An aerial view of the Daesan Petrochemical Complex, one of Korea's three major petrochemical complexes. [Photo = Seosan City Hall]Table of Contents

① Why is Iran's nuclear program targeting Korean factories?

② If the Strait of Hormuz closes, the arteries of the Korean economy will also be blocked.

③ Why are the refining and petrochemical industries security industries?

④ Crude oil to the U.S. and non-Middle Eastern regions, with flexible processing.

⑤ The hydrogen economy is not outside petrochemicals, but within them.

Iran's nuclear issue is not a Middle Eastern military problem, but a Korean industrial security problem.

If the Strait of Hormuz is shaken, crude oil, naphtha, refining, and petrochemicals will all be shaken simultaneously.

Korea, living with North Korea's nuclear threat, cannot pretend to be a third party in the face of Iran's nuclear program.

Iran's nuclear program seems like a distant issue for Korea. On the map, it's a nuclear crisis in the Middle East; in diplomatic news, it's a conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran; and on the international page, it's military tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

However, the conclusion changes when viewed through the lens of industry. Iran's nuclear program is an issue that targets Korean factories. This does not mean nuclear weapons are directly aimed at Korea.

If Iran solidifies its status as a nuclear threshold state and a Middle Eastern war becomes a reality, the Strait of Hormuz will be the first to be shaken. And if the Strait of Hormuz is shaken, Korea's crude oil and naphtha, refining and petrochemicals, transportation and power, and the basic material chain of manufacturing will all be shaken simultaneously.

The essence of Iran's nuclear program is a Middle Eastern nuclear domino effect.

The essence of Iran's nuclear issue is not whether one country possesses nuclear weapons. If Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state or solidifies its de facto status as a nuclear threshold state, the balance of power in the entire Middle East will be shaken.

As of June last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran possessed over 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium. 60% enrichment is far beyond the level of fuel for civilian nuclear power plants.

If Iran maintains this state and buys time between negotiations and de-escalation, it could lead to the international community virtually acknowledging its pre-nuclear weapon status.

At that moment, Saudi Arabia will be the first to act. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia already indicated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would follow suit.

Iran's nuclear program will not end with Iran alone. It could trigger discussions about nuclear potential and security anxieties in major regional countries, including Saudi Arabia.

While North Korea's nuclear program in Northeast Asia is a risk confined within a deterrence structure involving the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the China variable, and U.S.-China containment, Iran's nuclear program in the Middle East is a risk entangled with sectarian conflict, proxy wars, the possibility of preemptive strikes by Israel, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and competition among oil-producing nations.

Therefore, Iran's nuclear program is not a less serious issue than North Korea's nuclear program. The nature of the risk is simply different.

While North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a direct military threat to South Korea's security, Iran's nuclear program is a complex risk that shakes Korean industry through a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race and an energy crisis.

North Korea is already acting like a nuclear-armed state, and that risk has become a constant for South Korea's security. On the other hand, Iran is still in a phase where it can be stopped, but if it fails, it could push the entire Middle East to the brink of a nuclear domino effect.

North Korea's nuclear program is about Northeast Asian power balance; Iran's nuclear program is directly linked to industrial security.

If North Korea's nuclear program is an issue of deterrence in Northeast Asia, Iran's nuclear program is a problem that combines a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race with an energy crisis. Iran's nuclear program is not just about a single nuclear weapon, but a trigger that shakes the global energy order.

If that trigger is pulled, Korea cannot remain a bystander.

The Middle East is a major base for global energy production, and the Strait of Hormuz is the lifeline through which that energy flows to the world.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 15 million barrels of crude oil per day, about 34% of global crude oil trade, passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025. Japan and Korea, in particular, were identified as countries heavily reliant on the flow of crude oil through this strait.

Korea's risk does not end with rising oil prices.

If crude oil is shaken, refining is shaken. If refining is shaken, naphtha is shaken. If naphtha is shaken, the naphtha cracking center (NCC) is shaken. If the NCC is shaken, the supply of basic fractions like ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, and xylene is shaken.

These basic fractions lead to plastics, synthetic fibers, rubber, packaging materials, automotive materials, electronic materials, and construction materials. Ultimately, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is not a problem of gas station prices, but an industrial security issue that shakes the basic material chain of Korean manufacturing.

The fact that the Korean government recently announced it had secured 273 million barrels of crude oil and 2.1 million tons of naphtha through alternative procurement networks outside the Middle East and less affected by the Strait of Hormuz is in the same vein.

Reuters reported last year that 61% of Korea's crude oil and 54% of its naphtha passed through the Strait of Hormuz route. These figures illustrate why Korea is a direct victim of a Middle Eastern conflict.

Korea is not an oil-producing country. It imports crude oil, refines it, produces or imports naphtha to connect to petrochemicals, and operates its manufacturing sector with those materials.

If the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, Korea will face simultaneous shocks in oil prices, naphtha, exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and exports.

Questions Korea must ask and principles it must uphold.

Therefore, Korea's questions must change.

 Instead of asking, "Why does the U.S. object to Iran's nuclear program?", we should ask, "What will Korea gain by standing by with its arms crossed in the face of Iran's nuclear program, given that it lives with North Korea's nuclear threat?"

Korea is a country that has consistently stated it cannot accept North Korea's nuclear weapons. If Korea views Iran becoming a nuclear threshold state as someone else's problem, its diplomatic consistency in criticizing North Korea's nuclear program will also weaken.

If Iran persists and becomes a nuclear threshold state, and the international community eventually compromises, it could send the wrong signal to North Korea, suggesting that "countries that give up nuclear weapons are at a disadvantage."

