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[Editorial] Lee Jae-myung Administration Opens the Door to Dictatorship
  • Admin
  • March 1, 2026 at 8:48 PM
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  • Simultaneous Operation of the Law on Criminal Distortion, the Law on Courts, and the Law on Increasing the Number of Supreme Court Justices
  • Legislation that Simultaneously Transformed the Standards, Paths, and Structure of the Judiciary
  • A structure that weakens checks and balances under the guise of legality

People Power Party lawmaker Cho Jung-hoon is continuing unlimited debate on the comprehensive amendment bill for the Referendum Act (alternative bill) at the plenary session of the National Assembly on the 1st. 2026.3.1  [Photo=Yonhap News]

The National Assembly has collectively passed the so-called ‘Law Distortion Crime Act (amendment to the Criminal Act)’, the ‘Trial Petition Act (amendment to the Constitutional Court Act)’, and the ‘Chief Justice Increase Act (amendment to the Court Organization Act)’ without a bipartisan agreement.

 

While each is an amendment to an individual law, they form a legislative package that affects the entire judicial structure when operating simultaneously.

 

The core of this legislation lies in its simultaneous adjustment of the standards, pathways, and composition of the judiciary.

 

Criminal Control over Judgments, the ‘Law Distortion Crime Act’

 

The amendment to the Criminal Act stipulates that judges can be criminally punished if they distort legal principles in their rulings. The intention is to strengthen judicial accountability.

 

However, judgments are inherently an area of legal interpretation. Interpretations can differ on the same matter, and cases are not infrequently overturned by higher courts.

 

The structure of imposing criminal responsibility by retroactively judging differences in interpretation as “distortion” places the act of judgment itself within the realm of potential punishment.

 

Judicial control is already exercised through institutional mechanisms such as appeals and final appeals.

 

Control through criminal penalties should be a last resort. If the boundaries are unclear, this could lead not to strengthened accountability but to the inhibition of judgments. This affects the standards for judicial decisions.

 

Change in the Final Adjudication Structure, the ‘Trial Petition Act’

 

The amendment to the Constitutional Court Act expands and refines the system to allow for the filing of trial petitions with the Constitutional Court regarding judgments made by general courts.

 

This measure has the effect of duplicating the final adjudication structure of the judicial system. Previously, Supreme Court rulings functioned as the final judgment, but with the expansion of the trial petition system, the Constitutional Court would operate as another de facto final decision-making body.

 

The Constitutional Court is an institution formed through a political appointment process. As the authority for final decisions expands, it is possible that judicial decisions could become more closely intertwined with political debates.

 

This is a change that alters the pathway of adjudication.

 

Reorganization of Interpretive Power, the ‘Chief Justice Increase Act’

 

The amendment to the Court Organization Act significantly increases the number of Supreme Court justices.

 

The Supreme Court is not merely an institution that processes cases; it is an institution that shapes the direction of the national legal order through precedent.

 

With this amendment, the number of Supreme Court justices who can be appointed during the current president's term reaches a total of 22. When the increase and existing replacement personnel are combined, the structure allows for a significant portion of the Supreme Court's composition to be filled by a single administration.

 

This means that the landscape of judicial interpretation can change in a short period.

 

While resolving case backlog has been presented as the justification, many point out that the bottleneck causing trial delays primarily lies in the first and second instance lower courts.

 

The prioritization of expanding the upper echelons over strengthening the lower structure is a factor that amplifies political ripple effects, separate from policy effectiveness. This is a change that alters the composition of the judiciary itself.

 

Simultaneous Shift of the Three Pillars

 

The ‘Law Distortion Crime Act’ has added the possibility of criminal penalties to the standards for judgments, the ‘Trial Petition Act’ has expanded the pathway for final decisions, and the ‘Chief Justice Increase Act’ has reorganized the composition of interpretive power.

 

The standards, pathways, and composition have all shifted simultaneously.

 

This is why it is evaluated as legislation that does not merely amend a single law but simultaneously adjusts key pillars of the separation of powers structure.

 

Another point of contention is the procedure. While the judiciary requested public discussion and social consensus, the bills were passed without bipartisan agreement.

 

Given that reforms to the judicial structure have traditionally been predicated on cross-party consensus, this approach is likely to set a precedent.

 

The Guise of Legality and Historical Precedents

 

In modern times, the concentration of power often proceeds through legal procedures.

 

Venezuela, often cited as a prime example, also systematically altered its judicial structure through elections and legislation. The number of Supreme Court justices was increased, the structure of constitutional interpretation was adjusted, and control mechanisms over the judiciary were strengthened.

 

All processes were formally legal.

 

However, as the checks and balances weakened, the institutional mechanisms for correcting policy errors collapsed, and ultimately, a resource-rich nation with the world's largest oil reserves experienced a severe economic crisis and institutional collapse.

 

The key was not the seizure of power but the weakening of the checks and balances.

 

Democracy Rests on Restraint

 

The judiciary is the last safeguard for controlling power.

 

Legislation that simultaneously alters the standards, pathways, and composition of that safeguard is difficult to view as mere institutional improvement.

 

Legality is the starting point of democracy, but it is not the entirety of it.

 

It is the restraint of the majority, not the power of the majority, that sustains democracy.

 

The passage of these three judicial bills signifies a shift in the power structure, not just a simple amendment of laws.

 

The extent of that shift will depend on the attitudes of politics and the judiciary going forward.

 

The door opened quietly.

 

Whether to close it or widen it further is now a matter of choice.



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    guest2026-03-01 21:00:56

    1. 대법관 증원은 헌법대로 대법원판사를 임명해서 대법원장과 법원행정처장을 제외한 대법관 1명당 대법원판사 2명씩 소재판부 12개를 구성하면 업무적체를 해소하고 재판업무의 전문화도 가능.

    2. 재판소원은 재판 자체가 실체적 진실이 아니라 절차적 진실을 찾아가는 과정이라는 소송의 한계를 감안하면 4심제가 3심제에 비해 실체적 진실에 가까이 갈 수 있다는 보장이 없는 이상 현행 3심제 아래에서 절차적 정의를 구현할 수 없는 경우 예외적이긴 하지만 재심을 통해 재판소원이라는 사실상 4심제를 도입하여 이루려는 정의의 상당부분은 감당할 수 있으며, 4심제인 재판소원을 감당할 만큼 헌법재판소의 인적•물적 자원이 부족한 현실과 그에 따른 비용을 추가로 소송당사자에게 지우는 것은 경제적 약자에게 지나친 불평등을 초래할 수 있으므로 우리 현실상 불합리한 제도.

    3. 법왜곡죄는 판사나 검사의 직무와 관련하여 기존의 직권남용죄에 해당하지 않는 영역까지 처벌하려는 의도라면 독재를 위한 악법일 뿐. 하일, 이틀러(Heil, Yitler)!

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