Cheap components, invisible switches, and the fire that brought down the national computing network. Han-Mi-Ilbo Graphic

The fire at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) computing center in Daejeon was no mere accident. Services ranging from mobile ID systems and the e-People (Gungmin Sinmungo) portal to post office financial services and 119 emergency reporting were simultaneously paralyzed.

Beyond mere inconvenience, citizens experienced a realistic fear that national functions could come to a complete standstill in an instant. The origin of the fire was the UPS battery in the server room.

However, the greater issue is not the fire itself, but the structural vulnerability where a single point of failure can lead to the total disruption of national administration. The "Single Point of Failure (SPoF)" of our national infrastructure has been laid bare.

The government might attempt to blame a lack of budget, but this is nothing more than an evasion of responsibility. The NIRS is not just a simple server room; it is the heart of national administration. Yet, it has been operating without a complete Disaster Recovery (DR) system or inter-regional redundancy. This represents a grave management failure.

The battery, in particular, is a major problem.

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) units are the last line of defense for a data center. Yet, that is precisely where the fire started. The government must immediately disclose the manufacturer and country of origin. It is a well-established international fact that cheap Chinese lithium batteries are prone to frequent fires. If critical national infrastructure has been relying on unverified, low-cost components, this incident was not a coincidence, but a predictable disaster.

The procurement system must also be examined at its roots.

Government equipment procurement is fundamentally based on lowest-price competitive bidding. Unit cost is prioritized over quality. Consequently, cheap Chinese components find their way into public facilities everywhere. If the entire national administration can be halted to save money on a few cheap batteries, the responsibility lies in the flaws of the procurement system. Moving forward, core IT infrastructure components must be selected based on safety and reliability, not price.

The even more frightening threat is the "kill switch."

What happens if low-cost equipment functions normally in everyday situations but self-paralyzes upon receiving a specific signal or under certain conditions? This would be far more fatal than a simple fire.

The international community has already designated Huawei equipment as a security threat. This is why the U.S., Europe, and Japan have excluded Chinese-made equipment from their telecommunications and power grids. Yet, South Korea continues to cling to cheap, short-term efficiency, embedding Chinese products throughout its public infrastructure. This is the folly of installing "invisible switches" in the nation’s heart for the sake of short-term gains.

International comparisons make the situation even more embarrassing.

Following 9/11, the U.S. invested trillions of won to build redundant data centers. Germany introduced a state-level backup system after the collapse of the Cologne Archives. Japan strengthened its regional decentralization system after experiencing major earthquakes. All these nations learned from painful experiences and reformed their systems. South Korea, however, delayed preparedness simply because no major accidents had occurred, eventually paying the same heavy price.

Patchwork responses are insufficient.

First, redundancy for DR centers must be mandatory for national IT infrastructure. Second, power equipment such as UPS and batteries must have their country of origin, manufacturer, and safety certifications transparently disclosed and strictly verified during the procurement phase. Third, the potential for kill switches in public infrastructure equipment must be institutionally blocked at the source.

Through this incident, the public has confronted a fundamental anxiety: "What will happen to my life if there is a fire at a national data center?" This is not just a technical issue; it is a matter of state responsibility, political priorities, and administrative trust.

We must never again entrust the heart of our nation to the temptations of cheap batteries and the threats of kill switches.

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