ROK-US Combined Combat Command Training. [Photo=Yonhap News]

The United States and Japan conducted joint exercises in the East Sea and East China Sea on February 16th and 18th. It was a large-scale aerial training exercise involving four US B-52 strategic bombers and F-2 and F-15 fighter jets from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.  

This occurred immediately after South Korea rejected the ROK-US-Japan joint exercise proposed by the United States, raising doubts about the stability of the ROK-US alliance.  

Subsequently, on February 18th, tensions rapidly escalated in the airspace over international waters as Chinese fighter jets responded to the sortie of ten US F-16 fighter jets from the Korean Peninsula in the Yellow Sea.  

This is interpreted as an expansion of "strategic flexibility" beyond deterring North Korea to also checking China. What choices would the ROK military have to make, and how would things unfold if this situation were to escalate into actual combat and a US-China war, with North Korea invading South Korea at China's request?  

This question is not mere imagination; it is one of the war scenarios. The scenario would unfold in completely different ways depending on who holds wartime operational control (OPCON). The current administration is accelerating the transfer of OPCON. Let's examine the burden the ROK military would face in wartime if OPCON is transferred.  

Simultaneous Occurrence of US-China and Korean Peninsula Wars with OPCON Held by the US Forces

If the US-China confrontation escalated into an actual war, the ROK military would immediately come under the operational control of US forces within the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) framework.  

In December 2024, US Air Force B-52H strategic bombers conduct joint exercises in the Western Pacific, escorted by F-15 fighter jets of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. [Photo=Japan Self-Defense Forces]

Upon the outbreak of war, following the war decision and approval process by the presidents of South Korea and the United States, the CFC would transition to a wartime posture, and the Commander of US Forces Korea would exercise theater command authority.  

All major operations of the ROK military would be integrated under the command of the CFC. Responses in the Yellow Sea, the Northern Limit Line islands, and the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) would be decided and coordinated within the combined command structure, rather than through independent judgment.  

The core of the current CFC structure, with OPCON held by US Forces, is that the ROK military can focus on the defense of the Korean Peninsula without being caught up in a US-China clash.  

The US military has already deployed strategic assets in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, and upon the commencement of war, strategic bombers, fighter jets, reconnaissance aircraft, and naval forces from Guam, Okinawa, and mainland Japan would be automatically reinforced. With the integration of missile defense systems and cyber/electronic warfare capabilities, the ROK military could immediately supplement its own capabilities with forces it could not secure independently.  

Under the current CFC command structure, the ROK military can concentrate on essential missions such as repelling North Korean surprise provocations, defending the Seoul metropolitan area, defending the Northern Limit Line islands, and protecting rear areas and bases.  

Furthermore, with US forces holding theater command authority, China would perceive South Korea as an ally of the United States rather than a principal party in the war, making direct attacks on South Korea less likely.  

Ultimately, with OPCON held by US forces, the ROK military can operate stably within the US theater strategy, deterring the escalation of the US-China conflict to the Korean Peninsula. However, transferring OPCON means abandoning all these advantages, akin to "trading a live tiger for a dead puppy."  

US-China and Korean Peninsula Wars Occurring Simultaneously with OPCON Transferred to the ROK Military

If the US-China confrontation escalates into a full-scale war with OPCON transferred to the ROK military, the situation would be entirely different. In this case, the ROK military would become the entity exercising independent theater command authority, without being subject to the CFC's command.  

After the transfer of OPCON, the deployment of US strategic assets would not be automatic. The US military would act in accordance with the ROK military's requests and consultations, which would lead to a slower response speed in the initial stages of the war.  

As the ROK-US Combined Forces Command would not be in charge of wartime command, immediate utilization of US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense, and electronic warfare capabilities could become difficult. The ROK military would have to make independent decisions regarding responses in the Yellow Sea, the Northern Limit Line islands, and KADIZ, taking on all the uncertainties and risks of the battlefield head-on.  

With OPCON held by the ROK military, South Korea's likelihood of being drawn into the US-China conflict increases. This is because the ROK military would have to independently manage US-China military actions occurring in the Yellow Sea airspace.  

China would focus its efforts from the outset on neutralizing the ROK military. However, the ROK military would not be able to control US operations and, at the same time, would have to directly withstand Chinese attacks. This is like a shrimp getting crushed between fighting whales.  

There are significant concerns that the ROK military has not yet fully acquired the practical requirements for OPCON, such as independent ISR, joint command and control, cyber/electronic warfare capabilities, and sustained wartime operational capabilities. If the ROK military were to take sole command of the theater in such a state, it would be difficult to prevent the US-China conflict from escalating to the Korean Peninsula, and there would be a high probability of command confusion. It would be like a dog chasing a chicken only to stare at the roof.  

Transfer of Wartime OPCON is an Act of National Suicide if War is Considered

If the US-China conflict escalates into a full-scale war with OPCON held by the ROK military, the ROK military would face direct pressure from both the US and China and would be at greater risk of becoming the focal point of the war.  

The ROK military would have to simultaneously handle the dual tasks of defending the Korean Peninsula and preventing escalation, with an unprepared command structure and limited intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. If war is considered, the attempt to transfer wartime OPCON can be likened to "burning the book of security to light the candle of pride."  

Until our military power reaches a level comparable to that of the US military, the transfer of OPCON is premature. What is needed now is not a speed race for OPCON transfer.  

The focus should be on building a strong military capable of fighting and winning under any conditions, by strengthening mental preparedness and basic combat capabilities to enable autonomous military operations, improving the military's weapon systems in line with modern warfare, completing combat readiness as the military's faith, and restoring and boosting the morale of service members.  

◆ Park Pil-gyu

Editor at The Hankookilbo

40th graduating class of Korea Military Academy