Sinan offshore wind power, nuclear power, transmission grids, and global financial buildings are arranged on a single screen, symbolizing the power and capital structure behind the Honam semiconductor complex. While renewable energy provides the justification, the 6.3GW constant load cannot be supported without nuclear power, KEPCO grids, and backup power sources. [Photo=Hanmi Ilbo Graphics]Table of Contents

① Fact Check

② Is Additional Expansion Necessary?

③ The Shadow Behind the Power Grid

“The power grid behind Honam semiconductors… How did Sinan wind power, nuclear plants, and BlackRock meet?”

Part 1 examined the facts. The Lee Jae-myung administration's “800 trillion won Honam semiconductor complex” was closer to a conditional concept involving future plans, guidelines, candidate sites, and potential changes listed in Samsung and SK Hynix’s public filings, rather than a finalized investment.

Part 2 questioned the industrial necessity. While a memory shortage in 2026 is a fact, it was not sufficient grounds for the additional construction of four new fabs in the 2030s.

Therefore, the question for Part 3 is power. Even if four Honam fabs are necessary and feasible, what will power them?

Semiconductor fabs are electricity-driven industries. Memory fabs, in particular, require high-quality power that never stops—24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Instant power outages, voltage instability, and frequency fluctuations are not mere inconveniences; they lead to issues with yields, equipment stability, and client trust.

Thus, the essence of the Honam semiconductor project is not the promotional claim that “Honam has abundant renewable energy.” The real question is who will supply 6.3GW of constant load, with what power source, at what cost, and how reliably.

The government is aware of this issue. On June 29, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announced its “Three Mega-Projects for Korea’s Great Leap Forward,” stating that it would build four semiconductor fabs with a total value of 800 trillion won, along with an ecosystem of partners and human resources in the Southwest region.

At the same time, it proposed leveraging “abundant renewable energy and nuclear power” for electricity and “utilizing multi-purpose dams and alternative water resources” for industrial water as infrastructure measures for the Southwest semiconductor industrial complex. This is an admission by the government itself that renewable energy alone is insufficient.

The numbers make this clearer. Yonhap News reported that the four Honam semiconductor fabs are estimated to require 6.3GW of power and 650,000 tons of water per day. 6.3GW is equivalent to the capacity of about 4.5 large-scale nuclear reactors, and 650,000 tons of water is the daily usage volume for 2.125 million people.

Converting this power demand into a constant load used throughout the year, the annual consumption is approximately 55.188 billion kWh. Based on the domestic industrial electricity rate of 181 won per kWh, the electricity bill alone would approach approximately 10 trillion won annually. While the actual burden may vary depending on contract methods and rate structures, it is clear that electricity costs are a key variable in semiconductor production costs.

Considering that industrial electricity rates in China and the U.S. are in the 120-won range, a cost gap of roughly 3 trillion won per year could emerge from electricity rates alone.

This is where Sinan wind power enters the picture. The most plausible justification for Honam semiconductors is RE100. The southwest coast has great potential for wind and solar power, and the Sinan offshore wind farm is its symbol.

A plan to create an offshore wind power cluster totaling 3.2GW across 10 complexes by 2033 in the waters off Sinan-gun, Jeollanam-do, was designated through the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy's Renewable Energy Policy Council. Government documents describe this as a large-scale offshore wind cluster promoted through public-private consultative bodies and shared connection facilities.

However, Sinan wind power cannot provide all the electricity for the Honam fabs. The 3.2GW, or even the 8.2GW discussed in the long term, refers to installed capacity. Wind power is an intermittent energy source that only generates power when the wind blows.

What semiconductor fabs need is not nominal capacity, but 24-hour firm power. Therefore, Sinan wind power is less of a complete energy solution for Honam semiconductors and more of a supporting pillar to reinforce RE100 compliance and regional energy justification.

More accurately, the power equation for Honam semiconductors consists of three layers. On the front is the justification of Sinan wind power and renewables. In the middle are nuclear power and the KEPCO grid. On the back are ESS, LNG backup, grid stabilization, transmission network expansion, and electricity rate structures.

This is why the government proposed “utilizing renewable energy and nuclear power” together. Because a fab is not a factory that only runs when the wind blows.

Nuclear power is the actual backbone of this power grid. Honam has the existing large-scale base-load power source of the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant. Furthermore, in its infrastructure measures for the three mega-projects, the government proposed not only achieving 100GW of renewable energy early but also actively utilizing nuclear power and SMRs, expanding transmission grids, increasing grid stabilization facilities, and establishing electricity rate systems that support advanced industries.

Ultimately, while renewable energy provides the energy justification for Honam semiconductors, the practical solution for a 6.3GW constant load is a complex power system that includes nuclear power, the KEPCO grid, and backup power sources.

The problem is the cost.

Nuclear power plants and transmission grids are not free. Nuclear facility investment and lifetime extension costs are initially reflected in KHNP’s finances. However, KHNP is a core power generation subsidiary of the KEPCO group. The costs for grid reinforcement and system stabilization are linked even more directly to KEPCO’s books.

