The special counsel team led by Lee Tae-han, tasked with investigating the broad suspicions surrounding the June 3rd election fraud, has finally assembled its team and entered the preparatory stage for a full-scale investigation. Some observers are harboring doubts regarding the expertise and election investigation capabilities of the appointed assistant special prosecutors, expressing anxiety that the special counsel team—appointed by the Lee Jae-myung administration—might simply grant absolution by downplaying the election fraud allegations. In this light, is serializing its [Old Articles] series, selecting and re-uploading reports previously covered in other media to provide information regarding election fraud. expects the special counsel team to focus on the fact that South Korea's election statistics have been so inexplicable that they would require rewriting mathematics textbooks worldwide. We urge the team to exert every effort not only in addressing ballot count manipulation but also in rooting out and prosecuting the entities that artificially manipulated the 'vote share' rates. [Editor's Note]

[Exclusive] Continuous Suspicions Surrounding Early Voting... 'Auditing' is the Answer

Computer Science Ph.D. Jang Jae-eon Offers Solution to Solve 'Mystery'

“Circumstances suggest one out of every three ballots in this year's general election was digitally inflated”

Computer auditing could verify whether fake votes were inserted

Based on statistical laws, People Power Party would have 142 seats… Democratic Party 109

As statistical values that are physically impossible on Earth emerge from the 22nd National Assembly election data released by election authorities, deepening suspicions, it has been argued that election fraud can be verified through an audit of the election management system. [Image re-processed by AI]

A solution has been proposed to solve the mystery of early voting results that defy statistical science. As it is a surprisingly simple method to verify whether or not the April 10 general election involved fraud, it is expected to garner significant attention.

In this 22nd National Assembly election, the Democratic Party’s early voting share was more than 10% higher than their same-day voting share in all 425 'dong' (neighborhoods) in Seoul. Based on statistics released by the National Election Commission (NEC), the Democratic Party's lead in early voting was 14.6% in Yongsan-gu, 13.6% in Jung-gu/Seongdong-gu A, 12.8% in Seongbuk-gu B, 12.3% in Gangbuk-gu A, 12.3% in Dobong-gu B, 12.0% in Eunpyeong-gu A, 11.9% in Nowon-gu A, and 11.8% in Dongdaemun-gu B. In those same districts, a corresponding negative (-) value was derived for the People Power Party (PPP).

In four districts including Seocho-gu A and Gangnam-gu A, B, and C, while PPP candidates received more early votes than Democratic candidates in some neighborhoods like Sinsa-dong, Apgujeong-dong, Cheongdam-dong, and Suseo-dong, the total number of early votes in these areas still significantly outperformed the number of same-day votes.

Ultimately, early voting played a decisive role in determining the outcome of the election.

However, these results violate the 'Law of Large Numbers,' a fundamental principle of statistical science.

The law states that if the population is the same, the sample groups should be identical or differ only by a very small margin (±1%). Some interpret this by claiming that early voters have a tendency to support the Democratic Party, but this is merely a fictional claim that has never been proven. By the same logic, it would mean that conservative voters who did not participate in early voting should have voted overwhelmingly in the same-day election across all 425 neighborhoods, but such a phenomenon did not occur.

According to statistics, the possibility of an anomalous result in one or two neighborhoods cannot be entirely ruled out. However, the probability of the same result occurring 425 times in a row does not exist on this planet.

Specifically, the probability of the same result occurring 100 times in a row involves the number 1 followed by 30 zeros. This is a unit called 'quetta,' which was first introduced at the 2022 General Conference on Weights and Measures (CGPM). The probability of it occurring 425 times consecutively is nearly infinite and cannot be expressed with current measurement units. Mathematicians state that it is impossible to calculate with ordinary computers.

However, this pattern emerged again in this April 10 general election, following the April 15 general election in 2020, becoming an unsolved mystery among scientists.

Intellectuals are debating whether the results posted on the NEC website after the election are erroneous or if they were artificially manipulated.

A former head of the computer division of the Defense Security Command (DSC) has provided the key to solving this mystery.

