기사 메일전송
[Fact Check] Lee Jae-myung's Claim on Restoring Wartime Operational Control
  • Kim Young
  • October 23, 2025 at 11:44 AM
기사수정
  • October 8th, the intersection of President Lee Jae-myung's remarks on Armed Forces Day and the prohibition clause in the U.S. Congress.
  • U.S. Forces Korea Reduction and Wartime Operational Control Transfer Now Impossible Without Congressional 'National Interest Certification'

  • The language of self-reliant defense remains, but the reality of operational control has been sealed by law.
미 의회가 10월 9일 통과시킨 국방수권법(NDAA)에 ‘국익 인증 없이는 전작권 전환 불가’ 조항이 포함된 사실이 뒤늦게 논란이 되고 있다. 이재명 대통령은 그 직전 국군의 날에서 ‘작전통제권 회복’을 약속했지만, 정부는 한 달이 지나도록 입장을 내놓지 않았다. 한미일보는 7월 단독보도로 해당 조항을 최초 보도한 바 있으며, 이번 기사는 그 법안의 실제 내용과 정부의 인식 부재를 검증한다. <편집자 주>

On October 20th, at a defense industry development forum held at KINTEX in Ilsanseo-gu, Goyang-si, Gyeonggi Province, President Lee Jae-myung stated, "It is difficult for me to understand the fact that some citizens believe that the Republic of Korea, even in its current situation, cannot achieve self-reliant defense and must rely on someone else for defense." Yonhap News

President Lee Jae-myung declared on October 1st, at the 77th Armed Forces Day ceremony, "Our military must take one step further towards the completion of self-reliant defense and the recovery of operational control authority."

 

While the President's speech was evaluated as a message reaffirming the will for self-reliant defense, just 8 days later (October 9th), the U.S. Senate made a decision that was the complete opposite. The Senate passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, confirming a provision (Section 1233) that legally restricts the reduction of U.S. Forces Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON).

 

At the very moment the South Korean President was mentioning the 'recovery of operational control,' the U.S. was blocking that recovery through legislation.

 

The core of the issue is Section 1233 of the NDAA 2026. The provision states the following:

 

"The Secretary of Defense may not reduce the U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula or alter the wartime operational control (OPCON) of the Combined Forces Command unless the Secretary certifies to Congress that such action is consistent with the national interest of the United States."

 

This provision was finalized without a single word being amended, having passed the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on July 9, 2025, and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on July 15, then the House of Representatives on September 10, and finally the Senate on October 9.

 

The White House expressed concern on September 9th through a Statement of Administration Policy, stating, "It excessively restricts executive discretion," but Congress maintained it as is.


Consequently, any form of operational control transfer or reduction of U.S. Forces Korea has become impossible without the U.S. Congress's certification of national interest. This means it operates as an institutional control mechanism that requires legislative approval rather than simple diplomatic consultation.


On October 20th, at a defense industry development forum held at KINTEX in Ilsanseo-gu, Goyang-si, Gyeonggi Province, President Lee Jae-myung argued, "It is difficult for me to understand the fact that some citizens believe that the Republic of Korea, even in its current situation, cannot achieve self-reliant defense and must rely on someone else for defense."


There are criticisms that before making such claims, the President should first answer the question of whether diplomatic cooperation was sought to prevent the U.S. from passing such a bill.

 

A foreign affairs and security expert evaluated, "The U.S. Congress's national interest certification process is effectively a prior approval system by Congress, moving the issue of operational control from diplomacy to the realm of legislation."


Exclusive report by Hankook Ilbo in July, proven true

 

Hankook Ilbo first reported the core content of the provision in its exclusive article on July 19th titled 'Operational Control Transfer Blocked by U.S. Congress.' At the time, our newspaper analyzed the 'prohibition of budget execution' and the 'national interest certification' procedures included in the draft by the U.S. Congressional Armed Services Committee, stating, "The recovery of operational control has been effectively blocked."

 

Subsequently, major domestic media outlets belatedly reported on this around October 22nd, after the Senate's passage, and most of them downplayed it as "budget-related restrictions" or "administrative reservations."

 

However, the word used in the original text of the NDAA is "prohibits." This is an explicit prohibition, not a mere reservation, and leaves no room for the executive branch to disregard it.

 

Lee Jae-myung's Self-Reliant Defense... 'Recovery' and 'Prohibition' in Reality, Mere Words

 

In the first week of October, when the President mentioned "recovery of operational control," Congress in Washington was already finalizing the process to legally restrict that recovery. The President's remarks were words of determination, but in reality, they were closer to eloquent but empty rhetoric that obscured the truth.


While promising self-reliant defense to the nation, the U.S. Congress immediately afterward closed the door to self-reliance through legislation. The phrase 'recovery of operational control' is language used in domestic politics, but its implementation has now shifted to a triple structure involving approval from the U.S. Congress, certification by the Secretary of Defense, and joint resolution by the joint chiefs of staff of both countries. In particular, the remarks made on the 20th seem to be fitting for ridicule as "disembodied speech."

 

Operational control is an issue of a nation's sovereignty and, at the same time, falls within the legal domain of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement. In other words, it is not a right that can be regained solely by the will or assertion of one party. The phrase 'recovery of operational control' is language used in domestic politics, but its implementation has become more difficult. It can only be realized through a triple structure involving approval from the U.S. Congress, certification by the Secretary of Defense, and joint resolution by the joint chiefs of staff of both countries.

 

If the Lee Jae-myung administration was unaware of this, it is incompetence; if it knew and used it for political symbolism, it has deceived the public.

 

Operational Control is a System, Not a Will

 

President Lee Jae-myung's remarks on "recovery of operational control" symbolized the ideal of self-reliant defense, but that ideal was already blocked by law. Section 1233 of the NDAA 2026 has moved South Korea's military sovereignty from the domain of diplomacy to the domain of legislation. Now, the return of operational control has become a matter of congressional approval and procedure, rather than negotiation.

 

Therefore, the question remains:

"Is the recovery of operational control truly possible with our assertions alone?"

 

 

#FactCheck #LeeJaeMyung #OperationalControl #NDAA2026 #Section1233 #ArmedForcesDay #USFK #SelfReliantDefense #ROKUSRelations #HankookIlbo

 

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This article has 2comments.

  • Profile
    guest2025-10-24 06:11:36

    전작권 회수해 시진핑 한테 바칠 매국노.자유대한민국을 지키는 건 한미 우호밖에 없다.

  • Profile
    wien192025-10-23 21:55:51

    제발 너는 아무것도 하지마~!!!
    그냥 내려와~!!! 남의 자리 빼앗고 사니 좋으냐?

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