Memories of the 5·18 Democratization Movement have long remained scattered, failing to converge into a single, unified meaning. The new book, "Memories of Two Gunshots, Tears of Two Gwangjus," brings together two documents at the heart of these complex memories in a single volume.

Part 1 contains the full original text of the "Report on the Truth of the Gwangju Incident," produced by the Joint Government Investigation Team led by Major General Lee Gwang-ro.

In 1980, President Choi Kyu-hah ordered General Lee Gwang-ro to investigate the full account of the Gwangju Incident. General Lee organized an investigation team and surveyed 18 regions, including Gwangju, Mokpo, and Naju, over seven days from June 5 to June 11, 1980.

“The list of officials to be held accountable identified by General Lee Gwang-ro was clear: Yoon Heung-jung, Commander of the Combat Training Command; Jeong Woong, Commander of the 31st Infantry Division; and Ahn Byeong-ha, Director of the South Jeolla Provincial Police Agency. From the report’s perspective, they were at the center of issues involving command responsibility, faulty operational directives, failure of initial police response, and command voids. In addition, certain police commanders were held accountable for desertion, the theft of weapons, the abandonment of equipment, and the concealment of arms. However, the recommendations were not implemented. Although the responsibilities were laid out on paper, they never crossed the threshold of reality.” - From the Preface

What would have happened if President Choi Kyu-hah had punished those individuals according to the Joint Government Investigation Team's recommendations? Perhaps Gwangju would not have remained a subject of such intense controversy.

Part 2 translates and includes declassified CIA documents, including: the CIA Situation Reports from May 24 and 27, 1980; the NIC Warning Memorandum agenda from June 1980; the 1983 analysis of anti-Chun Doo-hwan factions; the 1985 report on the rise of anti-American incidents; the 1987 analysis of the radicalization of the anti-establishment movement in Korea; and the 1988 document on the prospects for South Korea post-Olympics.

These documents demonstrate that U.S. intelligence agencies did not view Gwangju as a mere local disturbance, but rather connected it to the legitimacy of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the political role of the South Korean military, the spread of anti-American sentiment, the potential for North Korean propaganda and provocations, and the long-term burden on U.S.-Korea relations.

The CIA documents provide a perspective different from domestic reports surrounding Gwangju. While the Lee Gwang-ro investigation report focused on on-site surveys and the issue of responsibility within public authorities, the CIA documents analyze how South Korean politics would sway after Gwangju, how the narrative of U.S. responsibility and anti-Americanism would spread, and how North Korea might attempt to exploit the chaos in the South, all within a long-term security framework.

"Memories of Two Gunshots, Tears of Two Gwangjus" does not simply repeat one side of the story. By presenting the original documents, translations, victim statistics, details on the theft of weapons, lists of those held accountable, and CIA intelligence assessments together, it awaits the reader's judgment. If the debate surrounding the memory of Gwangju is still ongoing, this book serves as a record that presents both the primary source material that should be the starting point of that debate and the perspective of an external intelligence agency.