In the broadcast of Lee Young-don TV on the 16th, a current National Election Commission official exposes the reality of the 6.3 local elections based on direct experience. [Photo=Screenshot from Lee Young-don TV]Questions surrounding the actual structure of the preliminary voting communication network are growing, as a current National Election Commission official testified that during the preliminary voting period for the 6.3 local elections, the wired communication equipment malfunctioned, forcing them to connect to Wi-Fi to operate the integrated voter registry terminal.

The official, appearing on Lee Young-don TV, stated that a state of emergency arose minutes before the commencement of preliminary voting on the morning of the first day due to the communication equipment failure. At one polling station, they proceeded with the preliminary voting for two days by connecting to Wi-Fi.

He claimed that this information is also documented in the NEC's internal group chat.

Whether the whistleblower's statement is accurate requires verification through equipment and communication records. However, if the testimony is true, the NEC must answer at least three fundamental questions.

Why Did the Wired Network, Inspected Three Times, Fail Just Before Voting?

The first question is why the primary wired communication network, which had undergone three preliminary simulations and a final test the day before voting, failed to operate just before voting commenced.

The NEC stated that they conducted three simulations ahead of the local elections, focusing on equipment operation, how to use the integrated voter registry system, and procedures for responding to malfunctions. These simulations included response drills assuming unexpected situations such as communication failures and power outages.[1]

On May 28th, the day before the preliminary voting, the National Election Commission conducted a final simulation at 3,571 preliminary polling stations nationwide, assuming actual voting environments. The inspection targeted not only the preliminary voting equipment but also the integrity of the communication network.[2]

Despite this, if the communication equipment failed minutes before voting was scheduled to begin at 6 a.m. the following day, the NEC must clarify what was inspected and what results were deemed normal.

The claim of a simple malfunction is insufficient. The time and cause of the failure, the initial point of awareness, and the process of reporting and repairing the issue must all be disclosed through records.

Why Was There an Emergency on-site When the System is Designed for Automatic Switching?

The second question is why there was a connection mix-up on-site, even though the system is designed to automatically switch to a backup wireless network when the wired network fails.

The preliminary voting communication network is bifurcated into a primary wired network and a backup wireless network. The structure is designed to ensure uninterrupted communication by rapidly and automatically switching to the backup wireless network in case of a wired network failure.[3]

Actual preliminary voting simulations have tested the automatic switching between wired and wireless communication networks and the failover procedures to disaster recovery centers in the event of a central server failure.

In a properly redundant system, there would be no need for on-site staff to seek alternative connection methods or declare an emergency, stating they "might not be able to start voting." This is because the communication equipment detecting the wired network failure should automatically switch to the approved election-dedicated wireless network.

If, however, separate measures were necessary on-site, it is possible that at least one of the following did not function properly: wired network failure detection, backup network automatic switching, wireless communication equipment, or central server authentication.

Furthermore, the three simulations included drills for responding to communication failures. If the automatic switching that succeeded during the simulations failed on the actual voting day, the simulation methods and inspection results themselves must also be re-verified.

If It Was 'Wi-Fi' and Not the Wireless Network, It Conflicts with National Standards

The third question is whether the connection method mentioned by the whistleblower was actual Wi-Fi, not the election-dedicated wireless network.

These two are not the same. The election-dedicated wireless network is a backup communication channel utilizing a private LTE/5G network from a mobile carrier. In contrast, Wi-Fi is a short-range wireless communication method connecting a laptop to a router or wireless access point.

The current national standard, KS X 3264 "Standard for the Construction of Communication Systems for Polling Stations Using Integrated Voter Registry," is still in the "maintained" status and stipulates that "Wi-Fi shall not be supported" for wired and wireless communication equipment.[4]

Therefore, if the Wi-Fi mentioned by the whistleblower was actual Wi-Fi connection and not simply a misspoken term for the election-dedicated LTE/5G backup network, then both scenarios present a problem.

If the official election wired and wireless communication equipment provided Wi-Fi, it directly conflicts with the wording of the national standard. Conversely, if the official communication equipment failed and the registry terminal was connected to a separate Wi-Fi, such as a general router or a mobile phone hotspot, it means the election-dedicated communication path established according to the national standard was bypassed.

If the integrated voter registry terminal directly connected to Wi-Fi, it implies that the laptop had a functional built-in or external wireless LAN device. If the system was designed to connect to the central server only through election-dedicated communication equipment, then the reason for leaving the registry terminal with the capability to connect to external Wi-Fi must also be clarified.

KakaoTalk Originals and Connection Logs Must Be Preserved First

At present, it is not possible to conclude that actual hacking or manipulation of election data occurred based solely on the whistleblower's testimony. The possibility that the term 'Wi-Fi' used by the whistleblower referred to the election-dedicated wireless backup network also needs to be investigated.

However, this is not an issue that can be dismissed simply with the NEC stating, "It was a dedicated wireless network." The whistleblower claims that the wired equipment failure and the use of Wi-Fi are documented in internal group chats.

The NEC must immediately preserve the original contents of the chat room, the communication failure reports, records of wired/wireless automatic switching, the models and serial numbers of routers and access points used, the SSID/BSSID of the connection devices, the network connection logs of the registry terminals, and the central server authentication logs.

The core of this issue is not to immediately conclude whether hacking occurred. It lies in clarifying why the wired network, which passed three simulations and the final inspection, failed just before voting, why the automatically operating wireless backup network failed to prevent on-site confusion, and whether Wi-Fi, which is excluded by national standards, was actually used in the preliminary voting.

Elections gain trust not solely through their results. If the NEC cannot disclose communication records and equipment data, the existing explanations of "closed network," "automatic switching," and "thorough preliminary inspection" will remain mere claims by the NEC, rather than verified facts.