President Yoon Suk-yeol is seated in the defendant's seat. [Photo=Seoul Central District Court] 

Lawyer Yoo Jeong-hwa, legal representative for President Yoon Suk-yeol and First Lady Kim Keon-hee, voiced criticism on Facebook on the 14th regarding the severe sentences imposed on President Yoon in relation to charges of sedition and leading a rebellion. 

Lawyer Yoo stated, "In a reality where the president has no power to dissolve the National Assembly, the opposition party holds an overwhelming majority of seats, the media and public opinion operate independently, and the military and civil service function according to the rule of law, physically preventing the National Assembly's demand to lift martial law and maintaining martial law for an extended period is merely a scenario close to political fantasy." She criticized, "Despite this, the court completely disregarded these practical and structural limitations, acknowledged the intent to 'establish a long-term dictatorial regime,' and consequently imposed severe sentences of life imprisonment and 30 years respectively for rebellion and sedition."

She further added, "Criminal trials must be judged based on proven facts, not hypothetical risks or speculated intentions. Particularly, to impose severe penalties tantamount to life imprisonment, strict and meticulous proof of the criminal intent and feasibility of execution must precede."

Below is the full text of Lawyer Yoo Jeong-hwa's Facebook post.

The court's ruling on June 12th, which recognized President Yoon Suk-yeol's sedition and imposed severe penalties, has left a significant point of contention in the constitutional history of the Republic of Korea. 

Above all, the court characterized the emergency martial law as an act of rebellion and sedition aimed at establishing a long-term authoritarian regime. However, a fundamental question arises as to whether such a scenario was actually feasible within the political and constitutional structure of the Republic of Korea in 2024. 

This perspective aligns with the judgment on emergency martial law in the "rebellion leader case."

Seizing political power for an extended period and establishing a dictatorial regime is not an issue that can be resolved simply by mobilizing military forces. 

To fundamentally alter the political situation through martial law and maintain it long-term, one must first be able to block the National Assembly's demand to lift martial law. 

This would require the president to have the power to dissolve the National Assembly, or at the very least, for the president's party to hold an overwhelming majority of seats in the National Assembly and for the president to have strong control over the party.

This was the case during the Yushin regime and the Fifth Republic era. During the Yushin regime in 1972, the president had a political foundation that allowed for strong leadership of the ruling party and the National Assembly. During the Fifth Republic, the constitutional right of the president to dissolve the National Assembly was recognized, providing institutional means for long-term political management and control. 

However, the situation in the Republic of Korea in 2024 was entirely different. 

Under the current Sixth Republic Constitution, the president does not have the power to dissolve the National Assembly. The opposition party held an overwhelming majority of seats in the National Assembly, and in a political environment where the separation of party and government had been established for over 20 years, the president did not have the structure to exercise absolute control over the ruling party. 

In such circumstances, even if President Yoon were to declare martial law, there would be virtually no way to block the National Assembly's demand to lift martial law for an extended period.

Furthermore, the military and civil service organizations, and even the media, are different now compared to the past. Even as the supreme commander, it cannot be assumed that the majority of military leadership and soldiers would unconditionally obey all orders. The civil service organization also has a pervasive atmosphere of seeking immunity from post-facto responsibility for any work. The media is also no longer in an era where it passively followed state propaganda controls. 

Ultimately, in a situation where the military, media, and civil service organizations do not cooperate, seizing control of the entire political landscape of the Republic of Korea solely through brute force is far removed from the principles of practical politics. "President Yoon was fully aware of this and therefore did not even consider prolonged martial law."

The actual progression of events supports this.

Following the declaration of martial law, members of the National Assembly promptly convened, and on December 4, 2024, at 1:03 AM, a motion to lift martial law was passed with the approval of 190 attending members. Subsequently, the order maintenance troops of the National Assembly were immediately withdrawn, and the Ministry of National Defense took measures to terminate the martial law situation. The president announced a policy to lift martial law, and once the quorum for the State Council was secured, martial law was officially and immediately lifted.

Ultimately, the National Assembly's right to lift martial law operated swiftly and normally, and the control mechanisms envisioned by the Constitution functioned as intended. To argue that a matter concluded within a few hours from declaration to lifting was in the execution phase of establishing a long-term dictatorial regime, a persuasive explanation must first be provided on how the objective could have been achieved within the existing means and structure.

The scenario of provoking North Korean provocations, mentioned in the sedition ruling, carries the same limitations. 

Even if North Korea had launched further military provocations, given the political landscape of the Democratic Party, a major opposition party in 2024, it is highly probable that the National Assembly would have immediately moved to demand the lifting of martial law. 

Therefore, in a reality where the president lacks the power to dissolve the National Assembly, the opposition party holds an overwhelming majority of seats, the media and public opinion operate independently, and the military and civil service function according to the rule of law, physically preventing the National Assembly's demand to lift martial law and maintaining martial law for an extended period is merely a scenario close to political fantasy.

Despite this, the court completely disregarded these practical and structural limitations, acknowledged the intent to 'establish a long-term dictatorial regime,' and consequently imposed severe sentences of life imprisonment and 30 years respectively for rebellion and sedition. 

However, criminal trials must be judged based on proven facts, not hypothetical risks or speculated intentions. Particularly, to impose severe penalties tantamount to life imprisonment, strict and meticulous proof of the criminal intent and feasibility of execution must precede.

The life sentence in the rebellion leader case, currently under appeal, and the 30-year sentence in the sedition case, recently handed down in the first trial, are not merely matters of sentencing. They will serve as a test of whether South Korea's criminal justice system, going forward, stands on objective facts and strict proof, or on narratives based on conjecture and imagination. 

Whether what the judiciary has ruled constitutes a crime that actually existed or a hypothetical scenario that could not realistically have been realized will ultimately be judged again in the appellate courts. However, it is essential for the courts to remember that they are institutions that judge facts, not punish imaginations.