Defense Minister Shin Won-sik explains the 2026 budget proposal at a plenary session of the National Defense Committee on the 5th. Yonhap News

Joo Eun-sik, Director of the Korea Institute for Strategic Studies Recently, a newspaper published an article that was unprecedented. It reported on the simultaneous replacement of all generals and lieutenant colonels at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For a first-time assignment at the JCS, it takes at least six months to understand one area of work. In the past, the critical reason for our failure during the Cheonan incident was that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was appointed without prior experience at the JCS, leading to an inadequate response to the crisis.

At the time, he honestly admitted that he had never worked at the JCS before and couldn't properly grasp the terminology or duties for the first six months after his appointment. However, the simultaneous replacement of JCS generals, staff officers, and department heads is a retaliatory personnel action aimed at devastating, not weakening, the JCS.

Military Command Breakdown Caused by Inadequate Response to Gray Zone Tactics

If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided inadequate answers regarding gray zone tactics, hybrid provocations, or gray space formations during the National Assembly confirmation hearing, the responsibility lies with "lack of preparedness for his duties," not with a wholesale, retaliatory replacement of all JCS generals. The moment responsibility for strategic ignorance is handled by devolving command responsibility downwards, the military command and control system degenerates into the most malignant form: 'responsibility → permeates downward, glory → monopolized upward'.

The military's combat power is maintained through systemic continuity, team redundancy, and accumulated contextual knowledge. The JCS, in particular, is the central link for intelligence-operations-command and control-combined defense-theater planning, and it is not a general administrative agency where "personnel can be replaced immediately." Replacing all 40 JCS generals at once will create a vacuum and confusion in combat readiness for at least six months. This is the politicization of personnel itself, sending a dangerous signal that the military is being tamed through examples and precedents. Aligning the military based on politics rather than strategy is the collapse of national survival strategy.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is either under political pressure or has acted recklessly. However, there is no reason for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who previously served as Commander of the Strategic Command and has no independent personnel authority, to make such a petty and bizarre decision himself. It is naturally presumed to be a measure by the military command structure above the Minister of National Defense. I ask you to present a case where personnel, including staff officers, are replaced all at once during peacetime, except in totalitarian states. Military officers' assignments are not made based on their personal desires. If a blanket replacement is carried out simply because they were at the JCS during the December 3 martial law, it constitutes treasonous activity that benefits the Korean People's Army.

Large-Scale Blanket Replacement Directly Leads to Weakened Combat Power and Organizational Culture Collapse

The military's combat readiness operates on a continuous, cumulative basis, including strategy and force planning, combined command and control communications, dispersed/extended deterrence, and understanding the phased deployment lists of allied forces. These areas are not "duties that can be immediately executed by changing personnel." In particular, combined operations at the JCS are not based on a single doctrine but require real-time interface with the US military, intelligence synchronization (cooperation based on intelligence processing and judgment), experience in theater priority allocation, and trust among allies.

Replacing all 40 individuals at once means losing accumulated knowledge, situational judgment algorithms, and the entire memory of judgment contexts. Combat is a system, and a system is a continuum of memory. Even if the Ministry of National Defense holds personnel authority, the JCS Chairman announcing such a signal sets the worst precedent, making the entire military interior subject to an "administrative-political purge cycle."

The justification of personnel reform due to the aftermath of the past martial law is also hypocritical. Command officers are not expendable items sacrificed for the political fallout of an incident, and wholesale leadership changes based on a vaguely defined incident that is still under trial constitute "self-inflicted combat power damage" under the guise of democratic control. The military is an organization that performs its duties without judgment in moments of crisis. However, if it destroys the very organization that is supposed to perform, the deterrence effect that the nation enjoys collapses. Regardless of who holds wartime operational control, this measure is highly problematic.

Based on my experience at the JCS, it takes at least six months to get oriented. However, in a situation where neither I nor anyone else knows what's going on, it could take even longer. It would be almost like starting from the founding of the JCS. No matter how much the JCS is disliked, this is not a normal measure.

What the Military Needs is a Renewal of Strategic Capabilities, Not a Purge

North Korean forces have been dispatched to the Russia-Ukraine war and gained combat experience, and they are armed with nuclear weapons. In this context, multi-domain operations, including preparations for cyber warfare, space warfare, and electronic warfare, are still in the early stages of doctrine establishment. The military's task in an era of gray zone tactics, cognitive warfare, ultra-warfare, hybrid warfare, supply chain attacks, and power asymmetry is the evolution of tactics and doctrine, which should be achieved through intelligent accumulation and integration, not through elimination and emptying.

If a commander who failed to win through strategy attempts to replace the entire military to evade responsibility, it blocks the path to enhancing strategic capabilities and is a violent organizational reset that tames the military to politics. Personnel appointments are tools for optimizing combat power, not for ideological vetting.

If the Minister of National Defense signaled such a measure and intention, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should either stake his position and resign or oppose it. The higher one rises in rank, the more one should contemplate when they might have to put their position on the line and step down. Whether to leave a stain on history or remain a righteous general who resisted injustice depends solely on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's own judgment and decision.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should focus his attention on the following areas:

Refining doctrine for gray zone preparedness

Reorganizing the judgment channels between the Theater Command, JCS, and the ROK-US Combined forces.

Integrating cognitive warfare into the C2 system, not through "mass dismissal purges." Combat is ultimately won through command. Command is established on adaptation, accumulation, and trust.

Destroying this all at once is akin to self-destructing and dismantling the military command base. Therefore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's remarks regarding the extensive replacement of JCS generals and staff officers must be immediately withdrawn, and the Ministry of National Defense must firmly halt this purge attempt in accordance with the legitimacy of personnel authority and the principle of protecting combat power. Many are watching Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shin Won-sik's decision. No matter how much soldiers are tasked with restoring order from disorder, it is a great relief not to be serving in the military during such a tumultuous time.

Joo Eun-sik, Director of the Korea Institute for Strategic Studies