S. political forces in South Korea will see their influence greatly diminished. The pro-North Korean and anti-U.S. political discourse in South Korea has so far been based on the premise that "the U.S. is the root cause of tension on the Korean Peninsula, and the North Korean issue should be resolved through national solidarity and inter-Korean reconciliation."

However, if North Korea no longer views the U.S. as an absolute threat, but rather seeks direct dealings with the U.S. for regime guarantees and limited avenues for economic opening, the traditional inter-Korean discourse of the South Korean progressive camp will be fundamentally shaken.

North Korea is not currently on friendly terms with the Lee Jae-myung administration either. Instead, North Korea has been moving in a direction where it no longer views South Korea as a fellow nation or an object of unification, but defines it as a hostile state.

This is not merely a rhetorical shift, but can be seen as a trend where North Korea is seeking to redefine inter-Korean relations from the past framework of national solidarity to a relationship between separate states.

In this situation, if North Korea improves its limited relations with the U.S., and the U.S. no longer poses an immediate threat to the North Korean regime, the rationale for the existence of pro-North Korean forces in South Korea could rapidly weaken.

The moment North Korea begins direct dealings with the U.S., a South Korean progressive administration tilted towards China and worsening relations with the U.S. could become not only unhelpful but even an inconvenient obstacle to North Korea.

Conversely, if a pro-U.S. administration takes power in South Korea, and the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea can forge a new relationship through limited economic exchange and security coordination, it would align with Trump's desired direction for a reordering of the Korean Peninsula.

This is why Trump believes there is no need to directly confront anti-U.S. and pro-North Korean forces in South Korea.

The moment the U.S. strikes a direct agreement with North Korea, the political rationale of anti-U.S. and pro-North Korean movements, which they have relied on for decades, will be shaken to its core. If North Korea no longer exclusively chooses confrontation with the U.S., anti-U.S. forces in South Korea will lose their footing.

Trump's objective is unlikely to be limited to simply managing the North Korean threat. He will seek to detach North Korea from China's sphere of influence and bring the entire Korean Peninsula back into a U.S.-led order.

For all of this to materialize, the Korean Peninsula must break free from China's sphere of influence. If China continues to hold onto North Korea, and the South Korean political establishment is also leaning towards China, the overall strategic framework for the Korean Peninsula will not easily change, even if the U.S. negotiates directly with North Korea.

Therefore, the reason Trump intends to negotiate with Xi Jinping this time is likely not solely for a trade agreement or tariff adjustments. Its deeper purpose is likely to reduce China's space for intervention on the Korean Peninsula, bring the North Korean issue onto the U.S.'s direct negotiation table, and ultimately, to separate the entire Korean Peninsula from China's sphere of influence.

Ultimately, Trump's long-term vision may not be limited to nuclear non-proliferation negotiations with North Korea. He may seek to separate the Korean Peninsula from China's sphere of influence, bring North Korea into a limited opening system that the U.S. can directly manage, and in the process, potentially dismantle the structural rationale of pro-North Korean and anti-U.S. political forces within South Korea.

If this materializes, the final battlefield on the Korean Peninsula will not be a military conflict, but a major realignment of the political order.

A Thorough Management Strategy for the Lee Jae-myung Administration

While the Trump administration offers carrots to North Korea, it appears to be approaching South Korea in a completely different manner.

Trump's greatest concern is that the Lee Jae-myung administration is leaning towards China under the guise of pro-China and balanced diplomacy. Therefore, South Korea has been classified as a target for structural, continuous control.

Thus, one of the key strategies to bind South Korea to the U.S. defense network is the Kill Web.

In an interview with Japanese media on April 28, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Gen. Paul J. LaCamera (erroneously attributed to Brunson in original text), emphasized the need to connect the military capabilities of the U.S. and its allies into a single entity, stating, "We must connect complementary capabilities through a Kill Web to maximize joint, all-domain effects. No alliance can exist in isolation."

