The government announced on the 4th that it had determined that an unidentified aircraft had struck the stern of HMM's cargo ship Namuho twice at one-minute intervals in connection with the explosion and fire on board the vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil transport route in the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the joint investigation results of the government on the 10th, releasing photos recorded by the on-site investigation team. [Photo=Yonhap News]'Struck' Confirmed Five Days Later

The core issue of the HMM Namuho explosion and fire incident is not the cause of the accident.

This is because it raised security questions: "Why did the government delay confirmation of the Namuho being struck for five days? Is there any issue with the ROK-US alliance?"

The United States mentioned an attack by Iran immediately after the incident, but the South Korean government officially confirmed an external strike by two unidentified aircraft on May 10th, after explaining that it was "awaiting confirmation after towing" and that "being struck was not certain."

This time lag is not a simple delay in announcement. It is a security matter that requires clarification of when the government became aware of the possibility of being struck, what information it received from the United States, and when the Namuho's CCTV footage was secured and analyzed.

The government announced on May 10th that the Namuho incident was caused by an attack from two unidentified aircraft.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that according to the government's joint investigation results, two unidentified aircraft struck the outer hull of the ballast water tank on the port side of the Namuho's stern twice at approximately one-minute intervals.

It was explained that the aircraft were captured on CCTV footage, and a hole approximately 5 meters wide and 7 meters long was confirmed on the ship's outer hull.

However, the origin of the launch, the exact model, and the physical size were not specified.

Therefore, the point of contention shifts from "whether it was struck" to "when the government knew of the possibility of being struck and why it was officially confirmed five days later."

The United States First Pointed to Iran

The problem is that the announcement on May 10th differs from the government's stance immediately after the incident.

On May 5th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that all 24 crew members of the Namuho were safe and the fire had been extinguished. However, it also stated that the exact cause of the accident could be determined during the process of towing the vessel and examining the damage.

At the same time, US President Trump mentioned that Iran had attacked ships of unrelated countries, including a South Korean cargo ship.

The remarks made by Wi Sung-lac, Senior Secretary to the President for National Security, on May 6th are even more significant.

Regarding the Namuho explosion incident, Wi stated, "Upon further review of the intelligence, it seemed that the strike was not certain." However, four days later, the government's joint investigation results indicated an external strike by two unidentified aircraft.

Therefore, the National Assembly needs to ascertain what the "additional review information" Wi mentioned was, and whether it included the US assessment, the ship's CCTV footage, and reports from the captain and crew.

How Did the Government's Stance Change?

This timeline reveals one key point.

The United States publicly mentioned the possibility of an Iranian attack early on, while the South Korean government confirmed an external strike five days later, after stating it was awaiting towing and that the strike was uncertain.

This gap is the basis for questioning the ROK-US intelligence sharing and the government's initial decision-making process.

When Was the CCTV Checked?

It is also significant that the government was aware of the safety of the crew and the firefighting situation on May 5th. This implies that at least a minimal communication channel with the vessel was operational.

If so, did the government inquire with the captain and crew at that time about external impacts, explosion sounds, approaching objects, and the existence of CCTV? If CCTV footage was one of the key bases for the May 10th announcement, then it is also necessary to confirm when that footage was secured and analyzed.

Of course, it needs to be separately confirmed whether the ship's CCTV footage could be transmitted immediately after the accident. It is possible that real-time acquisition was difficult due to factors such as in-ship communication status, equipment damage, data storage methods, and satellite communication conditions.

However, that is precisely what the National Assembly should investigate.

If the government was in contact with the ship, it must be confirmed when it learned of the existence of CCTV footage, when it requested the footage or screenshots, and why it was not reflected in the decision-making on May 6th.

Acting Defense Secretary Evades 'Contact with Seoul' Question, Answers 'Contact with Ship'

The remarks by Acting Defense Secretary Hagbes further fuel the controversy over ROK-US intelligence sharing.

During the US Department of Defense briefing on May 5th, a reporter asked about information regarding "a South Korean vessel reportedly hit by Iran" and inquired, "Is Seoul in contact with the US military about this matter?"

Hagbes did not confirm contact with the South Korean government, but replied, "We are in contact with that ship," adding that CENTCOM and the Maritime Coordination Forces are in touch. He further stated that such targeting demonstrates the indiscriminate nature of Iran's actions.

This answer provides grounds for concern about "Seoul bypassing."

It cannot be definitively concluded. It is possible that the US provided information to the South Korean government through separate channels.

Military intelligence may not have been disclosed to protect its sources and collection methods. However, at least in the public briefing, what the US confirmed was "contact with the ship," not "intelligence sharing with Seoul."

Security Matters the National Assembly Must Verify

There are four points of contention surrounding the Namuho incident.

First, the possibility that the United States provided relevant information to the South Korean government, but the South Korean government withheld its public release.

Second, the possibility that although the United States publicly pointed to Iran, it did not provide sufficient evidential information to the South Korean government.

Third, the possibility of a difference between the US's operational judgment and the criteria for the South Korean government's official announcement.

Fourth, the possibility that the South Korean government also confirmed the possibility of being struck but concealed it.

Regardless of the case, these are not issues to be overlooked.

The Namuho is a vessel operated by a South Korean company and was carrying 24 people, including 6 South Korean crew members. A South Korean-related vessel was externally struck in the Strait of Hormuz, and the highest levels of the US connected this to an attack by Iran or Iran's indiscriminate targeting.

However, the South Korean government confirmed the external aircraft strike only five days later and did not specify the attacker.

Any sign of abnormality in the ROK-US alliance is a very important security issue.

What is revealed through this incident is not a difference in the wording of the government's announcements, but the need to verify whether ROK-US crisis information sharing actually worked.

Alliances are not proven solely by joint statements or military exercises.

The National Assembly must ascertain what the US knew when a South Korean vessel was attacked in a strategic strait, whether that information was transmitted to the South Korean government, and if it was transmitted, why the South Korean government did not immediately confirm the strike.

The National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Defense Committee, and Intelligence Committee must confirm with the government what information was received from the United States, when, and through what channels.

In particular, Senior Secretary to the President for National Security Wi Sung-lac must be summoned as a witness to question the basis of his remarks on May 6th. It must be verified what the "additional review information" Wi mentioned was, and whether it included the US assessment, the ship's CCTV, and reports from the captain and crew.