[Photo by Hanmi Ilbo Graphics]

Table of Contents

① A National Investigation Without Witness Testimony is like a 'Steamed Bun Without the Red Bean Filling'

② The Full Story of the June 3rd Election Management the National Investigation Must Uncover

③ Constitutional Amendment is a Long-Term Task; The Law on Courts for Rebellion Cases Must Be Applied

The National Election Commission's Truth Commission has concluded that the election management for the June 3rd local elections was a "total failure."

According to the preliminary investigation results announced by the Election Commission on the 19th, additional ballots were sent to 140 out of 14,288 polling stations nationwide, actual ballots were used in 91 stations, and voting was temporarily suspended in 26 stations. There was a shortage of 7,194 ballots, and the suspension times ranged from a minimum of 4 minutes to a maximum of 105 minutes.

However, this is not the conclusion of the national investigation, but its starting point. It is necessary to go beyond the figures confirmed by the Election Commission's self-investigation to reveal who made such decisions, what happened on the ground, and ultimately, how many voters were disenfranchised.

Who Lowered the Minimum Print Count from 60% to 50%?

According to reports based on data submitted by the Election Commission to the National Assembly, this standard change was processed through internal executive decisions by the Secretary-General and the Director of Election Policy, without a formal meeting of the Central Committee in December 2025. While the intention was to reduce leftover ballots and prevent unnecessary suspicion, no proper guidelines were established for situations where ballots were insufficient.

The special committee for the national investigation must identify who first proposed the 50% figure and its statistical basis. It also needs to verify whether analyses were conducted on regional turnout rates for both in-person and early voting, the proportion of elderly voters, and the fluctuations in turnout for each election.

It is also crucial to understand why a change in the printing standard, which could affect citizens' voting rights, was handled by the Secretariat's executive decision rather than the Central Committee. If former Chairman Noh Tae-ak did not receive the report, it indicates a collapse in the reporting system; if he received it and took no action, then he bears management responsibility.

The Whereabouts of Unnumbered Ballots and Serial Numbers

The second agenda item concerns the continuity of management from ballot printing to use and collection.

In Songpa-gu, the reserve unnumbered ballots, which should have been prepared according to regulations, were not distributed sufficiently. After the shortage occurred, staff hastily wrote serial numbers and sent them to the field. Reports also emerged indicating that in the urgency of the situation, some ballots were sent without serial numbers, leading to confusion as numbers were written manually at the polling stations.

The special committee for the national investigation must link all additional ballots to their printed quantity, serial number, custodian, dispatch time, transporter, vehicle, recipient, quantity used, remaining quantity, and return status.

While it is not necessary to use the term "chain of custody" as in criminal evidence management, the principle that the record of the entire process, from who received and transferred how many at what time, must be continuous and unbroken is the same.

If ballots were brought from other polling stations, it must be matched to which station they came from, how many, and what the remaining quantity was at that station. Ballot boxes must also be verified for their sealing time, seal number, transporter, accompanying observers, vehicle route, and receipt and opening times at the counting center.

An election is not a process where confidence is secured solely by matching the final numbers. The entire process, from the moment the ballots are produced until they are confirmed as the counting results, must be recorded.

Why Did the Communication Network, Checked Three Times, Stop?

The third agenda item concerns the early voting communication network and voter identification devices.

A whistleblower, identifying as a current Election Commission employee, claimed to have witnessed the use of a network terminal after connecting to Wi-Fi due to a communication equipment failure at an early voting site. Vulnerabilities in the modification of electronic data and voter identification procedures were also raised.

These claims have not yet been confirmed as fact. However, given the assertion of specific locations and the existence of internal KakaoTalk records, these are matters that the national investigation must verify.

The special committee must secure records of the wired network failure time and cause, the type of wireless access equipment, the person who initiated the connection, connection logs between the terminal and the server, and remote access records of the maintenance company.

It must be clarified through technical appraisal whether general Wi-Fi was used or if field personnel referred to a separate wireless communication device managed by the Election Commission as "Wi-Fi." It is not a matter of pre-selecting one of the Election Commission's explanations or the whistleblower's claims. The connection logs and equipment must provide the answers.

For the voter identification devices, for which hundreds of millions of won were spent on replacement just before the general election, their purpose, performance tests, field inspections, and any failure records on election day must all be verified. If confusion occurred in voter identification and communication processes despite equipment replacement, procurement and inspection responsibilities must also be investigated.

Was the Counting Proceeding During Extended Voting Appropriate?

At polling station No. 2 in Jamsil 7-dong, voting was extended until 10 PM for voters who received waiting tickets due to a ballot shortage. In other areas during the same time, counting and broadcast of the count were underway.

While this cannot be immediately concluded as illegal, it must be examined how the continued voting by some citizens, while counting results were being disclosed in real-time, could have affected the fairness of the election and the act of voting.

It is necessary to ascertain who decided to extend the voting time and in consultation with the National Election Commission, on what basis the remaining voters were granted the right to vote, whether the progress of the count was communicated to the field, and how late-arriving ballot boxes were segregated and stored.

Specifically, if counting began while voting was ongoing, the voting end time, the counting start time, and the ballot box receipt and opening times must be precisely matched minute by minute.

Are the Actual Victims Only 12 People?

The Election Commission's investigation confirmed that 12 voters who received waiting tickets at Jamsil 7-dong polling station No. 2 did not vote. However, this number does not represent the full scale of disenfranchisement.

It is difficult to ascertain from existing records alone those who left the line after being told there were no ballots, those who went home without waiting for a long time, those who did not receive waiting tickets, and those who were not aware of the resumption of voting.

Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive comparison of hourly voter numbers at the 26 polling stations where voting was suspended, integrated voter registration confirmation records, waiting ticket issuance and return records, CCTV footage, and records of complaints and reports. If necessary, fact-finding surveys should be conducted among voters in the relevant areas.

The Questions This National Investigation Must Answer Are Not Complicated.

> Who reduced the number of ballots?

> Who knew of the risk of shortage but let it happen?

> What irregularities and illegalities occurred on the ground?

> As a result, how many citizens were unable to vote?

It is possible to investigate the Election Commission's disciplinary issues, such as overseas trips or evasion-type leaves of absence. However, if these issues take center stage, the direct line of responsibility for disenfranchisement may become blurred.

First, the decisions and execution on election day, the movement and management of ballots and ballot boxes, and the actual scale of damage must be determined. That is the essence of a national investigation.