[Yonhap News] 

Our security environment is facing a complex crisis, not just a single threat, but multiple threats overlapping simultaneously. North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have entered the operational phase for tactical nuclear weapons, and the strategic alignment between Russia and China poses a threat to the Korean Peninsula. The war in Russia and Ukraine, the turmoil in Iran, and instability in the Middle East are shaking the flow of energy, logistics, components, and finance, demonstrating that economic security is as important as military security.

While the threats to the Korean Peninsula are clearly increasing, there is growing concern that our security policies and decision-making systems are moving in the opposite direction due to fatal errors.

An Error in Security Perception… A Mere ‘Reactive Reflex’ to Events

In security, an autonomic nervous system that instinctively perceives and automatically reacts to threats is more important than physical muscles that perceive and respond to threats. Just as the human body detects pain, heat, or lack of oxygen before consciousness and regulates heart rate and breathing, national security requires a system that can instantly classify the nature and level of threats and respond according to established protocols.

The problem is that South Korea's security has not reached the autonomic nervous system stage. It remains at the level of a ‘reactive reflex’ to events, overreacting to North Korea, causing cardiovascular problems, and only then grabbing its heart after the security cardiovascular system has burst.

The Error of Perceiving North Korea's Nuclear Weapons as Defensive

North Korea has continued its nuclear development for complex purposes, including securing superiority over South Korea, strengthening its negotiating position, and maintaining its regime. Despite economic hardship, it has not stopped development, has enshrined nuclear armament in its constitution, and has even mentioned the possibility of preemptive use.

Although North Korea's nuclear program threatens South Korea's survival, leftist politicians have held vague expectations that North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons through continued dialogue and mistakenly believed that increased economic hardship would halt nuclear development. Expectations that aid to North Korea would lead to changes in its behavior have also been unmet, and there have been suggestions that some aid funds may have been diverted to nuclear and missile development.

Furthermore, contrary to expectations and assumptions that North Korea would not use its nuclear weapons first against us, it has repeatedly directly mentioned the possibility of preemptive nuclear use.

The approach to denuclearization, which is premised on North Korea's good faith, is divorced from reality, and viewing the North Korean nuclear issue solely as a problem between the United States and North Korea is also incorrect. Given that North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are mostly aimed directly at South Korea and are used as a means of communist revolution, the North Korean nuclear program is a matter directly linked to South Korea's survival.

Errors in the National Security Decision-Making System

Representative examples include the recommendation to disband the Drone Command and the braking of air power operations. The South Korean military possesses Apache helicopters (AH-64E) as a core attack force in operational use. The second phase of introducing an additional 36 helicopters was effectively halted when the budget was significantly reduced during the 2025 National Assembly budget review process.

This is not because air power has become useless or due to errors in procurement procedures or contracts. The decision to transition to future capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI) within the context of prioritizing the allocation of limited defense resources has led to a halt in Apache helicopter operations.

Despite identifying UAVs and AI as future forces, the decision was made to disband the Drone Command, the command and control for UAV operations. This is contradictory. One cannot help but suspect an ulterior motive to destroy the military's core capabilities under the guise of temporary issues and reform.

An Error in Peace Messages to North Korea… North Korea Defines Itself as ‘Two Hostile States’

North Korea does not change as we expect. Even after Kim Jong Un defined the South and North as 'two hostile states,' we have sent mixed messages, emphasizing peace on one hand while suggesting on the other that provocations should not be 'over-interpreted.' For example, immediately after North Korea's missile launch, a statement was made emphasizing 'situation management,' and a few days later, a statement emphasizing 'strong deterrence' was issued.

When rhetoric towards North Korea fluctuates based on sentiments of peace and spontaneous atmosphere, North Korea learns up to what extent it can provoke. Simultaneously, the public becomes unaware of the government's standards, and allies lose confidence in South Korea's security judgments.

Therefore, the language of security should be closer to military manuals than political rhetoric. Peace and deterrence only become realities when it is predetermined when, in what situation, what to say, and how to act.

An Error in Fragmented Policies Where Diplomacy, Security, and Economy Move Separately

The ability to wage war is not determined solely by ammunition and troops. Components and maintenance, energy and communications, finance and supply chains must all function together as a single circuit. In an era where economic security has become the forefront, not the rear, of military security, if the language of diplomacy, industrial understanding, and military plans point in different directions, the nation will lose its path to survival on a fractured map.

Just before the fall of South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese people likely believed that the military and government would remain intact. However, the case of 'Pham Ngoc Thao,' a key figure in the military who acted as a Viet Cong spy and led the surrender in the final battle, shows that what is visible on the surface is not the whole story. The more critical the area, the more thorough the vetting must be. The moment this is refused, the nation's safety becomes precarious.

23 Military Experts on Advisory Committee Should Tackle Security Errors

Of the 63 members on the five specialized advisory committees directly under the Ministry of National Defense, 23 individuals with military backgrounds have presented various improvement plans regarding the reality of the North Korean nuclear threat, the restructuring of force composition, the enhancement of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities, and the division of roles within the security system.

However, some proposals have prioritized speed over sufficient verification and have shown a submissive stance by responding to political demands without conscience. In particular, the integration of military academies, despite structural problems such as weakening the expertise of each branch, causing confusion in the long-term force structure, and potentially collapsing the education system, is being pursued as if to become historical traitors to the military, the nation, and their alma maters.

Military-origin advisory committee members are individuals who understand the military and security history better than anyone else. Therefore, they must prioritize the principles of national security and the honor of the military over titles or positions. What is needed now is not to waste the weight of their military careers on political controversies, but to focus on correcting security errors and designing strategies suitable for the future warfare environment.

We hope that those with military backgrounds will not forget that they are the last guardians against the security crisis and will act righteously with a spirit of selfless devotion to public service.

By Park Pil-gyu, Editorial Writer