On March 22, North Korea held the first session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang and re-elected Kim Jong Un as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. On this day, Kim Jong Un declared "South Korea as the most hostile country" and issued a stern warning, stating, "If provoked, they will pay a ruthless price." [Photo=Korean Central News Agency]

Why are the left-wing nationalists of South Korea unable to clearly state that North Korea is the "main enemy" of South Korea? Many people understand this as mere political calculation or vote counting. 

However, in reality, it is rooted in much deeper historical perception and psychological foundations. This is not a matter of a misstatement by one or two politicians, but a problem of collective thinking patterns created by modern and contemporary Korean history.

The Origin of South Korean Left-Wing Thought is Nationalism

First and foremost, the starting point of South Korean left-wing nationalism was a tendency to prioritize "nation" over "state." The conservative camp in South Korea generally views the survival and system of South Korea, a liberal democratic state, as the primary value. 

In contrast, the flow of nationalist left-wing thought has understood the "Korean national community" as a higher concept than the state of South Korea. From this perspective, North Korea is perceived not as a foreign country, but as "half of the divided nation."

This difference is significant. For the conservative camp, the moment North Korea develops nuclear weapons and militarily threatens South Korea, the concept of "enemy" is immediately established. However, for nationalist left-wing individuals, while North Korea may be a dangerous adversary, it does not easily feel like a completely alienated foreign state. This is because an emotional connection of shared ethnicity still remains.

In fact, nationalist discourse in modern and contemporary Korean history has long been centered on "national victimhood." The experience of Japanese colonial rule left a strong historical memory in all of Korean society. The problem is that, in this process, the narrative that "the nation was a victim and foreign powers divided us" became deeply ingrained. From this viewpoint, the division itself was interpreted not as a choice made by the nation, but as a product of the Cold War and foreign powers.

From this perspective, the emphasis is placed on "why the division occurred" rather than on the violence and dictatorial nature of the North Korean regime. This led to a trend of attributing the cause of division to the United States, Japan, and the Cold War system. Consequently, North Korea is understood more as a "result of historical circumstances" rather than as an aggressor. Of course, they are not unaware of the problems of the North Korean regime. However, psychologically, the arrows of blame are often directed towards external conditions rather than North Korea.

The influence of the student activist culture of the 1980s was also very significant. At that time, the National Liberation (NL) faction's discourse held considerable power within the student movement. This trend involved a perspective that viewed South Korea not as a fully independent nation but as a semi-state under US influence. Conversely, North Korea was sometimes interpreted as a "system that pursued a line of national self-determination, albeit in a distorted manner."

Of course, not all left-wing individuals today maintain these exact views. However, human thought is long influenced by worldviews formed during youth. The nation-centric thinking that was established then still leaves traces in various areas of politics, education, and culture.

The Perception of Foreign Powers as the Cause of Division Also Plays a Role

What is particularly important is the issue of "moral self-image." Many left-wing nationalists perceive themselves as forces pursuing peace and reconciliation. To them, the phrase "North Korea is the main enemy" sounds like the vocabulary of Cold War anti-communism. Therefore, the moment they accept that phrase, they feel as though they are aligning themselves with militarism or Cold War logic.

This is a form of psychological rejection. It is similar to how someone might feel emotional difficulty if told, "Since you have a criminal in your family, define the entire family as an enemy." While they may criticize the North Korean regime, psychological resistance arises when the expression extends to "an enemy of the entire nation."

Another interesting point is that South Korean left-wing nationalism often exhibits a "supranational nationalist" character rather than being "anti-state." For these individuals, "historical legitimacy of the national community" is more important than the legal state of South Korea. Therefore, they often prioritize reconciliation within the nation over interstate conflict.

The problem is that this clashes with reality.

International politics operates not on emotions, but on military power and systems. North Korea has actually developed nuclear weapons, continues to pose military threats to South Korea, and has constitutionally maintained a stance that denies the South Korean system. In such a situation, it is difficult to explain the security reality solely based on the emotion of "shared ethnicity."

Therefore, the South Korean conservative camp criticizes left-wing nationalism, saying, "National sentiment has overwhelmed a sense of national reality." Conversely, the left-wing nationalist camp criticizes conservatives, stating, "They view internal national issues solely through the lens of hostility and confrontation." Ultimately, both sides clash over which is prioritized: the state or the nation.

Interestingly, this phenomenon is not unique to South Korea. Some elements of the West German left before German reunification did not view East Germany as a complete enemy state. Similar psychological dynamics appear in the relationship between China and Taiwan. This tension always arises in situations where the nation and the state do not fully align.

However, in South Korea's case, this has solidified into a stronger form due to the prolonged convergence of colonial experiences, the Cold War, division, and nationalist education. The influence of "nation" being treated as an almost moral value, particularly in education and culture, has been significant. As a result, for some individuals, "nation" itself has become a more sacred concept than South Korea, a liberal democratic state.

Ultimately, the reason why some left-wing nationalists hesitate to easily call North Korea the main enemy of South Korea is not solely due to ignorance of North Korea's reality. Rather, it stems from a long-formed, nation-centric historical perspective, emotions, and issues of self-identity. For them, North Korea remains not a simple foreign country, but a "tragic state of division within the same nation."

◆ Songsan (송산) 

Poet and researcher of history and philosophy. Former director of the Rhee Syngman Institute. Currently serves as a research advisor for the Korean Modern and Contemporary History Research Association and as the representative of the philosophy forum Lyceum. He has published four poetry collections, co-translated "Heroes of the Goose Coast," and authored the humanities books "Joseon, the Mythified Nation," "Humanities on the Tatami," and "A Liberal's Reading of Gramsci." Songsan is a pen name.