Soldiers on duty at the GP. [Photo=Army]

The recent installation of border barriers by North Korea is not merely the construction of defensive walls. It is a 'fortification strategy' underpinned by a meticulous calculation to blind our military and establish covert staging grounds for surprise provocations behind these concealed barriers.

If the enemy raises the fence, we must equip ourselves with higher ladders and precision strike capabilities to pierce through it. However, the current discussions within the military to reduce GP personnel are a dangerously reckless idea that forgets the fundamental nature of border security, which requires foresight and swift decision-making.

There have been no victories in military history achieved by weakening border security

There has not been a single instance of winning a war by neglecting or failing in border security in the front-line areas facing the enemy. Border security is the beginning and the end of combat. It is the 'cornea' and the 'neural network' of national security, the 'genetic code' of security guaranteeing the survival of the nation and its people, and the 'last line of survival.' No matter how sophisticated the layered weapon systems may be, if they cannot detect enemy intrusion first, they are merely pieces of scrap metal.

The case of Israel offers us a painful lesson in border security. Even Israel, boasting the world's top-tier scientific border security system, exposed vulnerabilities to the disruption and surprise attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas on October 7, 2023, despite reinforcing its border security.

This suggests that even advanced equipment can never fully replace human intuitive judgment and the immediate response of on-site personnel. Lax security centered on equipment is an act of self-harm that opens up covert infiltration routes and invasion pathways into our territory for the enemy.

Border security centered on artificial intelligence, without the support of border personnel, makes immediate action difficult, even with borrowed eyes. Scientific equipment is merely an auxiliary means for border security; the main force that ultimately identifies and deters the enemy is the on-site personnel possessing senses and judgment. Even if sensors are triggered, if there are no border 'personnel' to deploy, the enemy will breach our defense lines through various means.

Past cases of 'knock-and-defect' or 'wait-and-defect' by our military starkly illustrated the security loopholes that emerge when the density of on-site border personnel is compromised. If those incidents had been infiltrations by armed guerrillas instead of defections, the front-line units would have been annihilated.

Further reducing the already insufficient border personnel now is a grave error that allows covert infiltration, not just an operational failure but an act that jeopardizes national existence. In a situation where the enemy, viewing the Republic of Korea as a belligerent nation, is preparing asymmetrical provocations behind the Military Demarcation Line fence, discussing the reduction of GP personnel is tantamount to sending an invitation to the enemy saying, "Infiltrate anytime."

For a fickle enemy, self-reliance is the answer, not begging for peace

The Iran-Iraq War proved that overwhelming military power can neutralize an enemy's sacrificial cohesion. In the grave situation where US-China hegemony competition is expected to intensify and concentrate on the Korean Peninsula, reducing GP personnel is an act of security suicide.

To prevent the security vacuum caused by GP personnel reduction, instead of hasty personnel adjustments, we must first implement phased verification of advanced technologies such as AI, drones, and quantum communication, re-employ skilled veterans by establishing dedicated border brigades, and build a response system based on mutually beneficial complex towns for civilians and the military in border areas.

Concurrently, we must complete an offensive surveillance system utilizing miniature satellites and drones, conduct unannounced inspections of equipment and ammunition status for front-line units, strengthen the 'take action first, report later' authority of junior officers to maximize on-site response capabilities, and above all, cease political disciplinary actions and consumption wars that use the military as a tool for political strife, and create an environment solely dedicated to practical preparedness, which is the only path to national survival.

Security stems from strong deterrence, and that deterrence is only complete when the enemy is instilled with the fear that the North Korean regime itself will face its end the moment it provokes. Reducing troops citing the demographic cliff is not the solution. Cautiously examining a 6-month conscription for women and maintaining an overwhelming border posture that allows not even a sliver of an opening is the only way to protect the Republic of Korea.

For a fickle enemy, it is more advantageous for survival to find our own path to victory rather than begging for peace. Those in the security apparatus who offer advice to the Ministry of National Defense must remember that a border gap is a path to national ruin. There is no second place in border security and national defense; only 'victory' guarantees true peace. The security apparatus must immediately learn the philosophy of border security, and the military must tighten its grip on border vigilance once more.

◆ Commissioner Park Pil-kyu

Editorial Committee Member, Hankook Military-Journal

40th graduating class, Korea Military Academy