KEPCO is already saddled with 206 trillion won in debt, and electricity rates for the third quarter of 2026 have been frozen. Residential rates have been frozen for 13 consecutive quarters, and industrial rates for 7 consecutive quarters. If the costs for large-scale power grids, shared connections, and grid stabilization for semiconductors are not properly reflected in electricity rates, the burden will inevitably fall on corporate costs, KEPCO’s deficit, the public’s electricity bills, or the national budget.

The same applies to offshore wind power. A wind turbine is not a facility that is finished once installed in the sea. Costs for submarine cables, substations, HVDC, shared connection facilities, and grid stabilization follow.

The Ministry of Environment and KEPCO stated that by promoting shared connection facilities for offshore wind in the Haenam area, the existing 703km of connection lines would be reduced to 287km, saving approximately 3.6 trillion won in total investment compared to individual connections. Conversely, this means that offshore wind power was never cheap energy to begin with, but rather power predicated on large-scale grid investment.

This is where BlackRock comes in.

In 2021, BlackRock acquired a 100% stake in the Korea Renewable Energy Development and Operation Holding Company, or KREDO Holdings. KREDO Holdings was introduced as a developer with a pipeline of over 2GW of new offshore wind power and became BlackRock Real Assets’ first offshore wind investment in Korea. BlackRock also announced plans to invest over $1 billion in the future to build the KREDO portfolio.

The BlackRock-affiliated Sinan wind project hit a snag once. In January 2024, the Electricity Regulatory Commission under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy rejected five Sinan offshore wind power applications submitted by Credo Offshore, a subsidiary of BlackRock. The reasons given were a lack of documentation proving financial capability and issues with power grid connectivity. At the time, the project scale was reported to be around 2GW with a cost of approximately 10 trillion won.

However, the tides turned in June 2025. On June 27, the Electricity Regulatory Commission approved seven West Coast offshore wind power projects, totaling approximately 2.7GW. Among these, five projects developed by Credo Offshore—Sinan Blue Jaeun, Blue Imja, Blue Sinui, and Blue Bigeum 1 & 2—totaled 2GW.

The 2GW Sinan wind power project by BlackRock, which had been rejected a year prior due to grid and financial issues, passed the approval table.

Following this, in September 2025, Lee Jae-myung met with BlackRock CEO Larry Fink in New York.

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs data, Adebayo Ogunlesi, chairman of GIP, and former World Bank President Jim Yong Kim were also present. The government signed an MOU with BlackRock for cooperation on domestic AI and renewable energy infrastructure.

The data describes BlackRock as the world’s largest asset manager, managing $12.5 trillion, and explains that it is leading global AI and renewable energy infrastructure investment by forming AI infrastructure partnerships with Microsoft, Nvidia, and xAI.

This timeline is noteworthy.

In June 2025, BlackRock-affiliated Credo Offshore’s 2GW Sinan wind project was approved. In September 2025, Lee Jae-myung met the BlackRock chairman and signed an AI/renewable energy infrastructure MOU. In June 2026, the government announced the three mega-projects, including Honam semiconductors and AI data centers, and proposed both renewable energy and nuclear power as the power solution for the Southwest semiconductor complex.

A direct causal relationship cannot be confirmed. However, Sinan wind power, AI infrastructure, renewable energy, and Honam semiconductors all sit on the same axis of power and capital.

Therefore, this issue is not simply about “whether to build semiconductors in Honam.” Sinan wind power provides the RE100 justification for Honam semiconductors. Nuclear power and the KEPCO grid serve as the physical power axis supporting the 24-hour constant load.

Global infrastructure capital like BlackRock views renewable energy and AI infrastructure as long-term income-generating assets. The structure is one where Honam semiconductors and AI data centers create electricity demand, Sinan wind power and transmission grids create the infrastructure investment board, and government MOUs institutionalize the connection.

However, the question the public must ask is simple.

Who supplies the 6.3GW of power? Who bears the costs for nuclear power, transmission grids, shared connections, and backup power? Is it Samsung and SK, KEPCO, or the public? If the profit structures of nuclear power, the KEPCO grid, and global infrastructure capital are hiding behind the renewable energy justification packaged as Sinan wind power, the government must first disclose the cost sheet.

The power debate over Honam semiconductors is not “Can it all be done with Sinan wind power?” Even the government does not claim that. The real question lies elsewhere: Renewables are used as the justification, stable power is supplemented by nuclear plants and the KEPCO grid, and who is being stuck with the bill?

If this question cannot be answered, it will be difficult to avoid the criticism that the “800 trillion won Honam semiconductor complex” is not an industrial policy, but a political project built upon KEPCO’s books and global capital.

The conclusion of Part 3 is clear. Sinan wind power can be a symbol of Honam semiconductors. But semiconductor fabs do not run on symbols. Fabs run on 24-hour power, low electricity rates, stable grids, ultrapure water, skilled labor, and a partner ecosystem.

The true power grid for Honam semiconductors lies not in the windmills of the Sinan sea, but in the combined structure of nuclear power, the KEPCO grid, electricity rates, and global infrastructure capital. If the government does not disclose this cost sheet, the “800 trillion won Honam semiconductor complex” may become not a future industrial strategy, but a political industrial project for which the public receives the bill later.