Jang Jae-eon (69, KMA 34th Class), a computer science Ph.D. from the University of Oregon who built and operated the DSC's integrated computer system, met with reporters on the 21st and claimed, "Circumstances have been detected suggesting that for every three ballots cast by Seoul voters in the 22nd National Assembly election, one ballot was digitally inflated and added to the Democratic Party candidate's total."

According to Dr. Jang, the statistics released by the NEC appear to be the result of specific input values. He explained, "If you input the command 'If count=3, then count=count+1' into the election management program, all statistics will match exactly."

He noted that because of this, no statistical anomalies where early voting and same-day voting are reversed were found, and the value of early votes minus same-day votes converges to '0,' which does not violate the Law of Large Numbers.

For this reason, Dr. Jang metaphorically described this computational inference as a process of descending from the "realm of God," where such results are statistically impossible, to the "realm of man."

Based on NEC statistics for the Jongno-gu district in Seoul, Democratic candidate Kwak Sang-eon received 44,713 votes, defeating PPP candidate Choi Jae-hyung (38,752 votes). The gap between the two is 5,961 votes.

An input value of "adding 1 for every multiple of 3" effectively means there is a digital "ghost" count equal to one-fourth (25%) of the total votes. If the election program was operated to add this much to the Democratic candidate, subtracting that value would estimate the candidate's actual vote count, which would be 33,534. This is the result of subtracting 11,178 votes—25% of the total—from the 44,713 votes announced by the NEC. Under this hypothesis, candidate Kwak would have trailed candidate Choi by 5,218 votes (38,752 - 33,534), losing the election, and the PPP candidate would have been elected.

He presented his research findings that the input value to bring the deviation between early and same-day voting to a reasonable level, based on the Law of Large Numbers, is the surprisingly simple "3+1." In other words, he inferred that it is the result of one free vote being added digitally for every three votes.

Naturally, this so-called "inflated" digital value must differ from the physical ballot count.

If 90 actual ballots are counted at the polling station and reported to the NEC server, the NEC computer program would register 120 votes (90+30) on the counting screen.

Accordingly, an audit can confirm whether even fake physical ballots were inserted.

On the dawn of the 11th, at the Yeungnam University gymnasium counting station in Daegu, observers raised objections after discovering identical marks (yellow circle) in the same shape, size, and position on early voting ballots cast in different locations. Provided by informant

“The probability of the same result for 425 consecutive early votes does not exist on Earth”

Multiple ballots suspected of fraud appeared again this time… Officials 'shocked'

President Yoon and Interior Minister Lee's resolution needed to resolve national suspicion

Following the April 15 general election four years ago, a large number of ballots suspected of fraud appeared again in this April 10 general election, shocking observers and NEC officials.

For instance, at a Daegu counting station around 2:30 AM on the 11th, the day after the main election, a commotion arose when early voting ballots from different outside-district voting locations were found to have toner-like marks of the exact same shape, size, and position.

One early voting ballot was stamped by the early voting management officer of Sora-myeon, Yeosu, Jeonnam, while another had the stamp of the management officer of Gohyeon-dong. There are three Gohyeon-dong locations nationwide: Geoje in Gyeongnam, Yeongju in Gyeongbuk, and Osan in Gyeonggi. The location can be identified by finding the name of the voting management officer, Kim Min-ja.

However, regardless of the location, they are physically very far from Sora-myeon, Yeosu, yet the toner-like marks on the top of the early ballots are astonishingly identical in shape, size, and position. It is possible to hypothesize that fake early voting ballots printed by a machine were secretly inserted into the ballot box and witnessed at the counting station.

Dr. Jang's inference reduces the possibility of direct external hacking by hostile countries like China or North Korea, which many had feared. This is contrary to the inference many citizens concerned about election fraud had leaned toward following the joint inspection of the NEC by the National Intelligence Service last October.

If North Korea or others were to manipulate digital values through hacking, the number would differ from the physical ballots coming out of the counting station, forcing observers or party-recommended commissioners to raise objections. However, if the operation is internal to the NEC, they can insert fake physical ballots to match the converted values. This means there must be an offline accomplice for whoever changed the online input values from the inside.

The NEC stores the digital seals of early voting management officers. Figures such as former PPP interim leader Han Dong-hoon demanded a system change where management officers personally stamp their seals, but the NEC did not accept this until the end. If someone with malicious intent abuses the digital image of a voting management officer, there is a structural loophole where, theoretically, large quantities of fake ballots could be produced.

