Media outlets reported on the 26th that the Constitutional Court recently ruled the early voting system constitutional. / Yonhap News.

Media outlets reported on October 26th that the Constitutional Court has ruled the early voting system and the barcode method for early voting ballots constitutional. However, this decision is a judgment based on mere literal interpretation of the law, ignoring or being ignorant of the realities of electronic election management and election invalidation lawsuits.

First, the barcode structure of early voting ballots is designed in such a way that neither poll watchers nor election officials can verify it. Early voting ballots have barcodes that contain serial numbers. Barcodes typically have numerical serial numbers appended, but early voting ballots do not. Therefore, the number of ballots issued cannot be visually confirmed. This means it cannot be cross-verified with the quantity of ballots issued by the ballot issuance machine. In contrast, ballots issued on election day have numerical serial numbers, and physical evidence remains to verify the number of ballots issued by tearing off and keeping the serial number slips. With early voting ballots, the barcode is not removed, so no paper evidence exists. From the 2020 National Assembly elections to the presidential election on June 3rd of this year, there have been numerous reports and testimonies that the number of ballots put into ballot boxes by poll watchers visually counted at early voting stations was less than the number of ballots issued as announced by the election commission. However, there is no way to verify the number of ballots issued and cast for early voting, even after the vote count.

Second, early voting ballots are scanned and stored electronically by an electronic ballot sorter during the vote count. During this process, barcode and ballot marking location information are recorded together. When this data is aggregated on the National Election Commission's computer server, a structural possibility arises to trace who voted for which candidate and when through system logs. Although the Constitutional Court stated that barcodes do not contain personal information, the core issue is not the 'content of the information' but the 'possibility of information linkage.' If the computer server knows when a specific barcode was issued and matched with the integrated voter list, then the secret ballot is already broken. This is not a mere technical management issue, but a serious matter that could lead to a 'Big Brother election system' where citizens' political choices can be datamined and monitored.

Third, although the Constitutional Court cited the "public interest of expanding opportunities for election participation" as a reason, the expansion of participation cannot take precedence over the authenticity and transparency of voting. Ensuring the authenticity and secrecy of the vote is more important than increasing voter turnout.

Fourth, the Constitutional Court stated that "if there are suspicions of manipulation, ex-post verification is possible through election litigation," but this is a judgment made without understanding the reality. The lawsuit to invalidate the results of the April 10th National Assembly elections in 2024 has not yet been ruled upon, and the lawsuit related to the presidential election on June 3rd, 2025, has not even commenced. The legal provision for 'swift trials within 180 days' has been effectively nullified. During the process of the 4.10 general election invalidation lawsuit, the defendant election commission brazenly submitted a document to the Supreme Court stating that 'log records from the ballot issuance machines are not stored.' Consequently, the possibility of ex-post verification exists only in form, and practical remedy for rights is impossible due to an institutional vacuum.

This decision cannot escape criticism of being a 'computer illiterate judgment' by judges who do not understand the basic principles of electronic systems, so-called 'computer illiteracy judgment.' The Constitutional Court's assertion that "barcodes do not contain personal information" is an apathetic judgment unaware of the structure linking server logs and databases.

The core of the secret ballot is not simply not writing personal information, but a structure where it is impossible to trace who voted for whom through electronic records. However, the early voting system is a opaque system where even the number of ballots issued cannot be verified on-site, undermining the principles of fair elections and secrecy.

The bigger problem is the lack of realistic means to rectify this. Election invalidation lawsuits, which should be processed within 180 days, are being delayed, and even log records for verifying the number of early voting ballots issued do not exist. Although early voting ballots are managed and issued electronically, the electronic servers have never been subjected to public verification for auditing purposes. The Constitutional Court's logic of deeming it constitutional based on the possibility of ex-post remedy is nothing more than an armchair judgment that ignores reality.

The Constitutional Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of early voting is a grave misjudgment that undermines the essence of popular sovereignty. If digital election systems are not re-examined from the public's perspective immediately, the Constitutional Court will be recorded as an historical sinner who ruined the credibility of elections and democracy in South Korea.

Wi Geum-sook, Chair of the Special Committee for Election Reform of Liberty and Innovation & Ph.D. in Computer Engineering