President Kim Dae-jung and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il. After Kim Jong-un’s “two-state theory” was announced, Kim Jong-il’s collected works published afterward omitted the entire content of the 2000 inter-Korean summit. [Photo=Yonhap News]Discussions on constitutional amendment and inter-Korean summits have shown a curious correlation in South Korean politics. 

This is because it wasn't the case that summits were held first, followed by discussions on constitutional amendment, but rather that discussions on constitutional amendment first shook the political sphere, and then the inter-Korean summit phase unfolded, or at least a major political agreement on inter-Korean relations followed. 

Looking at the timeline, this pattern is difficult to dismiss lightly, spanning the governments of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, and now into the Lee Jae-myung administration.

The Kim Dae-jung administration opened the door first. The Kim Dae-jung administration did not initially pursue constitutional amendment. After illegally sending $450 million to the North, it immediately moved towards the 2000 inter-Korean summit and the June 15 Joint Declaration. 

However, the second clause of the June 15 Joint Declaration already contained a sentence acknowledging the common ground between the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a low-stage federation. While the form was reconciliation and cooperation, in substance, a political agreement that could redefine the nature of inter-Korean relations had already been placed above the domestic order. 

It can be seen that the language of inter-Korean coexistence, which could later create tension with the constitutional order, had already entered the center of institutional politics at that time.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration had discussions on constitutional amendment first. In January 2007, former President Roh Moo-hyun proposed a one-point constitutional amendment centered on a four-year presidential term limit for re-election. 

This was followed by a visit to the North by former Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan in March, which the political circles at the time interpreted as a preliminary coordination or exploratory signal for an inter-Korean summit. Although the initial plan did not bear immediate fruit, it led to former President Roh Moo-hyun's visit to Pyongyang and the second inter-Korean summit in October of that year. 

Looking solely at the timeline, discussions on constitutional amendment first shook the political sphere, and the summit was held afterward.

The Moon Jae-in administration was similar. President Moon Jae-in proposed a presidential constitutional amendment bill on March 26, 2018. 

The first inter-Korean summit of 2018, the Panmunjom Summit, was held a month later, on April 27. 

This can also be interpreted not as the summit leading to constitutional amendment, but as the door to constitutional amendment being opened first, followed by the expansion of the space for inter-Korean summit diplomacy. At least, that's what the timeline suggests.

The reason this pattern repeats is that inter-Korean summits are not mere diplomatic events, but political acts concerning how inter-Korean relations will be defined and in what direction the order of the Korean Peninsula will move. 

However, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea already sets a clear direction. The current constitution defines the territory of the Republic of Korea as the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands and mandates the establishment and pursuit of a peaceful reunification policy based on the fundamental order of liberal democracy. 

In other words, the subject of unification is the Republic of Korea, and the order of unification is liberal democracy. 

Under this constitutional structure, it is difficult to accept the perpetuation of separate states on the Korean Peninsula as a permanent state, or a coexistence order that replaces liberal democratic unification, as the final state.

It is precisely at this point that North Korea's hostile "two-state theory" becomes a declaration that cannot be taken lightly. 

In January 2024, Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations not as relations between compatriots but as "hostile two-state relations" and "relations between two belligerent states in a state of war." Subsequently, North Korea announced in October 2024 that it had amended its constitution to define South Korea as a "hostile state." 

This is not a mere hardline statement directed at South Korea. It is a declaration that shakes the state legitimacy, territorial integrity, and principles of unification that the Constitution of the Republic of Korea upholds. 

If North Korea preemptively defines the two Koreas as two states, there will inevitably be pressure within South Korea to the effect that "in that case, shouldn't the constitution also be changed to reflect reality?" 

The hostile two-state theory is a statement aimed at inter-Korean relations and, at the same time, a political language that pressures the South Korean constitutional order.

The correlation between constitutional amendment and inter-Korean summits becomes clearer at this point. 

Constitutional amendment is not simply a matter of institutional refinement, but an act of shaking the taboos of the constitution. 

Once the door to the constitution is opened, the second and third times become easier. Initially, domestic agendas may come to the forefront. However, what is more important is the precedent that the constitution is something that can be touched. 

At that moment, inter-Korean summits or the redefinition of inter-Korean relations can function not just as simple diplomatic events but as opportunities to realize regime change through constitutional amendment or to reinterpret the constitution. 

The fact that the current Lee Jae-myung administration is once again knocking on the door of constitutional amendment is difficult to view as unrelated to this trend. 

The current proposed constitutional amendment includes various domestic agendas such as strengthening emergency decree control, revising the constitutional preamble, regional balanced development, and guaranteeing quality of life and opportunities. While superficially appearing as a consolidation of different domestic issues, what is important in the world of politics is not the individual clauses but the fact that the 'door to constitutional amendment' itself is opened. 

The first constitutional amendment always lowers the threshold for the next one, and taboos of the constitution that have been shaken become channels for incorporating larger issues later. 

In fact, the current proposed constitutional amendment even includes a clause stating that the state should reduce regional disparities and promote balanced development so that all citizens can enjoy equal quality of life and opportunities regardless of their place of residence.

It cannot be definitively concluded that constitutional amendment will immediately lead to inter-Korean summits. 

However, the Kim Dae-jung administration opened the door in a different way instead of constitutional amendment, and in the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations, discussions on constitutional amendment first shook the political sphere, followed by the inter-Korean summit phase. And now, the Lee Jae-myung administration is once again knocking on the door of constitutional amendment. 

It is difficult to view this timeline as mere coincidence. South Korea's political experience shows that when the taboos of the constitution are shaken first, the space for inter-Korean politics also expands. 

Ultimately, constitutional amendment and inter-Korean summits are not two unrelated events. Constitutional amendment is the act of opening the door to institutions, and inter-Korean summits are the act of opening the door to order. 

South Korea's political timeline generally shows that the front door was opened first, and the back door followed. Therefore, the current discussions on constitutional amendment should not be read solely as a scene in domestic politics. It could be a preview of an upcoming inter-Korean summit.