For this reason, Dr. Jang emphasized that President Yoon Suk-yeol and Minister of the Interior and Safety Lee Sang-min must conduct a lightning "audit" of the election management program to resolve national suspicion. State agency computer programs are legally required to undergo audits. Dr. Jang is an expert who has personally audited institutions such as the Korea Securities Depository to identify problems.

He estimated, "While hacking and manipulation by North Korea are possible, matching the digital numbers to physical ballots is impossible; thus, the scope narrows to an internal act within the NEC. Since those who built and operated the election management system may have had a hand in it, the government must conduct an 'audit' of the election program to dispel national suspicions."

According to Dr. Jang, an audit can be more efficient than compulsory investigations such as raids and forensics on NEC servers. He argues that the administration can lessen the burden of political pressure, it is free from fairness controversies since the election has ended, and it does not require looking into voter information, thus avoiding misunderstandings of government election interference.

There is another reason why an audit is efficient in identifying whether election fraud occurred.

If someone with malicious intent inside the NEC inserted input values to derive different results, it could be detected immediately during the audit process. If someone intentionally deletes the input values in preparation for an external audit, the results would inevitably differ from the final vote counts reported from each counting station to the NEC, allowing evidence of artificial manipulation to be discovered through what is known in military terms as an 'After Action Review.' This process is like "reviewing a game" in Baduk (Go). By calculating the final vote results in reverse, one can see if they match the counting results reported from each region. If the program was tampered with, these values can never match.

Dr. Jang emphasized, "If 10 IT auditors inspect the computer operating system managed by the computer department on the NEC website, all suspicions can be cleared."

He added an interesting inference. In this general election, a phenomenon where the number of voters exceeded the number of electors by one or two occurred commonly in many voting districts.

He interpreted this as a phenomenon supporting the possibility of an "input value." According to Dr. Jang, if it was programmed in Seoul to add one ballot for every multiple of 3, but the voting ended at a value of 2 or 1, a mismatch between the number of voters and the number of electors occurred. He explains that while the number of voters and electors would match if 1 is added at every multiple of 3, if the voting closes before reaching 3, it stops as there are no more ballots. This, he interprets, is why the statistics showing one or two more voters than electors appeared.

Dr. Jang, KMA 34th Class, earned a master's degree in computer science from the Naval Postgraduate School in the U.S. and, as the first KMA graduate to do so, received a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Oregon. He also served as a professor at the Korea National Defense University. He is a computer expert who designed the integrated computer program for the DSC to block hacking and track and apprehend anti-state suspects, and he personally commanded the 30-member DSC computer team composed of elite agents.

Meanwhile, there are 52 Democratic Party lawmakers who were elected despite losing to PPP candidates in same-day voting.

If one assumes that the results of the same-day voting were reflected in early voting according to the Law of Large Numbers, and calculates the number of seats accordingly, the Democratic Party would decrease from 161 to 109 seats, and the PPP would increase from 90 to 142 seats. It would be 109:142 between the Democratic Party and the PPP.

In a phone call with our reporter on the 22nd, an NEC official denied the operation of a computer system that adds one vote to a specific candidate for every three votes, stating, "As far as I know, it does not seem that votes are being pushed toward a specific candidate," and "Our (computer department) system simply releases the data reported by the committee, and we do not do things like that (pushing votes)."

Regarding an external audit of the computer program, he added, "I'm not sure exactly what you are referring to, but we did receive security consulting from the NIS last year," and "There were many incidents last year, so we sometimes had visits from the prosecution, and we have also had many visits from the Board of Audit and Inspection, the NIS, various committees, and the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, so it is ambiguous to say that we received a specific audit for our computer systems."

As of September 2026, Dr. Jang Jae-eon maintains his consistent stance that the election was fraudulent due to computer manipulation, and he expects the special counsel team to produce a flawless investigation result without a single doubt through thorough forensics of the servers. Dr. Jang, recently met at Olympic Park, is presenting his opinion on computer data analysis. [Photo = Reporter Heo Gyeom]

Reporter Heo Gyeom