The South Korean government's replacement of the paper arrival card for foreigners with an electronic arrival card (K-ETA) has sparked controversy as Taiwanese individuals are now unable to identify themselves as Taiwanese upon arrival in South Korea, being forced to write only 'China (Taiwan)' as demanded by China. Unsplash

Seo Sang-moon, Editorial Writer and President of the East Sea Future Research Institute

Recently, South Korea has become entangled in a long-standing dispute between Taiwan and China, causing diplomatic repercussions. While Taiwan and China are the instigators, South Korea provided the impetus.

This is because the South Korean government replaced the paper arrival card for foreigners with an electronic arrival card (K-ETA), making it impossible for Taiwanese individuals to list "Taiwan" as their nationality upon entering South Korea, forcing them to select only "China (Taiwan)" as required by China.

Previously, Taiwanese individuals could directly write their nationality as "대만(臺灣)" or "Taiwan" when entering South Korea.

However, starting in February 2025, the new electronic arrival card has changed the 'origin and destination country' for Taiwanese travelers in the dropdown menu to "중국(대만)" or "China (Taiwan)" in English.

While the 'Nationality' field, where personal information is entered, still allows the selection of "대만 (Taiwan)," the 'Departure From' and 'Next Destination' fields automatically classify Taiwanese individuals as having "China (Taiwan)" nationality. Taiwan officially protested to the South Korean government earlier this month due to this change.

Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded immediate correction, stating that it is "inconsistent with the facts and gives the impression that Taiwan is subordinate to China." Even Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te, who strongly advocates for Taiwan's independence, directly stated, "We hope South Korea will respect the will of the Taiwanese people."

The President's remarks have amplified the gravity of the situation. Strong voices have emerged within Taiwan calling for a complete re-evaluation of relations with South Korea.

There are reasons for Taiwan's strong backlash. It is likely due to concerns that this notation could be interpreted as the South Korean government officially recognizing China's "One China" principle.

There is also dissatisfaction with why South Korea, unlike major countries such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, which allow the designation "Taiwan" on entry documents, exclusively acknowledges China's stance.

The South Korean government is in a difficult position. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "Our fundamental stance of promoting informal practical cooperation with Taiwan remains unchanged," but is adopting a cautious attitude rather than readily making changes. Several complex reasons appear to be at play.

First, it is difficult to break the diplomatic agreement made in August 1992 when South Korea established diplomatic relations with China and agreed to respect the "One China" principle. China, which asserts that the Taiwan issue concerns its core interests, has reacted extremely sensitively to any attempt to recognize Taiwan's independence in any form.

South Korea cannot help but consider its relationship with China for various reasons. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated its stance that "there is no problem," effectively supporting South Korea's current measures.

Second, there is the issue of administrative consistency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reluctant to change the designation, citing that "China (Taiwan)" has already been used on alien registration cards issued to foreigners staying for more than 90 days since 2004.

There are concerns that altering a practice maintained for over 20 years without significant issues could trigger a chain reaction in other administrative systems.

Third, this is a sensitive issue where the "One China" principle and Taiwan's identity clash directly, going beyond a simple digital transformation of administrative procedures.

This is a diplomatic challenge that will be difficult for any government to resolve easily. The electronic arrival card system was introduced before the current Lee Jae-myung administration took office, so it is not appropriate to dismiss this issue as being due to a specific government's "pro-China" tendencies.

This issue can be seen as a karmic consequence of historical decisions made when the Roh Tae-woo administration, at the time of establishing diplomatic relations between Korea and China, readily accepted the "One China" principle, thereby failing to respond adequately and being swayed by China's pace.

Even now, a century later, South Korea finds itself trapped by its own actions, with the issue of Taiwan's national designation being a continuation of the strategic decisions made by the South Korean government at the time of establishing diplomatic relations with China.

At that time, the Roh Tae-woo administration (Foreign Minister Lee Sang-ok) established diplomatic relations with China by recognizing the "One China" principle, gaining significant benefits from the Chinese market.

Simultaneously, by acting prudently, it could have skillfully avoided the "One China" option, but by rushing into diplomatic ties with China in an impatient and inexperienced manner, it has subsequently imposed restrictions on its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This indicates that, regardless of political party, the South Korean government has consistently lacked a proper understanding of China.

Since it is impossible to list all the evidence of hasty diplomatic relations due to a lack of understanding of China, only one or two examples will be presented here.