The Kill Web is a strategy that integrates all sensors, command and control systems, and weapon platforms across the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains of allied nations into a single, vast real-time network.

This is a network-centric warfare system that realizes the principle of "Any sensor can cue any shooter," completely integrating the information gathering, command and control, and strike capabilities of South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.

This concept is an operational means for the First Island Chain defense strategy emphasized in the 2026 U.S. Defense Strategy (NDS). As proposed by Gen. Paul J. LaCamera in late April, it is a network-centric warfare system that integrates sensor, command and control, and weapon systems of South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines in real-time.

This strategy emerges from the modern warfare environment, which has shifted from the era of land-based defense to a focus on space-based early warning and air and space operations. This Kill Web strategy will be the most powerful tool for the Trump administration to manage South Korea.

Once all sensors of the South Korean military, including radar, drones, and missiles, are connected to the U.S.-led network, the U.S. will be able to monitor and control South Korean military operations in real-time. This serves as the ultimate insurance policy against South Korea drifting into China's sphere of influence and, in effect, a means of military control.

Economic Pressure

This will be accompanied by economic and financial pressure. Tariffs will be used for continuous management of key industries such as automobiles, semiconductors, and steel, and a significant increase in defense cost sharing to 4-5% of GDP will be demanded.

Furthermore, instead of directly engaging with the Lee Jae-myung administration, the U.S. government will directly deal with companies like Samsung and Hyundai Motor, maintaining political pressure with minimal engagement with the South Korean government.

The calculation appears to be to maintain a certain level of pressure on the Lee Jae-myung administration while resolving the North Korean issue, and then, after negotiations are concluded as planned by the U.S. and North Korea, to adjust tariff and defense cost pressures once a pro-U.S. conservative government takes power.

Conclusion: The New Northeast Asian Order Trump Envisions

Trump's overall picture is clear.

North Korea will be partially detached from China and brought into a state of peace manageable by the U.S., while South Korea will be firmly controlled within a triple-layered pressure structure of Kill Web, tariffs, and defense cost sharing, preventing it from drifting into China's sphere of influence.

This is not simply a diplomatic adjustment, but a grand strategy that will transform the entire political and security landscape on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea will be brought to the negotiating table with carrots of deals and regime guarantees, while South Korea's space for action will be strictly limited through military, economic, and financial pressure.

From Trump's perspective, North Korea is an object of negotiation, but the Lee Jae-myung administration's South Korea is an object of surveillance and control. Therefore, he adopts a strategy of giving carrots to North Korea and putting shackles on South Korea.

If South Korea had not elected a pro-China leaning government, this structure would have been a tremendous strategic opportunity for South Korea.

The moment the U.S. detaches North Korea from China's sphere of influence and reorients the entire Korean Peninsula within a U.S.-led economic and security order, South Korea could have benefited the most from its central position.

However, if the current South Korean government is not aligned with the U.S.'s strategy, that opportunity will inevitably turn from a blessing into pressure.

For Trump, South Korea is not a key ally with whom to craft a grand plan, but rather an entity to be managed to prevent it from defecting to China.

If this strategy succeeds, Trump will secure a historical legacy of resolving the North Korean issue, and U.S. dominance in the Indo-Pacific will be further strengthened. However, from South Korea's perspective, domestic political chaos and security dilemmas are bound to increase.

Ultimately, how the Lee Jae-myung administration endures and responds to this pressure will be the key variable determining the future fate of the Korean Peninsula.

All of this is an extension of the "deal-centered pragmatism" consistently demonstrated by Trump since his first term. Once the results of the Beijing summit are known, it will soon be confirmed how accurately this scenario materializes.

◆ Gene Cummings

U.S. political columnist. After working at Channel 13 in Baltimore, Maryland, he served as Editor-in-Chief of 'The Sunday Times' (1994-1996) and Business Director of 'The Korean Weekly' (1996-2000), after which he founded 'Asia Post'. He is currently working as a backend analyst in political, diplomatic, and security affairs for a private company performing government contracts.