China’s unrestricted warfare transcends legal, public opinion, and economic boundaries. South Korea’s response must begin with the institutionalization of law and politics. Korea-US-Japan Graphics

Facing China’s strategy for the Korean Peninsula is uncomfortable, yet unavoidable. China does not view South Korea as a target for conquest. Instead, it defines South Korea as a weak link in the U.S. alliance network, seeking to keep it tethered as a neutral zone that can be shaken at any time.

This strategy can be explained through five pillars.

First, preventing South Korea from standing firmly on the U.S. side.
Second, utilizing North Korea as a leverage.
Third, maintaining a structure of economic dependency to ensure a constant supply of retaliation cards.
Fourth, provoking historical and territorial disputes to undermine Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation.
Fifth, exploiting political and social divisions within South Korea.

As evidenced by real-world cases, China has projected its influence by exploiting internal conflicts within South Korea.

Cultural controls, such as the ban on Korean culture (Hallyu), shocked Korea’s content industry and public opinion, while persistent attempts have been made to co-opt pro-China figures and groups through specific political and academic exchanges.

Chinese-funded academic and media support, which lacks transparency, has intervened in the formation of public opinion like a shadow. Since some media and academic institutions are under no obligation to disclose whether they receive Chinese funding, a structural vulnerability remains where Chinese messaging can covertly permeate domestic public discourse.

The goal is clear: to lock South Korea into a state of strategic neutrality, thereby weakening the U.S. alliance network.

The more hesitant South Korea becomes compared to the U.S. and Japan, the more time China gains, and the weaker the pressure on the alliance becomes.

The retaliation over THAAD was a classic example. As military, economic, and information warfare were simultaneously deployed, South Korea suffered catastrophic damage while lacking a basis for institutional response.

According to a 2017 National Assembly report, South Korean corporate losses reached 8.5 trillion won at the time; Hyundai Motor had to halt operations at its Chinese plants, and Lotte Mart was forced to sell its stores in China.

Some estimates suggested that total losses, including tourism, exceeded 20 trillion won. This was not merely a diplomatic friction, but proof of a national vulnerability caused by a void in law and institutions.

Therefore, South Korea’s response strategy should not remain a passive adaptation. The country must prepare a proactive, "counter-unrestricted warfare" strategy that exploits China’s own weaknesses. This must evolve from mere rhetoric into concrete policy options.

Key examples include strengthening strategic ties with the U.S., Japan, and Australia; enacting foreign influence transparency laws; strengthening pre-screening of Chinese investments; mandating reporting of Chinese-origin cyber threats; establishing a system to expose public opinion manipulation; and enhancing internal social cohesion.

Above all, codifying the definition of the principal enemy, amending espionage laws, and establishing clear benchmarks in strategic documents are the foundations upon which all these mechanisms operate.

Comparing overseas legislative precedents with Korea’s current system reveals the gaps in our existing framework.

First, the issue of foreign influence transparency.

The U.S. has long operated the FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938), requiring the registration and disclosure of lobbying and media activities linked to foreign governments. Australia also introduced the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act in 2018.

In contrast, while South Korea can punish political funding from foreign sources or acts of espionage, it has no system that mandates the transparent disclosure of lobbying, academic, or media activities.

In other words, there is no obligation to disclose if a foreign government or entity funds academic research or influences reporting direction through media advertisements or sponsorships. This means the public and the National Assembly have no way to verify the existence of such activities.

This vacuum serves as a structural vulnerability that allows China to project influence inside South Korea covertly and without leaving a trace.

Conversely, the U.S. and Australia mandate the registration and public disclosure of all such activities, ensuring that foreign government interference is recorded and made public. By failing to enforce such exposure, Korea’s current system is effectively leaving the door open to China’s long-term infiltration.

Second, foreign investment screening.

The U.S. CFIUS has the authority to block foreign investments that pose security threats. The EU also introduced the FDI Screening Regulation in 2019, and Japan, under its 2020 amendment to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, imposes pre-screening for acquisitions of even 1% or more of shares in publicly traded companies.

While South Korea can conduct partial screening under the "Foreign Investment Promotion Act" and "Industrial Technology Protection Act," the scope is limited to "national core technologies." There is no comprehensive, security-oriented screening authority.

Third, cyber and information security.

The U.S. established CISA in 2018 to build a public-private cyber defense system, and the EU, through the NIS Directive, forces infrastructure and platform operators to comply with security obligations and report threats.

South Korea has the "Information and Communications Network Act" and the "Personal Information Protection Act," but lacks a framework that legally mandates private platforms to report Chinese-origin threats.

Fourth, support for nurturing and transitioning strategic industries.

The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act (2022) attaches "China investment restrictions" as a condition for semiconductor subsidies. The EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act (2023) also promotes supply chain self-reliance and the reduction of dependency on China while designating clean energy industries.

South Korea offers tax incentives and subsidies for semiconductors and batteries under the "National High-Tech Strategic Industry Act" enacted in 2022, but lacks provisions for restricting investment in China.

Fifth, the need to amend the Espionage Act.

The current "National Security Act" regulates traditional military espionage but has clear limitations in responding to Chinese-style unrestricted warfare. Industrial technology theft, cyber infiltration, public opinion manipulation, and political lobbying escape its legal net.

The U.S. Economic Espionage Act (1996), the U.K. National Security Act (2023), and Australia’s Espionage and Foreign Interference Act (2018) cover industrial espionage, political sabotage, and cyber operations. A Korean-style amendment should expand the definition of espionage to include industrial, cyber, and political realms, define economic espionage and technology leaks as major crimes, and create a new offense for "foreign operations" involving foreign-linked public opinion manipulation and funding.

Sixth, the definition of the "principal enemy."

The ambiguity of Korea’s strategy stems from the failure to clearly define "who is the enemy" at the state level. The Defense White Paper must explicitly define North Korea as the primary enemy and codify China as the "greatest strategic challenge" or "strategic principal enemy."

Just as the U.S. defines China as a strategic competitor in its National Security Strategy, and Japan identifies China as the greatest challenge in its National Security Strategy, South Korea must include such definitions in its laws and strategic documents. This is not mere rhetoric; it is about establishing benchmarks for law and policy.

Espionage law amendments, transparency acts, and cybersecurity laws must all function based on this definition of the principal enemy.

Ultimately, South Korea must move away from a system centered on protection and support toward a proactive system that includes disclosure, transparency, restrictions, and aggravated sentencing.

China’s ultimate strategy is to keep South Korea confined to a neutral zone. If South Korea clarifies its coordinates and secures its legal and political resilience, it will cease to be a country that is easily swayed and instead stand tall as a nation that sets norms and drives its own strategy.

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