Members of the People Power Party, including leader Jang Dong-hyuk, shout slogans at a general assembly at the National Assembly on the 6th, urging an end to the ruling party's push for a special prosecutor to investigate fabricated indictments and prosecutorial cancellations. [Photo = Yonhap News]

With the constitutional amendment bill failing to pass the plenary session of the National Assembly on the 7th due to a lack of quorum, the political landscape for the June 3rd local elections has entered a new frame war. 

Although the constitutional amendment bill itself did not pass the parliamentary approval process, its political repercussions are highly likely to continue until election day. 

The core of this constitutional amendment bill is to explicitly state the spirit of the Gwangju Uprising and the Busan Democracy Movement in the preamble of the Constitution, and to strengthen parliamentary control over the president's declaration of martial law. 

It was proposed by 187 lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties and independents, excluding the People Power Party, and required the approval of more than two-thirds of the total 286 lawmakers, or 191 votes, to pass. The structure made it difficult to pass without the cooperation of the People Power Party. 

The People Power Party reaffirmed its party's opposition to the constitutional amendment bill at its general assembly on the 6th, the day before the vote. As People Power Party lawmakers were absent from the plenary session in accordance with the party's stance, the bill was not rejected based on a vote count but was categorized as a failure to vote due to not meeting the quorum requirement for deliberation. 

This failure to vote is not a mere procedural mishap. 

It is a political event that provides both ammunition for the ruling party and grounds for defense and counterattack for the People Power Party ahead of the local elections. 

The ruling party is highly likely to raise the issue of responsibility, claiming, "The People Power Party blocked constitutional amendments to prevent martial law." However, there is a more direct frame. It is the frame of rebellion. 

From the ruling party's perspective, the failure of the constitutional amendment bill vote is material that reinforces the narrative of responsibility for rebellion, rather than an independent election issue. 

The ruling party will not simply say, "The People Power Party abstained from the constitutional amendment." They are highly likely to accuse them of being, "A party that even blocked constitutional amendments for martial law control." 

In this case, the failure of the constitutional amendment bill vote lies in the extension of the narrative of responsibility for rebellion that has continued since the December 3rd martial law incident. 

The People Power Party's defense logic is also clear. 

Instead of directly opposing individual clauses of the constitutional amendment bill, the People Power Party is raising issues with the timing and procedures. 

The moment they engage in a clause-by-clause debate, the People Power Party could be at a disadvantage, as it would appear they are directly opposing clauses such as strengthening martial law control, including the May 18th democratization movement in the Constitution, and stipulating the Busan Democracy Movement. 

Therefore, the People Power Party's message is bound to focus on "blocking hasty constitutional amendments for election purposes" rather than "opposing constitutional amendments." 

However, the People Power Party's actual counter-card is elsewhere. 

It is the special prosecutor bill for fabricated indictments, or more precisely, the controversy over special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations. Instead of getting trapped in the ruling party's rebellion frame, the People Power Party is highly likely to counterattack, arguing, "A special prosecutor bill that allows the cancellation of prosecution for the president's own case is the true appropriation of power." 

Hankyoreh reported that the special prosecutor bill for fabricated indictments proposed by the Democratic Party included the authority for the special prosecutor to cancel prosecutions in ongoing trials, and that the People Power Party criticized this as "self-amnesty." 

MBC also reported that the People Power Party is protesting the content of the special prosecutor bill that effectively grants prosecutorial cancellation powers, stating, "It is giving a free pass to President Lee Jae-myung." 

This is the key point that will differentiate the impact of the constitutional amendment bill's failure to vote on the local elections. 

While the ruling party will attack by saying, "The People Power Party blocked constitutional amendments for martial law control," the People Power Party can retort, "The special prosecutor bill for self-cancellation of prosecution, aimed at erasing the president's own case, is a bigger problem." 

For the undecided voters, the gray zone, the controversy over the special prosecutor for prosecutorial cancellations may seem like a more direct and real issue of power than the failure of the constitutional amendment bill vote. 

There are no centrists in elections. There are only those in the gray zone. 

These individuals, closer to the "swing voters" in English-language political analysis, are not a fixed support base but a segment of voters who selectively shift their allegiance based on issues, candidates, evaluations of the administration, and regional interests in each election. 

The gray zone is likely to focus on questions like, "Why now for constitutional amendments?", "Why now for a special prosecutor?", and "Who is pushing for what political agenda right before an election?" rather than meticulously scrutinizing the entire text of the constitutional amendment bill. 

The more strongly the ruling party pushes the narrative of responsibility for the failure of constitutional amendments and the rebellion frame, the more the People Power Party can counterattack with the controversy over the special prosecutor for prosecutorial cancellations, arguing, "The goal isn't constitutional amendment, but settling the president's case." 

The 2018 case is an important benchmark for understanding the current situation. 

