The unilateral announcement of the 'Jang Bogo N (nuclear-powered submarine) project' between South Korea and the US, without prior consultation, is an act of diplomatic autocracy that overlooks the harsh realities of alliance calculations and a financial gamble. The 3,000-ton class submarine 'Jang Bogo-III' [Photo = Yonhap News]

A commander-in-chief's directive and declaration are military orders and the highest security manuals. 

In a field army, before a single order is issued, commanders and their staffs act as a unified decision-making body to analyze missions, assess friendly and enemy capabilities, devise the best strategies, and develop contingency plans to respond to the worst-case scenarios. 

Therefore, orders are only given after numerous war games have been conducted to control risks to near zero. This is because diplomacy should not involve luck, 'tentative steps,' or 'bold moves' in the realm of security, which is the highest domain of national survival.

However, the recent announcement by the government regarding the development plan for a Korean-style nuclear-powered submarine (nuclear submarine), the 'Jang Bogo N project,' and President Lee's remarks surrounding the transfer (reclamation) of wartime operational control (OPCON) are shaking the fundamental security manual to its core. 

There are no experts who would disagree with the necessity of strengthening defense capabilities in response to North Korea's nuclear advancements. The problem lies in the fact that the method of propulsion is not based on thorough strategic calculations, but rather on consolidating support for the upcoming June 3rd local elections and leaning towards an immature 'peace theory.'

1. Diplomatic Autocracy Overlooking the Harsh Calculations of the Alliance

The unilateral announcement of the 'Jang Bogo N (nuclear-powered submarine) project' between South Korea and the US, without prior consultation, is an act of diplomatic autocracy that overlooks the harsh realities of alliance calculations and a financial gamble. 

The acquisition of 'low-enriched uranium,' the core component of a nuclear-powered submarine, and the domestic construction plan are blocked by the barriers of the South Korea-US Atomic Energy Agreement and the US Congress's strong non-proliferation stance, with no face-to-face consultations having taken place for the past six months. 

Specifically, while South Korea views a nuclear submarine as an 'underwater kill chain' to counter North Korea's nuclear weapons, the United States sees it as a combined force to check China in the Western Pacific. Considering the case of Australia (AUKUS), which received nuclear submarine technology after demonstrating a firm military commitment, pursuing an independent path while ignoring the US demand to participate in the front against China will only lead to diplomatic friction. 

Considering the introduction of France's 'Scorpène-class reactor' to avoid US obstruction is also a dangerous idea that invites a rupture in the combined defense posture. If the US later forces construction in US shipyards or links it to pressure for increased defense cost-sharing, the 29 trillion won budget for the nuclear submarine will skyrocket astronomically, and in conjunction with the 40 trillion won budget for OPCON transfer, a national financial conflict will be unavoidable. 

It is urgent to secure practical understanding and trust through working-level negotiations between South Korea and the US, rather than engaging in a race against time driven by political motives.

2. The Danger of the Early OPCON Transfer Theory Claiming 'No Problem'

With North Korea's nuclear threat becoming a daily reality, the early transfer of OPCON is not simply a recovery of military sovereignty but an act of suicidal security for the Republic of Korea. Currently, North Korea is virtually solidifying its status as a nuclear-armed state and intensifying pressure southward through Russian troop deployment and close trilateral cooperation between North Korea, Russia, and China. 

At a time when North Korea even declares nuclear war by defining the North and South as 'hostile states,' the commander-in-chief's assertion that there are 'no problems' with the early transfer of OPCON is a dangerously oblivious statement to the security reality. 

Is the statement "no problems" regarding the early transfer, which would lead to the dissolution of the 'ROK-US Combined Forces Command,' the core of deterrence that has maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula for the past 70 years, a statement made on behalf of North Korea's position? Where does such a reckless remark originate? 

The US has already indicated that upon the transfer of OPCON, it will dissolve the Combined Forces Command and move to a 'separated command structure for Korea and the US (parallel command structure).' This is due to the 'Pershing Principle,' which states that US forces do not come under the command of foreign forces. If the command separation system, which was actually pursued during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, becomes a reality, the automatic intervention and rapid deployment of US reinforcement forces in case of emergency will be completely nullified. 

The moment we, who lack independent nuclear deterrence capabilities, reject the free nuclear umbrella shield of the world's strongest 'ROK-US Combined Forces Command,' the combined forces will collapse, and the Korean Peninsula will be reduced to a hostage of North Korea's nuclear weapons. This is the scenario that North Korea, which desires the collapse of our security, would most eagerly await. 

We must immediately cease this reckless rush that gambles with the lives of our citizens, driven by the ideological illusion of self-reliance, and thoroughly verify our tactical capabilities in accordance with the 'conditions-based transfer' principle agreed upon in 2014.

3. Security is Not 'Words' but Diplomacy to Prevent War and a Struggle for Survival

Security is not a castle in the air built with words. It is constructed only on the triangular framework of the harsh 'alliance equation,' 'financial backing,' and 'contingency plans' that assume the worst-case scenario. 

In modern international politics, no country advocates for 'independent defense.' Even the US, with the world's strongest military, operates NATO and expands its global alliance system. Japan also operates with the US-Japan alliance as its core. Immature directives thrown out without alternatives undermine policy credibility, expose our hand to the enemy, and only cause distrust and fatigue among allies. 

The government should reflect on the security policies it has pursued so far. Have there been policies that instill fear in the enemy? We must examine whether these policies are benefiting the enemy under the guise of peace and serving as events to build up the achievements of a faction, and stop them now if necessary. The public hopes that the 'Jang Bogo N project' will reflect the fact that they crave one nuclear weapon more than 100 nuclear submarines. 

A directive from the commander-in-chief that does not consider sophisticated security logic and meticulous contingency plans is not 'independent defense' but 'voluntary security self-harm.' We hope that the security line will directly inform the commander-in-chief about the harsh international situation and present clear alternatives that the public can accept.

◆ Park Pil-gyu

Editorial Board Member, The Hankyoreh

40th graduating class, Korea Military Academy