At the time, both South Korea and China desired diplomatic relations, but China maintained a leisurely attitude without revealing its intentions, which the South Korean government failed to discern. Furthermore, the issue of an apology for China's "illegal intervention" in the Korean War, which could have given South Korea an advantage during the normalization negotiations, was not properly utilized.

Instead of receiving an apology, the South Korean side did not even elicit an acknowledgment and apology for the immense damage and sacrifices suffered by the South Korean people due to China's illegal intervention in the Korean War, nor for the obstruction of Korean unification. It merely ended with the Chinese government mentioning it as an "unfortunate and regrettable incident that should not happen again."

This is not all. The South Korean government failed to utilize Taiwan as a diplomatic leverage to make China recognize "One Korea." At that time, both Taiwan and China adhered to the "One China" principle, but the South Korean government could not utilize it, citing the principle of Korean unification.

Moreover, by leveraging the fact that both China and Taiwan advocate for "One China," South Korea should have asserted that while acknowledging the "One China" principle in relation to China, the question of which of the two constitutes that one China should be left to China and Taiwan to decide individually.

This is similar to the format of the "1992 Consensus," where both Taiwan and China advocate for "One China" but agree to verbally express their respective positions on "One China."

Therefore, by engaging in a prolonged negotiation, just as China was made to recognize only "One Korea," South Korea should have made China recognize only "One Korea."

However, this is an irreversible past event. In the current situation, it is highly likely that the South Korean government will consider the following three main options.

First, to follow China's position as it is. Second, to accept Taiwan's position and designate it as "Taiwan (Taiwan)." Third, to use this incident as an opportunity to designate Taiwan as "Republic of China."

The likelihood of the South Korean government choosing the first option is close to 100%, and the third option will be 100% not chosen.

None of these three options can satisfy both China and Taiwan. Therefore, an alternative must be presented to satisfy both Taiwan and China, or at least prevent them from continuing to assert their existing positions.

The author proposes "Chinese Taipei" as an alternative. "Chinese Taipei," a neutral designation used by Taiwan to avoid political friction with China in various international organizations and events, including the Olympics, has a history of being accepted as a "second-best option" to avoid the worst-case scenario, even if not fully satisfactory to both China and Taiwan.

In November 1991, with the support of the South Korean government, Taiwan joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with China and Hong Kong using this designation. Since then, the international community has used this term. Taiwan participates in the Olympics and international conferences under this designation.

In October, at the APEC Summit in Gyeongju, the South Korean government designated Taiwan as "Chinese Taipei," and Taiwan did not raise any objections.

From China's perspective, the term "Chinese" symbolically upholds the "One China" principle, while Taiwan secures a channel for international participation without being annexed as part of "China."

Therefore, if the South Korean government adopts this designation for arrival cards, it could provide a rationale to persuade both sides of the Taiwan Strait not to continue making strong assertions. Although both China and Taiwan may be dissatisfied, they will not be able to stubbornly insist on their existing positions until the end.

Even though the current ruling party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, has strong independence leanings, it will eventually accept this designation rather than rigidly insisting on "Taiwan." Similarly, China will also not be able to insist on its existing "China (Taiwan)" position until the end.

Of course, this solution is not perfect. The appropriateness of applying "Chinese Taipei," a product of compromise for specific purposes like international conferences and sporting events, to an immigration control system related to national sovereignty may be debated.

Therefore, as a secondary option, allowing the selection of "Taiwan" for nationality itself, while seeking a technical solution for the problematic "Departure From/Destination" fields, could be a viable alternative. However, we must resolve the issue in principle with "Chinese Taipei."

The problem lies with the Lee Jae-myung administration's subservient and pro-China stance. It is highly likely that the changed designation will be pushed forward, continuing the existing pattern of observing China's mood and trying to appease it. Doing so will invite disaster.

We must avoid the foolishness of causing greater trouble by responding unwisely. This could offend the sentiments of both the Taiwanese and South Korean people, and negatively impact practical relations such as semiconductor supply chain cooperation with Taiwan and the annual exchange of millions of people.

Taiwan is currently increasing pressure by even mentioning the trade deficit with South Korea. While this has its limitations in terms of effectiveness, separate from that, we must foresee the changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape in the near future. Therefore, it is necessary to consider this as a national strategic item and manage relations with Taiwan smoothly.

If this issue is not resolved promptly and is left unaddressed, it will become more complex amidst the broader trends of intensifying US-China competition and escalating geopolitical tensions in East Asia. This is a time when wise and pragmatic diplomacy that upholds principles while not losing sight of practical benefits is more necessary than ever.

Editorial Writer, Hanmi Daily, President of the East Sea Future Research Institute