At that time, the constitutional amendment bill proposed by then-President Moon Jae-in was also put to a vote at the National Assembly plenary session on May 24, 2018, but failed to meet the quorum due to the opposition parties' absence, resulting in a failure to vote. The actual number of participating lawmakers was only 114. 

In the subsequent 2018 June 13th local elections, the Democratic Party achieved a landslide victory. Out of 17 metropolitan mayoral positions, the Democratic Party won 14, the Liberty Korea Party won 2, and one went to an independent. 

However, it is dangerous to directly apply the 2018 results to the current local elections. In 2018, major diplomatic events that overshadowed the controversy over the failed constitutional amendment followed in chronological order. 

The major political events of 2018 were as follows: the inter-Korean summit at Panmunjom on April 27th; the Moon Jae-in administration's constitutional amendment bill failed to be voted on May 24th; followed by the second inter-Korean summit on May 26th, the North Korea-US summit in Singapore on June 12th; and the 7th nationwide local elections were held the very next day, June 13th. 

Ultimately, the 2018 local elections were elections where the Korean Peninsula peace events and the anticipation of the North Korea-US summit had a greater impact on the election landscape than the failure of the constitutional amendment bill. 

At that time, the Liberty Korea Party succeeded in blocking the constitutional amendment but suffered a crushing defeat in the local elections. The clear lesson from 2018 is that blocking constitutional amendments does not necessarily lead to election victory. 

But 2026 is different. 

There are no major tailwinds visible for the ruling party, such as inter-Korean or North Korea-US summits. Instead, there is a headwind in the form of the controversy over special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations. 

If peace events overshadowed the controversy over the failed constitutional amendment in 2018, in 2026, the controversy over special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations could overshadow the narrative of responsibility for the failure of the constitutional amendment vote. 

This difference could be decisive for the gray zone. 

While observing the exchanges between the ruling and opposition parties regarding the failed constitutional amendment, the gray zone is likely to ask, "Why is a special prosecutor bill that can cancel prosecution for the president's own case being pursued now?" 

The moment this question grows, the failure of the constitutional amendment bill's vote could become an opportunity for the People Power Party to counterattack, rather than a weapon for the ruling party. 

The first effect of the constitutional amendment bill's failure to vote on the local elections is the mobilization of the support base. 

The ruling party will try to awaken its supporters by combining the rebellion frame and the narrative of responsibility for the failed constitutional amendment. The People Power Party will attempt to rally conservatives by combining the argument against hasty constitutional amendments and the opposition to special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations. This effect will work for both sides. 

The second effect is the centralization of the local elections. 

Local elections should ideally focus on regional administration, candidate competitiveness, aftereffects of nominations, and local issues. However, following the failure of the constitutional amendment bill vote, the elections are increasingly likely to be drawn into the frame of central politics. The ruling party will talk about "judging the forces responsible for rebellion," and the People Power Party will talk about "judging hasty election-driven constitutional amendments and self-serving special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations." 

The third effect is the pressure on the gray zone's decision-making. 

The gray zone will look not at which party is shouting more plausible slogans, but at which side's argument is closer to a realistic risk. 

If the ruling party's rebellion frame is accepted as an argument for defending the constitutional order, the People Power Party may be in a defensive position. 

Conversely, if the controversy over special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations is perceived as an exercise of power to settle the president's case, the ruling party may face a backlash the more they push the narrative of responsibility for the constitutional amendment. 

Another issue is the possibility of re-promotion. 

Since the constitutional amendment bill was not rejected through a vote count but was declared a failure to vote due to a lack of quorum, the possibility of re-voting on the same bill or re-submitting it in a different session may be discussed in political circles. 

However, constitutional amendment bills require separate procedures: parliamentary approval within 60 days of their announcement and a national referendum within 30 days of parliamentary approval. Therefore, while there may be legal room for re-promotion, the political schedule of simultaneously holding the June 3rd local elections and a national referendum is virtually bound to be significantly disrupted. 

The Constitution stipulates a procedure of public announcement of a constitutional amendment bill for at least 20 days, parliamentary approval within 60 days of the announcement, and a national referendum within 30 days of parliamentary approval. 

Ultimately, the deciding factor in the local elections is not the failure of the constitutional amendment bill's vote itself. 

It is about what the gray zone perceives as more dangerous. 

The ruling party will talk about "the People Power Party blocking constitutional amendments for martial law control," and the People Power Party will talk about "self-serving special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations aimed at erasing the president's own case." 

Between these two frames, the latter is more likely to directly resonate with the gray zone. 

The constitutional amendment bill failed to be deliberated at the parliamentary vote stage. However, the door to the local elections has now been opened more aggressively. 

The failure of the constitutional amendment bill's vote is not a closed chapter but the starting point of a frame war in the June 3rd local elections, where the rebellion frame and the controversy over special prosecutors for prosecutorial cancellations will clash.