Of course, this does not mean Korea should immediately jump into a Middle Eastern war. The issue is not a dichotomy between military participation and non-intervention.

Korea must at least clarify its principles.

It opposes Iran's possession of nuclear weapons. The export or dilution of highly enriched uranium, the freezing of enrichment capabilities, and the restoration of IAEA verification are necessary. Navigation safety in the Strait of Hormuz is not just a global economic issue, but a matter of Korea's economic survival.

If one criticizes the U.S., one must also present alternatives on how to reduce Iran's nuclear materials, how to prevent a Middle Eastern nuclear domino effect, and who will protect the Strait of Hormuz.

A shift in perception of the refining and petrochemical industries is needed.

At this point, the meaning of refining and petrochemicals also needs to be re-examined.

Korea has long viewed refining and petrochemicals as export industries. They were industries that imported a lot, refined a lot, cracked a lot, and sold a lot. In peacetime, that was their competitiveness.

However, in the face of Middle Eastern conflicts and crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the same structure becomes a vulnerability.

Now, refining is the front line of energy security, and petrochemicals are the rear guard of manufacturing security.

Crude oil import, refining, naphtha production, NCC operation, and basic fraction production are not separate industries but a single, integrated process. If this chain breaks, Korean factories will stop.

Therefore, Korea's industrial policy must shift from an export-oriented mindset to a self-sufficiency-oriented mindset.

Self-sufficiency here does not mean producing all crude oil domestically. It means keeping the minimum supply chain that prevents the shutdown of domestic industries during a crisis under domestic control.

The state must calculate the minimum quantities not only of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and marine fuel, but also of naphtha, basic fractions, and essential industrial materials. A distinction must be made between surplus facilities for export and essential facilities for security.

Petrochemical restructuring should not be about clearing unprofitable facilities, but about reorganizing the material security network to protect Korean manufacturing.

Crude oil supply lines must also be reconfigured.

Middle Eastern crude oil cannot be cut off overnight. Refining facilities, long-term contracts, transportation costs, and oil type compatibility are all intertwined. However, at the very least, the security volume to withstand crises must be fixed with the U.S. and non-Middle Eastern regions.

Increasing U.S. crude oil imports is not simply changing suppliers. Changes in crude oil properties alter refining yields, change the naphtha supply structure, and require the entire petrochemical process to be redesigned. Crude oil procurement strategy is, in essence, a strategy for redesigning refining and petrochemical processes.

Petrochemicals are the threshold to entering the hydrogen economy.

It is also important to be cautious about promoting renewable energy as a solution.

Renewable energy can be a supplementary measure for power issues, but it is not a direct solution for refining and petrochemical feedstock. Solar and wind power generate electricity. However, petrochemicals deal with carbon-based raw materials.

Electricity is not ethylene, wind power is not propylene, and solar power is not butadiene. The critical point for Korean industry is not just a shortage of electricity, but the carbon feedstock chain leading to crude oil, naphtha, NCC, and basic chemical materials.

However, the transportation sector is different.

Electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are direct solutions to reduce reliance on petroleum for transportation.

Passenger cars and short-distance transport should transition to battery electric vehicles, while long-distance freight, buses, port, airport, and military logistics should move towards hydrogen fuel cells. Hydrogen power generation is also indispensable.

While hydrogen cars are a strategy to reduce oil demand, hydrogen power generation is a strategy to secure power security.

Importantly, hydrogen is not a future industry outside of petrochemicals. It is a security energy that connects by-product hydrogen and reformed hydrogen, generated from crude oil refining, naphtha cracking, and NCC processes, to industrial complexes, power generation, and transportation fuels.

However, it is premature to consider green hydrogen, obtained by electrolyzing water, as the main solution at present. Electrolytic hydrogen is a long-term goal.

The hydrogen that Korea should realistically utilize now is the by-product hydrogen and reformed hydrogen generated within the integrated refining and petrochemical process. The entire chain, from crude oil import, refining, naphtha production, NCC operation, basic fraction production, to hydrogen extraction and utilization, must be linked as a single industrial security chain.

The hydrogen economy is not an environmental slogan, but the next stage of the refining and petrochemical security industry.

Iran's nuclear program poses questions for Korea.

Ultimately, Iran's nuclear program poses three questions for Korea.

First, what principles will Korea, as a victim of North Korea's nuclear program, establish in the face of Iran's nuclear proliferation?

Second, how resilient will Korea's crude oil, naphtha, refining, and petrochemical supply chains be when the Strait of Hormuz is shaken?

Third, is Korea prepared to redesign its refining, petrochemical, and hydrogen industries not as export industries, but as security industries?

Iran's nuclear program is not a Middle Eastern military issue.

It is an industrial security issue that can simultaneously shake the raw materials, power, transportation, and exports of Korean factories.

A country that lives with North Korea's nuclear threat and relies on Middle Eastern crude oil as its industrial lifeline cannot pretend to be a third party in the face of Iran's nuclear program.

Korea must now rewrite its energy policy not as an environmental slogan, but as a survival strategy. Refining and petrochemicals are security industries before they are export industries, and the hydrogen economy is not a future slogan, but the next stage of industrial survival.

Preview of the next episode

② If the Strait of Hormuz closes, the arteries of the Korean economy will also be blocked.

The next episode will specifically address the impact of the Strait of Hormuz on the Korean economy. The problem is not just rising crude oil prices, but the complex shock that simultaneously shakes crude oil, naphtha, NCC, basic materials, exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and exports.

It will analyze why the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is an issue of the Korean economy's arteries, and what strategies Korea should adopt for stockpiling, alternatives, and procurement.